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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three chapters on the youth and low-skilled labor markets.
In Chapter 1, I show that teen employment is significantly more responsive than adult em-
ployment to immigration, and that growth in low-skilled immigration appears to be a partial
explanation for recent declines in teen employment rates. Using variation in immigrant shares
across metropolitan areas between 1980 and 2000, I demonstrate that the impact of immigration
on youth employment is at least twice as large as the impact on adults, and that immigration
affects school enrollment decisions and the type of jobs held by native youth. These effects are
strongest for black youth and youth from poorer and less educated families. The estimates sug-
gest that a 10 percentage point increase in the immigrant share of a city's low-skilled population
reduces the teen employment rate by 5 percentage points, implying that between one-third and
one-half of the fall in teen employment between 1990 and 2005 can be explained by increased
immigration.
In Chapter 2, co-authored with David H. Autor and Alan Manning, we offer a fresh analysis
of the effect of state and federal minimum wages on earnings inequality over 1979 to 2007,
exploiting substantially longer state-level wage panels than were available to earlier analyses
as well as a proliferation of recent state minimum wage laws. We obtain identification using
cross-state and over-time variation in the 'bite' of federal and applicable state minimum wages,
as per influential studies by Lee (1999) and Teulings (2000, 2003). Distinct from this work,
we use statutory minimum wages as instrumental variables for the bite of the minimum wage,
thereby purging simultaneity bias stemming from errors-in-variables, which we hypothesize
causes upward bias in prior OLS estimates. While we uphold the finding that the minimum
wage reduces inequality in the lower tail of the wage distribution, we estimate that earlier OLS
models overestimate this impact greatly-by 150 to 450 percent. Models purged of simultaneity
bias indicate that the minimum wage explains at most one-third of the rapid rise in inequality
during the 1980s, and a comparable share of the more modest subsequent rise. These impacts
are still larger than would be implied by a simple mechanical application of the minimum to
the distribution, suggesting spillovers. We identify these spillovers by structurally estimating
the latent wage distribution, calculating the mechanical effect of the minimum wage through
truncation, and inferring spillovers by comparison of the mechanical and observed distributions.
Spillovers account for one-third to one-half of the minimum's modest impact on percentiles in
the lower tail of the wage distribution. Their magnitude has declined in parallel with the direct
effects of the minimum, though their share of the total effect has risen.
In Chapter 3, I explore the extent to which polarization in the adult labor market-i.e. a
gradual increase in the share of adults working in the highest and lowest paying occupations,
caused by technology-induced (computers) changes in labor demand-has impacted youth em-
ployment. I show that, since 1980, teen employment rates fell more in states and commuting
zones for which the share of adults in low-paying occupations increased the most. I also find
that this measure of polarization is strongly associated with lower teen and low-skilled adult
wages, and more weakly associated with lower employment rates for low-skilled adults. These
results can be rationalized in a model of local labor markets for which a reduction in the price
of computing capital reduces labor demand for middle-income, routine-task intensive (manu-
facturing) jobs, pushing these workers into lower-paying service jobs. This chapter therefore
provides evidence that a portion of the recent decline in youth employment is attributable to a
reduction in labor demand for youth, due to an increase in the supply of substituable labor (i.e.
the gradual movement of less-educated adults from middle-paying to lower-paying occupations).
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Chapter 1
"Dude, Where's My Job?" The
Impact of Immigration on the Youth
Labor Market
1.1 Introduction
The summer employment rate for high school-aged teenagers fell by over ten percentage points
between the early 1990s and 2005. No other age group experienced such a dramatic decline in
employment over this period. Declining teen employment rates have frequently been discussed
by the press and policy communities 1, but there is little research exploring the causes of this
trend. Potential explanations for this decline include growth in the use of high stakes testing and
exit exam requirements (Smith 2008), greater labor market competition from other less-skilled
workers such as immigrants and single mothers, and increased emphasis on high school and
college education (Aaronson, Park and Sullivan 2006). Understanding why youth are less likely
to work is important because some explanations (increased schooling) suggest that lost work
experience is replaced with other forms of human capital, while other explanations (greater
competition from low-skilled workers) do not necessarily have this implication.
The recent, large influx of less-educated and younger adult immigrants might seem to offer
1For example, Bureau of Labor Statistics 2002 and Sudeep Reddy, "Teen Behavior Offers Clue To Why Jobless
Rate Stays Low Despite Slowing Growth", The Wall Street Journal, June 18, 2007.
a potential explanation, but previous research generally estimates a small to modest impact of
immigration on native adult low-skilled employment (Altonji and Card 1991 and Card 2001).
Extrapolating from this existing evidence, one might conclude that the effect of immigration
on teen employment is also minimal. Nevertheless, the actual youth employment response may
be quite different than the adult response. On one hand, since adult low-skilled immigrants
typically have more work experience than native teens, they may work in jobs that are less
common among youth-so immigration may have an even smaller effect on teen employment
than it does on adult employment. If there is some degree of labor market competition between
immigrants and teens, however, youth labor supply may be more responsive to immigration
because teens have fewer financial constraints that necessitate their labor income, teens can
substitute time from labor to schooling and class work in addition to leisure, and teens' job
search is more geographically constrained.
This paper analyzes the effects of immigration on teen employment outcomes and the type
of jobs held by youth, and considers why these effects may differ between teens and adults,
and within the youth population. Using Census microdata, I identify the impact of low-skill
immigration on labor market outcomes for youth age 16 and 17 using variation in immigrant
concentration across 100 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) between 1980 and 2000. I
compare these estimates to similar estimates for adults. To overcome the potential endogeneity
of immigrant geographic concentration, I implement an empirical strategy commonly used in
the literature by instrumenting the immigrant share of the city's population with a measure of
predicted immigrant shares, where predicted shares are based on the geographic distribution of
pre-existing immigrant stocks in 1970.
The paper has two key findings. First, I show that low-skilled immigration has a stronger
effect on the employment rate of teens than on the employment rate of less educated adults:
a 10 percentage point increase in the immigrant share of the low-skilled population (which
is slightly larger than the average increase across cities between 1990 and 2000) reduces the
percentage of teens employed in the reference week by 4.8 percentage points. This is over three
times the percentage point effect for adults, and the difference is even larger relative to baseline
employment rates. I estimate that the number of employed low-skill native adults falls by 12 and
the number of employed native youth falls by 4 for every 100 low-skilled immigrants that enter
an MSA, so excluding youth from the analysis significantly underestimates the employment
impact of immigration. Employment effects of this magnitude explain some-but not all-of
the fall in teen employment since the mid-1990s. Differences in labor supply elasticities can
partially explain why immigration effects are larger for youth than adults.
The second major finding is that immigration has larger disemployment effects relative to
baseline employment rates on native youth who come from poorer families or are minorities.
These are populations with traditionally low employment rates, and a considerable amount of
research attention has been devoted to documenting and explaining lower employment for black
youth in particular (Freeman and Holzer 1986; Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist 1998). I show that the
employment effects of immigration are proportionately larger for these youth partially because
they are more likely to live in urban centers, which is also where low-skilled immigrants are most
concentrated. I also demonstrate that school enrollment rates for these populations increase
slightly in response to immigration.
Only two recent studies examine the effect of immigration on youth outcomes. Aaronson,
Park and Sullivan (2006) consider an extensive set of explanations for recent declines in youth
employment. They test immigration as a cause by extending the Mariel boatlift analysis from
Card (1990) to the youth labor market, and find that teen employment rates in Miami increased
more than they did in comparable cities after the arrival of many low-skilled Cuban immigrants.
Although this evidence is suggestive, it comes from a single case study, and average immigration
effects across all cities may be different. Sum, Harrington, and Kathiwada (2006) uses 2003
American Community Survey data to estimate the cross-state relationship between the relative
size of immigrant inflows into a state and employment rates for young natives (age 16-24). They
find that a 1 percentage point increase in a state's population due to immigration is associated
with a 1.2 percentage point reduction in the employment rate for young adults. Since this is
a point-in-time relationship, it may not represent a causal estimate of immigration effects in a
state over time.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 describes the data I use for this analysis, and
provides a brief description of trends in teen employment. Section 1.3 demonstrates that youth
employment is more responsive than adult employment to immigration, and shows that larger
labor supply elasticities for teens in combination with a binding minimum wage can explain the
sizeable employment effects. Section 1.4 demonstrates that employment effects are proportion-
ally larger for youth from less advantaged backgrounds, and tests explanations for this finding.
Section 1.5 concludes by estimating the contribution of immigration to recent youth employment
trends, and discussing welfare consequences of immigration on the youth population.
1.2 Data
My empirical analysis uses 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS)
from the Decennial Census. Immigrant shares for an MSA are derived from the 1980, 1990, and
2000 5 percent samples. Following the literature, an individual is categorized as an immigrant
if he or she reports being born abroad and being either a naturalized citizen or a non-citizen.
Natives are all other individuals, regardless of their parents' citizenship status. Throughout
most of the analysis, I instrument immigrant shares in 1980, 1990, and 2000 with a measure of
predicted immigrant shares, where predicted shares are based on native and immigrant stocks
in 1970 (as explained further in section 1.3.2). Immigrant and native stocks in 1970 are derived
from the 1 percent Form 1 Metro and State samples. For some specifications, I also include the
2005 American Community Survey (ACS) 2.
Natives age 16 and 17 are the primary population of interest in this analysis. A key reason
to focus on this population is that the fall in employment since 1990 is largest for this age group
(Figure 1.1). Younger ages cannot be included, since employment status in the Census is not
asked of individuals less than 16 years old. I exclude 18 year olds, because the primary focus
of this research is on the labor market impact of immigration for those still in school and some
18 year olds may have graduated (or have been eligible to do so) by the time of the Census.
The data appendix provides further details on sample selection and the construction of wage
measures from the Census.
Figure 1.1 displays trends in the average annual employment rate for teen and low-skilled
adults. Until the mid-1990s, youth and adult employment rates trended together, and adult
2The ACS has been administered annually by the Census Bureau since 2000, and generally asks the same
questions as the Census Long Form. However, the survey is administered throughout the year, and public use
data does not include a monthly identifier. As a result, I do not pool Decennial Census and ACS data in
my primary specifications when considering outcomes with seasonal variability, such as employment or school
enrollment probabilities in the previous week. I include 2005 ACS data in some robustness checks.
employment rates exceeded youth rates by about 30 percentage points. The tight labor mar-
ket of the late-1990s was characterized by rising adult employment, yet over these years teen
employment rates remained stable at about 35 percent. Hence, teen employment began falling
relative to adult employment in the mid-1990s. Although youth employment participation
is highly seasonal, declining employment occurred during both the summer and non-summer
months (Figure 1.2). Employment participation and wages are higher for non-blacks and teens
from more highly educated or wealthier families (Appendix Table 1.A1), though trends in the
employment-population rate are comparable across all categories of youth over this period3 .
Throughout this paper, immigration effects are estimated using variation in immigrant
concentration across 100 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs). Individuals from the 100
MSAs with the largest average population size between 1970 and 2005 and which are consistently
coded over all decades are included in the analysis. Immigrants are highly clustered in cities:
over 70 percent of all low-skilled immigrants live in these MSAs. Table 1.1 displays low skilled
immigrant shares for the included MSAs that have the highest and lowest immigrant shares
in 1980. Two facts stand out. First, by 2000 immigrants make up over half of the low skilled
adult population for the majority of the high immigrant MSAs. Second, the locational pattern
of immigration changes across decades. Between 1980 and 1990, new immigrants tended to go
where old immigrants had already settled, and so the immigrant share in high immigrant MSAs
increased more than it did in areas that had fewer immigrants. After 1990, immigrants began
settling in different areas - for instance, the low skilled immigrant share increased from 1.5 to
10 percent in Greensboro between 1990 and 2000.
The younger and less educated immigrant population has grown substantially in size since
1990 (Figure 1.3). Given somewhat similar levels of education and work experience, it is
plausible that this group of immigrants may compete with native youth in the labor market. As
shown in Table 1.2, there is some overlap in occupations common among low-skilled immigrants
and youth. Male youth and low skilled adult immigrants tend to be cooks, stock handlers, and
janitors, while female youth and adult immigrants tend to be cashiers and saleswomen.
3Graphs available upon request.
1.3 Labor Market Impact of Immigration
1.3.1 Empirical Strategy and OLS Estimates
To estimate the impact of immigration on natives, I regress labor market outcomes for natives on
a measure of low-skilled immigrant concentration for MSA c in year t, individual-level controls,
and MSA and year fixed effects. Potential measures of immigrant concentration include the
log of the low-skilled immigrant stock, the ratio of low-skilled immigrants to natives, and the
immigrant share of the low-skilled population. Converted into the impact of one more immigrant
into an MSA on the number of employed natives, the immigration effects that I estimate are
similar regardless of how immigrant concentration is measured. Following much of the literature
(Altonji and Card 1990; Borjas 2003, 2005; Ottaviano and Peri 2006), I use immigrant shares
as the primary regressor of interest, where shares are defined as Ic+ and Ict and Nt are
low-skilled immigrant and native adult stocks, respectively4 .
Figures 1.4A and 1.4B illustrate the main empirical result of this section. There is a strong
negative relationship between changes in the low-skilled immigrant share of an MSA and changes
in the youth employment rate of an MSA between 1980 and 2000. The relationship between
changes in low-skilled immigrant shares and adult employment rates is much weaker.
The primary empirical specification for this analysis is:
Yict = yPct + OXi + ac + at + Eict (1.1)
The regressor of interest, Pet, is the immigrant share of the low skilled population in MSA c
and year t as defined above. The dependent variable yict is one outcome from a set of labor
market outcomes reported in the Census, including a dummy for employed last year, a dummy
for employed last week, and hours worked in the last year (defined as weeks worked multiplied
by usual hours worked per week). Individual-level controls (Xi) are age, age squared, race
dummies, and gender dummies. Results from OLS estimates of y in equation (1.1), separately
4Borjas (2003) and (2005) argue that estimated immigration effects tend to be larger when using national
variation in immigrant concentration within education-experience groups, and that estimates are smaller in
magnitude when geographic variation is also introduced. Since teens represent a single education-experience
group, I am unable to estimate immigration effects using only national-level variation. However, the employment
effects that I estimate for low-skilled adults using geographic and time variation are quite similar to what Borjas
finds for this population using only variation in immigrant concentration in national experience cells over time.
for native teens and low-skilled adults, are shown in Table 1.3.
OLS estimates of (1.1) suggest that immigration has a large negative effect on teen em-
ployment outcomes. A 10 percentage point increase in the low-skilled immigrant share of the
population is estimated to reduce the proportion of teens employed in the reference week by 4.6
percent, the proportion employed in the last year by 5.2 percent, and annual hours worked (un-
conditional on employment) by 33. For comparison, the low-skilled immigrant share of an MSA
increased on average by 8 percentage points between 1990 and 2000. The estimated magnitude
of these effects is at least three times as large as adult estimates, depending on the outcome
variable considered.
1.3.2 Instrumental Variables Estimates
Empirical Strategy
OLS estimates of y might not represent a causal effect of immigration on native outcomes if
immigrant concentration is endogenous to native labor market conditions. In particular, if
immigrants decide to settle in areas that experience positive local labor market shocks, and if
the true y is negative, then ' will be biased towards zero and OLS estimates will be smaller in
magnitude than the causal effects.
As a solution to bias from endogenous immigrant migration, I instrument immigrant shares
with a measure of predicted shares (P5). Predicted shares are derived by predicting immigrant
inflows to an MSA from the geographic concentration of immigrants in 1970, which is a com-
monly used instrument for immigration stocks5 , and from predictions of native stocks absent
interstate migration.
The prediction of immigrant inflows is based on the idea that immigrants tend to settle in
areas where a larger share of their ethnic group (home country) have previously settled. Let
Fct,1970 represent the predicted low skill immigrant inflows into MSA c between years 1970 and
t (where t > 1980). Then:
Fct,1970 = Fto 197 0 (1.2)
0 11970
5A variant of this instrumental variable strategy was proposed in (Altonji and Card 1991), and has been
implemented in (Card 2001), (Lewis 2003), (Cortes 2006a), (Lewis 2006), and (Peri and Sparber 2007), among
others.
where Ft,1 970 is the flow of all low-skilled immigrants into the United States from originating
country o between 1970 and t, and 97 is the share of all immigrants from country o that
1970
lived in MSA c in 19706. Hence, F assigns incoming low-skilled immigrants from a specific
country into a city based on the geographic density of immigrants in 1970. Predicted low-
skilled immigrant stocks in MSA c at time t are then:
Ict = Ic,1970 + Fct,1970  (1.3)
where Ic,1970 is the actual stock of immigrants in 1970.
To form an estimate for native stocks that is purged of migration responses to immigration,
I define predicted native low skill stocks in the absence of native migration, NVCt, in the following
way:
a=18
a-(t-1 970) N~ LSta (1.4)
- Nc,1970 Na-(t-1970) Na (1.4)
64 1970
where Na,t is the native stock (unconditional on education) of age a in state c in year t. LSt
is the size of the low skill native population age a in t. The first term inside the summation
represents the size in 1970 of the cohort that is age a in MSA c in t. The second term inside
the summation represents the national change in population size between 1970 and t for the
cohort that was age a in t (i.e. the survival rate between 1970 and t). The last term is the
national share of the cohort age a in t that is low-skilled. 9Nt is the predicted size of the native
low skill state adult population in year t if there had been no out of city migration, if the
survival rate for each age cohort within an MSA followed the national survival rate, and if the
native population did not adjust educational attainment in response to MSA-specific factors
(i.e. constraining the low-skilled share of the native labor force to be constant across MSAs) 7.
6I divide the set of all possible originating countries into 15 country groups based on geography (group
categories available upon request).7This formula is not implemented exactly as written, since age cohorts less than 20 in 1990 and 30 in 2000
were not alive in 1970. To compensate, cohorts of age a for which stocks cannot be predicted in year t are
assigned population sizes based on the size of the population aged a - 10 in t - 10 multiplied by the national
survival rate between t and t - 10 for the age cohort. For instance, 18 and 19 year olds in 1990 were not alive in
1970, so to predict their population size absent migration, the size of the 8 and 9 year old MSA cohorts in 1980
is multiplied by the national empirical survival rate for this age cohort between 1980 and 1990.
Predicted immigrant shares are then:
I P = + c (1.5)
For Pct to be a valid instrument, it must be correlated with Pct, and conditional on controls,
must affect native labor market outcomes only through its effect on actual immigrant shares.
This exclusion restriction will be violated, for instance, if immigrants in 1970 chose their location
based on local labor market shocks which took decades to diminish. These shocks would induce
city-year specific variation in labor market outcomes after 1970 that would not be absorbed by
the separate city and year fixed effects in (1) (and would therefore be contained in eict), and
would be correlated with Pct.
If variation in 1970 immigrant dispersion is due to persistent but stable differences in local
labor market conditions, this will not violate the exclusion restriction because such variation will
be absorbed by MSA fixed effects. The exclusion restriction will not be violated if immigrants in
1970 are attracted to areas that experience positive labor market shocks in 1970 which dissipate
by 1980. Empirical evidence from (Blanchard and Katz 1992) on the persistence of state-level
employment and wage shocks suggests the impact of temporary labor market shocks disappears
within about 10 years. Additionally, most results are robust to the inclusion of Census region
dummies interacted with year dummies, so the exclusion restriction holds even if immigrants
are attracted to regions of the country which have positive labor market shocks in 1970 that
diminish over time.
Table 1.4 displays estimates from various city-level analogs to the first stage equation of the
following form:
wec = 615 ct + Or + Ot + vct (1.6)
where wct and ?bct represent actual and predicted immigrant stocks (panel A) native stocks
(panel B) and immigrant shares (panel C). All estimates are weighted by the size of the low-
skilled population, and standard errors are clustered at the MSA level.
The relationship between predicted and actual immigrant stocks, native stocks, and immi-
grant shares is strong (column 1). Actual immigrant stocks are somewhat underpredicted by
the predicted stock variable, actual native stocks are overpredicted by predicted native stocks,
and actual immigrant shares are somewhat underpredicted. The strength of the relationship
between actual and predicted immigrant stocks implies that the first stage relationship between
actual and predicted shares-which is used for 2SLS estimation-is not driven solely by native
stocks. The first stage relationship is robust to the exclusion of the earlier and later decade of
data (columns 2 and 3), the inclusion of Census region/year fixed effects (column 4), and the
inclusion of a large set of time-varying MSA controlss (column 5). Excluding the three high-
immigrant states has very little effect on the magnitude of the first stage relationship (column
6).
Finally, one would be concerned about the validity of the instrument if the majority of an
ethnic group settles in one state, so that national inflows are driven by state inflows for that
particular group 9. Column 7 tests the robustness of the first stage relationship to this concern
by constructing Ft,1970 as the inflow of immigrants into all areas other than city c, recalculating
predicted immigrant stocks, and reestimating (1.6). The strength and magnitude of the first
stage is robust to this specification.
As in previous studies (Card 2001 and Cortes 2006a), I find that the size of the native
low skilled population in an MSA is relatively unresponsive to changes in immigration. To
demonstrate this, I run the following regression at the MSA level using Census data from 1980-
2000, instrumenting the log of the low skilled immigrant stock with the log of the predicted low
skilled immigrant stock:
log Nt = P log Ict + ac + at + vt (1.7)
p is estimated to be -.04 with a standard error (clustered at the MSA level) of .14. Hence,
there is no evidence to suggest that the size of the native low skilled population responds to
immigration growth, and so changes in Pct can be interpreted as coming mainly from changes
in the size of the immigrant population rather than from a combination of immigrant inflows
and native outflows.
8These controls are the average age of the native population, and the share of the native population that is:
black, male, high school dropouts, and college graduates.
9For instance, 27% of Mexican immigrants lived in Los Angeles in 1970. If the L.A. labor market experiences
a positive shock between 1970 and 1980 and consequently attracts Mexican immigrants, then predicted Mexican
inflows to L.A. will be somewhat driven by actual inflows (this is because inflows to L.A. represent a large share
of national inflows). In this case, predicted inflows will be positively related to local labor market conditions,
violating the exclusion restriction.
Instrumental Variables Estimates
Table 1.5 presents instrumental variables estimates of (1.1). In all instances, estimated em-
ployment effects are larger in magnitude than OLS estimates from Table 1.2, but the difference
between OLS and IV results is not large. This suggests that the potential endogeneity of immi-
grant shares is not a significant source of bias1o. IV estimates imply that a 10 percentage point
increase in the low-skilled immigrant share of the population reduces teen weekly employment
rates by 4.8 percentage points, teen annual employment rates by 5.5 percentage points, and the
average total number of hours worked in a year by 29. Employment effects for teens remain at
least three times as large as estimated adult effects, and the difference is even larger relative to
baseline employment rates 1 .
How many native adults and teens are displaced from employment for every additional low-
skilled immigrant? To answer this question, I convert estimates of the relationship between
immigrant shares and native weekly employment rates (column 1 of Table 1.4) into the implied
impact of one additional low-skilled immigrant on the number of employed native teens and
adults in an MSA 12. Teens form about 2 percent of the employed native low-skilled population,
so if teen displacement from immigration is proportional to the share of teens in the employed
native population, and if there is perfect (one-for-one) displacement between immigrants and
natives, 100 additional immigrants would reduce the number of employed low-skilled adults by
98 and the number of employed teens by 2. Put differently, 2.04 employed teens would become
unemployed for every 100 employed adults who lose their jobs due to immigration.
I estimate that for every additional 100 low-skilled adult immigrants that enter an MSA,
101n specifications that use log Ia, the difference between OLS and IV results is more significant. I show this
in section 1.3.3.
1 'Adult employment effects are no larger than previous estimates in the literature. For instance, (Borjas 2003)
estimates that a 10 percentage point increase in the immigrant share of the high school dropout population
reduces the number of weeks worked in the year by about .4 weeks (weeks worked is the only employment
outcome reported in Borjas 2003). In unreported results, I estimate that immigration growth of this size reduces
the number of weeks worked for this adult population by .6 weeks and reduces the number of weeks worked for
teens by 1.6 weeks.
Iuse the following cui - -- _L.
121 use the following calculation: L n , where Og is the impact of one additional low-skilled
ct t 19 , O
1
ctimmigrant in a city on the number of employed natives of group g (either low-skilled adults or teens), ngB is the
size of group g in city c in year t, OEMP1Lt is the immigration effect estimated in column 1 of Table 1.4, and
t . Using estimates of -n and from Census data, I calculate Lc for each city-year,
and average across cities and years.
and average across cities and years.
the number of teens employed in the last week falls by 4 and the number of adults employed in
the last week falls by 12, for a total of 16 displaced natives. Ignoring the effects of immigration
on teens would reduce the estimated employment impact by one quarter of the actual impact.
These estimates imply that about 33 teens are displaced for every 100 native adults who lose
their jobs due to immigration. This is significantly larger than if the effect of immigration
on the number of employed youth relative to adults equaled the youth share of the employed
low-skilled population.
1.3.3 Robustness of Estimates
This section presents robustness checks of estimated annual employment effects for the teen
population (Table 1.6). Panel A displays estimates from testing the robustness of the primary
results to different specifications of the immigrant share variable. Estimates from Table 1.2 and
1.4 are repeated in columns 1 and 2 of panel A. Columns 3 and 4 include the immigrant share
of the high skilled population as an additional regressor, where the high skilled population
is defined over all adults with at least some college experience, and high skilled shares are
instrumented with predicted high skilled shares (which are constructed with predicted high skill
immigrant and native stocks). Low skilled immigration effects are, if anything, strengthened
by the inclusion of high skilled immigrant shares, and the effect of high skilled immigration is
imprecisely estimated' 3 . Columns 5 and 6 replace the low skilled immigrant share with the log
of the number of low-skilled immigrants (controlling for the log of the number of low-skilled
natives). A 10 percent increase in the size of the low-skilled immigrant population, conditional
on the size of the native low-skilled population, is estimated to reduce the proportion of teens
employed in the last year by 1.6 percentage points. Compared to estimates using immigrant
shares, these imply somewhat larger immigration effects 14
13 This is not due to a weak first stage; the coefficient on predicted high skill immigrant shares from the analog
to (1.6) is .73 with a standard error of .05.
14Between 1980 and 1990, the immigrant share of an MSA increased by 6.5 percentage points on average,
and the log of the number of low-skilled immigrants rose by .21 on average - each estimate implying that teen
weekly employment rates were about 3.1 percentage points lower than they would have been in the absence of
immigration growth regardless of how immigration concentration is measured. Between 1990 and 2000, similar
calculations imply that, in the absence of changes in immigrant concentration, teen weekly employment rates
would have been 4 percentage points higher. Had log immigrant stocks remained at their 1990 levels, teen
employment rates are estimated to have been 9 percentage points higher.
Estimated employment effects remain sizeable in magnitude and precisely estimated when
observations from 1980 or 2000 are excluded from the analysis, or when MSAs from the highest
immigration states are excluded (panel B). Employment effects are larger in magnitude in the
later period (column 2) than the earlier period (column 4). Excluding observations from the
high immigration states has little effect on estimated employment effects (column 6).
In panel C, I address concerns that changes in predicted immigrant shares may be correlated
with other time-varying MSA characteristics that also affect employment. Columns 1 and 2
add Census region dummies interacted with year dummies. Point estimates are quite similar
to those in the original specification. Columns 3 and 4 report estimates from adding 2005
American Community Survey data to the analysis. Columns 5 and 6 add MSA-specific time
trends as well. In this specification, a 10 percentage point increase in the low skill immigrant
share is estimated to reduce the probability of teen employment by 3.7 percentage points, which,
though less precisely estimated, is still an economically significant effect 5.
1.3.4 Immigration Effects by Age
Figure 1.5A provides striking visual evidence that the employment effects of immigration are
concentrated among the youth. In this figure, I plot the coefficient on low-skilled immigrant
shares, -, from estimating equation (1.1) independently for each age from 16 to 64. Again, the
employment effects of immigration are strongest for the younger ages and diminish rapidly in
magnitude through the late teens and early 20s, stabilizing around -.2 for individuals in their
mid-20s through 50s, and declining in magnitude for older individuals.
One reason why the employment effects of immigration as estimated from equation (1.1) and
presented in Table 1.5 are larger for teens than for 21-64 year olds may be because low-skilled im-
migrant populations are younger and hence more comparable in terms of work experience with
15Both OLS and IV estimates using MSA-specific time trends are smaller in magnitude than those which
exclude time trends, though the difference between OLS estimates is larger than the difference between IV esti-
mates. One explanation for this is that, after including time trends, much of the remaining variation in immigrant
shares is measurement error. Consistent with this explanation, instrumenting for immigrant shares has a sub-
stantial impact on the estimated employment effects of immigration once MSA time trends are included. Point
estimates from adding MSA-specific time varying controls (including the average age of the native population,
and the share of the native population that is black, male, a high school dropout, and a college graduate) are
quite similar to those from the initial specification.
youth 16. In other words, the relationship between low-skilled immigrant shares and teen em-
ployment may be larger in magnitude than that between immigrant shares and the employment
rate for 21-64 year olds because the age composition of the low-skilled immigrant population
becomes younger between 1980 and 2000, rather than because native youth employment is more
responsive to immigration from similarly experienced immigrants.
To test whether employment effects are larger for youth because youth are more responsive
to immigration from immigrants of a similar age, I estimate the following for each age a from
16 to 24:
YaCt = ap + X ac + at + ot ict (1.8)
This specification differs from that used to estimate Figure 1.5A since immigrant shares now
vary by age. For natives of age a, Pat is constructed as the immigrant share of the entire low-
skilled population between ages a-5 and a+ 5 in city c and in year t17, and Pet is instrumented
with predicted immigrant shares for that age group. This incorporates the idea that immigrants
and natives with similar amounts of potential work experience should be most substitutable,
and addresses the concern that estimated immigration effects on adults 21-64 were small because
they aggregated younger adults with older adults who are unlikely to be affected by younger
immigrants. I estimate (1.8) for ages 16 to 64 with 2SLS, and present the plot of ýa by age in
Figure 1.5B. Estimating immigration effects in this way only strengthens the conclusion from
the previous section: the employment effects of immigration are significantly stronger for teens
than for adults, and this is because teen employment is more responsive to immigration, rather
than because the immigrant population tends to be more similar in experience to youth than
to older workers18 .
16The average age of the low-skilled immigrant population of the country is 51 in 1980 and 42 in 2000.
'
7For individuals less than 21 years old, immigrant shares are calculated over ages 16 to 26.
18A 10 percentage point increase in the low-skilled immigrant share of one's 10 year experience group in his
or her city is estimated to reduce the percent of teens employed in the last week by 8.3 percentage points and
the percent of adults 21-64 employed in the last week by .5 percentage points.
1.3.5 Impact of Immigration on Type of Occupation
Native disemployment in response to immigration should be greater in occupations that are
more common among immigrants. As an additional robustness check to my measure of immi-
grant concentration, in this section I test whether disemployment effects are smaller in occupa-
tions for which natives have a comparative advantage over immigrants-such as jobs that rely
more heavily on English language skills, and verbal and interpersonal skills and abilities 9 .
To define the level of English language skills, and communication skills and abilities required
for a job, I use the US Department of Labor's Occupational Information Network (O*NET),
which classifies the level (on a 1-7 scale) and importance (on a 1-5 scale) of various skills,
abilities, activities, and required knowledge for over 800 occupations (of which around 300
can be matched with Census occupations). For each occupation, I define a communication
skills index based on the normalized sum of the level and importance scores for a large set of
relevant skills and abilities20. I then calculate each occupation's communication index percentile
(ranging from 0 to 1) in the population-weighted distribution of all jobs, using the occupation
distribution in 2000 and most recent skills classification from O*NET. As evidence that low-
skilled immigrants are less likely to work in occupations that require stronger communication
skills, the coefficient on communication percentile from an occupation-level regression of the
1980 share of immigrants in an occupation on communication percentile is -.37 and is significant
at the 1 percent level. Occupations that have a high verbal percentile and are common among
youth include secretaries, teacher's aides, and customer service representatives. Common low
verbal percentile jobs for teens include gardeners, farm workers, and construction laborers.
19This is similar to analysis from (Cortes 2006b) and (Peri and Sparber 2007) for the native adult population.
(Cortes 2006b) demonstrates that immigrants tend to work in occupations which require fewer verbal skills,
and in response to immigration, the immigrant share of an occupation increases by more in jobs that are less
English-intensive. She also shows that immigration has a more negative effect on the wages of natives in less
English-intensive occupations. (Peri and Sparber 2007) shows that native labor supplied to manual tasks relative
to native labor supplied to more interactive tasks (directing, controlling, planning) falls in response to low-skilled
immigration within a state, suggesting that natives adapt to immigration by specializing in jobs for which they
have a comparative advantage over immigrants.
20The communication index aggregates the level and importance scores for the abilities "oral comprehension,"
"oral expression," "written comprehension," "written expression," "speech clarity," and "speech recognition"; for
the skills "speaking" and "active listening"; and for "knowledge of the English language." For each occupation,
the level at which the skill is required is scored on a scale of 1-7, and the importance of the skill for the job is
scored on a scale of 1-5. I normalize each level and importance score to 1, and for each occupation sum the level
and importance scores for all 9 categories. The occupation's raw verbal score is this sum, and ranges from 0-18.
I estimate the following equation at the occupation-city-year level:
log(# employed),,oct = yPct + JPt comm pctileo + Qo + Oc + Ot + eoct (1.9)
The dependent variable, log(# employed),,ot, is the log number of employed teens or employed
low-skilled native adults in occupation o in MSA c in year t. Occupation o's rank in the com-
munication skills and abilities distribution of all jobs, as described above, is comm pctileo and
ranges from 0 to 1. The potentially endogenous variables in (1.9) are Pt and Pt -comm pctileo.
I instrument for Pct as before, and instrument for Pct -comm pctileo using Pc and its interaction
with comm pctileo. Growth in the immigrant concentration of an MSA reduces employment in
occupation o if y + Scomm pctileo < 0, while -y + comm pctileo > 0 indicates that immigration
growth causes employment growth in occupation o. If 6 > 0, employment declines are smaller
(or employment gains are larger) in occupations which require more communication skills and
abilities.
The number of employed teens in the least communication-intensive occupations
(comm pctileo = 0) are estimated to fall by up to 8.5 percent in response to a 10 percentage point
increase in the low-skilled immigrant share of an MSA (Table 1.7). The number of employed
native adults in these occupations is estimated to fall by 24 percent. Since 6 > 0, employment
declines are smaller in more communication-intensive jobs, and teen employment is estimated
to increase in the most communication-intensive jobs in response to immigration. Growth in
the immigrant concentration of 10 percentage points is estimated to increase the number of
teens employed in the most communication-intensive occupations by about 1 percent2 1 . Since
native disemployment in response to immigration is smaller in occupations for which natives
have a comparative advantage, this is additional evidence that native employment responds to
changes in immigrant concentration.
21 Although adult employment is estimated to fall more in percentage terms than teen employment for a given
occupation, the overall employment effects on youth are still estimated to be larger. This is because a greater
share of native teens are employed in jobs which require few communication skills.
1.3.6 Effect of Immigration on Wages
OLS and 2SLS Estimates of Immigration Effects on Wages
Why are the employment effects of immigration so much larger for teens than for adults? One
explanation for this finding is that immigration reduces native wages and that teen labor supply
is more responsive to changes in the wage. Reasons for this may include that teens have fewer
financial constraints which necessitate their income 22, that teens have higher disutility of labor,
and that teens can more readily substitute from labor to schooling as well as from labor to
leisure.
To assess whether teens are more responsive to changes in the wage, I first estimate (1.1)
with OLS and 2SLS for teens and low-skilled adults using log hourly wages as the dependent
variable23 . These estimates are presented in columns 1, 2, 4 and 5 of Table 1.7. A 10 percent-
age point increase in the low-skilled immigrant share of the population is estimated to reduce
teen wages by 1.4 percent, and adult wages by .6 percent. These estimates are small in magni-
tude and imprecisely estimated-a common finding in studies that identify immigration effects
from geographic variation in immigrant concentration (Card 2001, Cortes 2006). Combining
these estimates with estimated employment effects from Table 1.5 implies implausibly large
employment participation elasticities (over 3 for adults and over 8 for teens) 24.
Recent research provides some explanations for why the impact of immigration on the
average adult wages in a local labor market is small. (Lewis 2006) and (2003) demonstrate
that the choice of production techniques within industries-particularly, technology choice-is
especially responsive to the size of the low skilled population. Thus, endogenous production
decisions (i.e. heavier use of manufacturing techniques that more efficiently utilize low skilled
labor) may mitigate the wage effects of immigration. However, these studies mainly focus on
adjustments in manufacturing industries, which are smaller employers of youth than of low-
22Johnson and Lino 2000 provides evidence that a teen's labor income is used primary for his or her own
personal use, rather than for contributing to household expenses.23For these regressions, I also include the log of the state minimum wage and the following city level controls:
the average age of the native population, and the share of the native population that is black, male, a high school
dropout, and a college graduate.
24For instance, a 10 percentage point increase in the low-skilled immigrant share of the population reduces
teen employment in the previous week by 4.82 percentage points from an average of 31.7 percent - or, by 15
percent. From 2SLS estimates, an immigration increase of this magnitude reduces teen wages by 1.4 percent.
The ratio of these two effects (10.6) is an estimate of employment responsiveness to a change in the wage.
skilled adults or immigrants25 . Peri and Sparber (2007) demonstrate that natives respond to
immigration by moving to occupations for which they have a comparative advantage (such as
jobs which require stronger verbal or interpersonal communication skills), and (Cortes 2006b)
shows that the wage effects of immigration are smallest for natives who work in occupations
for which verbal skills are more important. Hence, the observed effect of immigration on
adult wages is mitigated because adults partially respond to immigration growth by moving
to occupations that face less immigrant competition. Although this is a potential explanation
for the small estimated impact of immigration on adult wages, there is little difference in the
impact of immigration on teen wages across occupations26.
Two additional explanations for small wage effects are relevant for the youth labor market.
First, since immigration substantially affects youth employment, selection bias is a significant
concern. If immigration has larger employment effects on teens with lower earnings ability, then
the estimated impact of immigration on observed wages confounds the effect of immigration
on the offered wage with the effect of immigration on the composition of the employed youth
population. Second, the minimum wage is more binding for youth wages than for adult wages,
and a strongly binding minimum wage will mitigate wage adjustment from immigration. I next
address each of these explanations.
Selection Bias
If teens with lower earning ability are more likely to drop out of the labor force in response
to immigration, then the observed immigration effect is a combination of two effects: the
impact of immigration on the offered wage of teens, and compositional effects (selection bias)
because individuals with higher earnings ability are more likely to remain employed. Although
it is not possible to directly examine whether the underlying earnings ability of those who are
258 percent of employed teens in the 1980 Census (2 percent in the 2000 Census) were employed in manufac-
turing industries. 25 and 33 percent of low-skilled native adults and immigrants were employed in manufacturing
in 1980, respectively (19 and 21 percent in the 2000 Census).26To test this, I have estimated the following regression at the individual level:
log wageict = "Pet + 6Pet - comm pctileo + ±comm pctileo + 3Xi + opWt + ac + at + eict
Given the likelihood of selection into employment and into occupations, however, these estimates are only sug-
gestive. For teens, I find that j = -. 145 (.094) and 5 = .006 (.050). For adults, - = -. 315 (.156) and
6 = .571 (.066). The wage impact of immigration is uniform across occupations for teens, while it is less negative
for more communication-intensive occupations for adults.
employed exceeds that for those who experience disemployment, I demonstrate changes in the
composition of observed characteristics for the employed teen population by estimating the
following equation:
# employed educatedct # educatedct
= (Pct + p + Oc + Bt + Uct (1.10)# employed less educatedct # less educatedct
The dependent variable proxies as a measure of the skill composition of the employed teen
population of MSA c in year t. It represents the ratio of employed youth with more educated
parents to employed youth with less educated parents, where youth from less educated parents
are defined as those with at least one parent who is a high school dropout, and those with
educated parents are defined as all other youth. In 2000, the average wage for teens with
more educated parents was $7.72 and the average wage for other teens was $7.57-so this ratio
is a summary measure of the observed earnings ability composition for the employed youth
population. To control for the composition of the entire youth population (i.e. unconditional
on employment), I include # educated If the share of the employed population from more# less educatedct"
educated families increases due to immigration growth, then # > 0 . The OLS estimate of '0 is
21.0 (with standard error of 12.5), and the 2SLS estimate of V is 33.6 (with standard error of
18.1). A 10 percentage point increase in the low-skilled immigrant share is predicted to increase
the ratio of employed youth with more educated parents to those with less educated parents
by 3.4 (for comparison, the average across MSAs is 6.5). This is suggestive evidence that
immigration growth causes the average earnings potential of the employed youth population to
increase due to compositional changes. Although the observed difference in earnings potential
between youth from different family backgrounds is not large (an hourly wage difference of
$.20 in 2000), selection on observable characteristics suggests that selection on unobserved
characteristics may also be present. Hence, the observed effect of immigration on wages is
its effect on offered wages (which is assumed to be negative) combined with its effect on the
composition of the employed youth population (which is likely to be positively related to the
wage). The impact of immigration on observed wages will therefore be more positive than the
impact of immigration on offered wages.
Selection bias in wage equations has traditionally been modeled by assuming linear offer
wage and reservation wage equations, and making distributional assumptions about the error
terms in both equations (Heckman 1979). Since the immigrant share is potentially endogenous
and affects both selection and the wage, I am unable to implement a standard Heckman selection
correction procedure. Assuming that an individual's log offered wage is wit = 7Pet + PXi +
ac + at + Eict, that individuals work only if their offered wage exceeds their reservation wage wzct
where wict = 6Xi + (, + t +uiet, and that uict and eict have a bivariate normal distribution, then
a simple solution motivated by the Heckman-type correction and as used in (Card 2001) is to
note that the effect of immigration on observed wages can be expressed as: 9 E[w-wijt>w c-=
S+ p OA(irt) OPlt
In this expression, wt is individual i's offered wage, wict is i's reservation wage, A(lXct) is the
Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) expressed as a function of the annual employment rate of MSA c in
year t (7rct), p is the correlation between errors in the offered wage and selection equations, aE is
the standard deviation of residuals in the offered wage equation, 7y is the effect of Pet on offered
wages, and 9 is the effect of immigrant concentration on annual employment probabilities.
I use IV estimates of t and OE[wictlwic>wct] from Tables 1.4 and 1.6, I estimate the slope of
the IMR at the average value of 7rat for teens and adults, and I estimate 0e from the data. I
assume moderate correlation between residual earnings ability and employment likelihood and
set p = .5. The effect of immigration on offered wages is OE[wct > ct _Pae These
estimates are presented in columns 3 and 6 of Table 1.6. Wage effects are negative and larger
in magnitude than 2SLS estimates: a 10 percentage point increase in the low-skilled immigrant
share reduces teen wages by 3.6% and adult wages by 1.1%.
The combination of employment effects estimated in Table 1.5, and selection-corrected wage
effects imply that the teen weekly employment participation elasticity (the responsiveness of
employment in the reference week to changes in the wage) is 4.2, and that the annual employ-
ment participation elasticity is 3.3. These estimates are larger than the implied labor supply
elasticities for low-skilled adults, and to my knowledge these are the first estimates of teen
labor supply elasticities. Elasticities for adults, though imprecise, are somewhat larger than
most previous estimates. For example, (Meyer and Rosenbaum 2001) uses the expansion of the
EITC in the 1980s and 1990s to estimate employment participation elasticities for single low
income mothers, and find weekly employment elasticities of .83 and annual employment elastic-
ities of 1.07. Using immigration-induced wage and employment changes, (Borjas, Grogger and
Hanson 2006) estimates annual participation elasticities of .8 for low-skilled black males, and
.2 for low-skilled white males.
Youth Wages and the Minimum Wage
A potential explanation for the combination of large youth employment effects and small youth
wage effects from immigration (which together imply large youth labor supply elasticities) is
that a binding minimum wage prevents further downward wage adjustment while still permitting
teen employment to decline. As shown in Figure 1.6, if the minimum wage is binding or is nearly
binding for teens, and an increase in immigration reduces demand for teen labor (from D to
D') enough that the minimum wage binds, then there will be an excess supply of teen labor.
The resulting wage-employment outcome will not be on the teen labor supply curve, and the
labor supply elasticity estimated from wage and employment changes will be an overestimate
of the true labor supply elasticity27
There is some suggestive evidence that a binding minimum wage inhibits wage adjustment
from immigration for teens. Imputed hourly wages for a large proportion of the youth population
are no greater than the minimum wage, although the share of the employed youth population
earning more than the minimum wage has risen as the real value of the minimum wage has
fallen. In 1980, the federal minimum wage exceeded the national median hourly teen wage
as calculated in the Census. The federal minimum wage gradually became less binding over
the next two decades: it was $3.80 in 1990 while the median wage for teens was $4.00, and it
was $5.15 in 2000 while the median wage was $5.71. In 1980, the federal or state minimum
wage exceeded the median youth wage in every state. In 2000, this was true for only 7 states.
Nonetheless, between 1980 and 2000, minimum wages were binding for a significant fraction of
27The initial equilibrium amount of youth labor is L*, and the equilibrium wage is w*. If low-skilled immigrants
and teens are somewhat substitutable, then immigration growth will reduce the demand for teens, shifting the
demand curve from D to D'. For a given wage, if employers prefer immigrants over native youth (since immigrants
may be willing to work longer hours in more difficult work conditions, or may be more willing to remain employed
throughout the school year), then youth employment may fall to a point such as L am in . The new wage-labor
outcome is {wmin, Lmin}, which is not on the youth labor supply curve. From observed wage and employment
changes, the estimated labor supply elasticity would be L / -, , which is larger in magnitude than
the actual labor supply elasticity at {w*, L*}.
the youth population.
If a binding minimum wage supported the teen wage distribution and mitigated the wage
effects of immigration, then the wage impact of immigration should be smaller in states for
which the minimum wage is more binding (i.e. states where the wage has less room to adjust).
2SLS estimates suggest that this is true for the impact of immigration on youth wages, but not
for the impact on adult wages. Estimates are not sufficiently precise to draw firm conclusions,
however 28 .
1.4 Immigration Effects for Minority and Less Advantaged Youth
1.4.1 Employment Effects of Immigration
An extensive body of research has documented that employment rates for youth from less
advantaged backgrounds-black youth in particular-are lower than those for other groups
(Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist 1990). One explanation that has received some empirical support
is the spatial mismatch hypothesis, which argues that suburbanization of jobs combined with
blacks' lack of mobility from the inner city to the suburbs is a primary cause of black joblessness
(Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist 1998; Raphael 1998; Weinberg 2000). Since low-skilled immigrants are
more concentrated in the urban center of an MSA than in the suburbs of an MSA29 and minority
youth or youth from poorer families (in the bottom qartile of the family income distribution) are
also more likely to live in the urban center of an MSA 30 , the effects of low-skilled immigration
28I estimate the following: yict = yPet + 6P&t - bindrt + Cbindt + OXX + ±W t + a• + at + Eit, where
binder=log(median teen wage)ct - log(min wage)ct, and Wct are the city level controls included in the wage
equations estimated in Table 1.6. In this specification, bindc, is a measure of state wage levels relative to the state
or federal minimum wage. This is a commonly used measure of the bindingness of the minimum wage - see Lee
1999, for instance. A larger (more positive) value indicates that the minimum wage is less binding. IV estimates
of this equation yield y = .163(.124) and 6 = -. 469(.421). Although these estimates are quite imprecise, they
suggest that areas with less binding minimum wages (higher values of bind,t) experience larger wage declines in
response to immigration growth. This is consistent with a binding minimum wage that mitigates wage effects.
Since the minimum wage is less binding for native adults (the median wage for low-skilled natives always exceeds
the state and federal minimum), there is no a priori reason to expect the effect of immigration on adult wages
to be larger in states for which the minimum wage is more binding relative to adult wage levels. Estimating a
similar equation for native low-skilled adults finds y = .049(.107) and 6 = .144(.102). The impact of immigration
on adult wages is smaller in areas with less binding minimum wages.
29In 2000 for instance, the low-skilled immigrant share of an MSA's center city was 33% on average, and was
28% on average outside of the center city. 57% of low-skilled immigrants in an MSA lived in its center city, on
average.
30In 2000, 61 percent of black teens versus 23 percent of non-black teens lived in the center city of an MSA,
and 51 percent of teens from poorer families versus 25 percent of other teens lived in the center city of an MSA.
into an MSA may be particularly strong for these youth.
I begin by showing that employment effects are proportionately greater for these popula-
tions. The primary estimation equation for this section is:
ict = CPct -di + rPct - (1 - di) + pdi + aXi + c + t + •ict (1.11)
Immigrant shares are interacted with di and (1 - di), which are dummy variables indicating
whether the youth is black, from a poorer family (their family is in the bottom quartile of
the household income distribution), or lives in the center city of an MSA. Pt is the low skilled
immigrant share of the population, and the interactions between Pct and di, and Pet and (1- di)
are instrumented with the interactions between Pct and di, and Pct and (1 - di).
Table 1.9A presents 2SLS estimates of this equation, separately for male and female teens
(columns 1 and 2), where Yict indicates whether individual i was employed in the reference week.
Panel A compares the impact of immigration on black youth to other youth, panel B compares
the impact on youth from poorer families to other youth, and panel C compares the impact
on youth from urban areas (living in the center city of an MSA) to all other youth. Black
youth, youth from poorer families, and urban youth have lower employment rates on average
(at least 10 percentage points below all other youth), so an equal percentage point impact of
immigration on employment represents a larger immigration effect, relative to baseline rates, for
these populations. To scale the impact of immigration by baseline employment rates, I divide
the effect of a 10 percentage point increase in the low-skilled immigrant share by the average
employment rate for each group (reported in brackets to the right of the mean).
The magnitude of immigration effects on employment rates is greater for white youth, youth
from wealthier families, and youth who do not live in the center city of an MSA. The effect
of immigration on employment rates relative to average employment rates, however, is larger
for youth with lower overall employment rates31 . For instance, a 10 percentage point increase
in low-skilled immigrant shares is estimated to reduce the employment rate of black males by
about 23 percent (4.0 percentage points) and the employment rate of non-black males by 16
percent (5.7 percentage points). There is little difference in employment effects by gender.
31The same conclusion holds if immigration effects are estimated with an IV probit model rather than a 2SLS
linear probability model.
Since employment effects are proportionately larger for urban youth (panel C), the impact
of immigration on black youth employment may be particularly large because black youth are
also more likely to live in the center city of an MSA. To test the plausibility of this explanation,
columns 1 and 2 of Table 1.9B (panel D) present estimates of immigration effects on the
employment of urban youth and other youth, conditional on being black. Although employment
rates are lower, on average, for black urban youth compared to all other black youth, the
magnitude of immigration effects on employment are larger for urban youth. Conditional on
living in the center of a city, immigration employment effects are not proportionately larger for
black youth (panel E), as they are in the unconditional estimates. This is suggestive evidence
that one reason why low-skilled immigration has a proportionately large impact on black youth
employment is that black youth are more likely to live in the center city of an MSA, and that
the employment effects of immigration are larger for urban youth.
Another potential reason why the employment effects of immigration are proportionately
larger for youth from less advantaged backgrounds is that these youth are more likely to work in
occupations that are prevalent among immigrants. Youth tend to work in similar occupations
regardless of family background or minority status, however, so differential immigration effects
are unlikely due to differences in the youth occupational distribution32
1.4.2 Immigration and School Enrollment
Since disadvantaged youth are more likely to drop out of high school than other youth (Appendix
Table 1.A1), and they are more likely to report being employed and not in school, they can
more realistically substitute from labor to schooling as well as to leisure. This added dimension
of substitutability provides an additional channel through which immigration may differentially
impact the less advantaged population.
Column 3 and 4 of Table 1.9A present estimates of (1.11), where yit is a dummy indicating
32For each category of youth (based on family background or race), I calculate the employed share of that group
in each occupation. For instance, 10.5 percent of employed black teens in 1970 were janitors. I make the same
calculations for low-skilled adult immigrants. I compare occupational distributions by calculating the correlation
in these shares between any two groups. The occupational distribution of teens is quite similar, regardless of
which groups are considered. For instance, the correlation between the distribution for youth from lower income
families in an occupation and for all other youth is .91, and the correlation between blacks and whites is .92.
The correlation between the share of low-skilled adult immigrants and youth in an occupation ranges from .49
to .57 depending on which category of the family income level or race of the youth is considered.
whether an individual reported being enrolled in school at any point in the two months prior
to the Census reference week. Immigration is estimated to significantly increase enrollment
rates among youth from poorer families and urban youth: a 10 percentage point increase in
the low-skilled immigrant share of the population increases the proportion of these youth that
are enrolled in school by 1 to 1.3 percentage points, relative to average enrollment rates of
around 90 percent. These enrollment effects may be coming through two channels. First,
since immigration reduces offered wages in the youth labor market, school enrollment may rise
due to a reduction in the opportunity costs of attending school. Second, to the extent that
youth perceive a reduction in job opportunities in the low-skilled adult labor market due to
immigration, low-skilled immigration growth may increase the perceived returns to education.
My analysis is unable to disentangle the two effects. These estimates mirror findings from the
minimum wage literature. For instance, Neumark and Wascher (1995a, 1995b, 2003) find that
reported youth enrollment falls in response to an increase in the minimum wage.
1.5 Conclusion
Previous research on the labor market impact of immigration generally concludes that immi-
gration has little displacement effect on adult natives, particularly for low-skilled adults. My
paper confirms this finding, but demonstrates that focusing only on the adult labor market
ignores a segment of the population-high school age youth-that experiences substantial dis-
employment from immigration. I estimate that a 10 percentage point increase in the share of
the low skilled population that is immigrant reduces the proportion of teens employed in the
Census reference week by 4.8 percentage points, and the proportion employed in the previous
year by 5.3 percentage points. Given average employment rates of 32% and 47%, respectively,
these effects are large.
How much of the decline in teen summer employment since the early 1990s can be explained
by rising low skill immigration? To answer this question, I estimate the impact of immigration
on summer youth employment using CPS data from 1979-81, 1989-91, 1999-2001, and 2004-
05. A 10 percentage point increase in the low-skilled immigrant share of a state is estimated
to reduce the number of teens who report being employed in the previous week (during the
summer) by 6.0 percent. To estimate a counterfactual national 2005 summer employment
rate for teens in the absence of changes to immigrant concentrations since 1990, I adjust each
state's 2005 teen summer employment rate by the estimated immigration effect on employment
multiplied by the actual change in immigrant shares over this period33 . Between 1990 and
2005, the summer employment rate fell from 43% to 32%. The counterfactual employment rate
in 2005 is 37%, suggesting that in the absence of immigration growth, the teen employment
rate would have fallen by 6 percentage points instead of 11 percentage points. Teen summer
employment rates are about 5 percentage points lower than they would be had immigrant
concentrations remained unchanged since 1990, and this difference is equivalent to almost half
of the actual decline in the employment rate over this period.
Much of the difference between actual and counterfactual employment rates is due to signif-
icant immigration growth between 1990 and 2000. During this period, teen employment rates
remained stable despite rising adult employment rates (Figure 1.1), so one interpretation of
this analysis is that in the absence of immigration, teen employment rates would have trended
up with low-skilled adult employment rates. However, it is not accurate to claim that half of
the decline in teen employment between 2000 and 2005-the period of especially strong declin-
ing youth employment-is attributable to immigration growth. Across all states, immigrant
shares increased by 2 percentage points on average between 2000 and 2005, and the number
of low-skilled immigrants increased by about 20 percent on average. Combining these changes
with the estimated effects of changes in immigrant shares and stocks on teen employment,
immigration growth between 2000 and 2005 can explain 15-25 percent of the observed decline
in teen employment in this 5-year period. Some have argued that teens have reduced their
labor force participation recently because of supply-side factors such as increasing emphasis on
high school and college education and growth in Hope-type scholarships (Aaronson, Park and
Sullivan 2006). One implication of this view is that alternative human capital investments are
replacing youth employment experience, which may result in long-run gains to these cohorts.
Since immigration effects are substantial, however, demand-side factors are also significant-and
33 Since only 40 MSAs are identified in earlier CPS data, I use variation in the immigrant share of a state rather
than an MSA. Counterfactual state employment rates in 2005 are: emp,2oos + .60 * (P, 2005 - Ps,1990). Immigrant
shares in 2005 are calculated using the 2005 American Community Survey. State counterfactual employment
rates are used to estimate the counterfactual number of employed youth by state, which are aggregated to
calculate the national counterfactual rate.
the long-run implications of falling employment are less certain.
This is particularly true for black youth, youth from poorer families, and urban youth, as
the employment effects of immigration relative to average employment rates are larger for these
populations. Ignoring the general equilibrium effects of immigration (including lower product
prices due to cheaper labor), disemployment due to immigration would generally suggest that
affected natives are worse off. For these less advantaged youth, however, this conclusion is
less certain because poorer youth and urban teens also respond to immigration by increasing
high school enrollment. Estimates of the returns to education from compulsory schooling laws
suggest that, for reasonable discount rates, the monetary returns from graduating high school
significantly outweigh the opportunity costs of lost wages from dropping out early (Oreopoulos
2002). Behavioral explanations such as distaste for school, uncertainty regarding individual
returns to education, myopia, or peer pressure may be better explanations for dropout behavior.
To the extent that these other explanations contribute to the dropout decision for at risk youth,
positive enrollment effects from immigration may be welfare enhancing in the long run34 . The
long run impact of the immigration-induced reduction in teen employment remains an open
and important research question.
34 Fully understanding the long-run welfare implications of lower youth employment requires better knowledge
of the effects of youth employment on academic performance and later life outcomes. However, there is little
consensus on whether school year employment affects academic achievement or post-graduation labor market
outcomes. See (Tyler 2003) and (DeSimone 2006) for estimates of employment effects on grades and test scores;
see (Ruhm 1997) and (Hotz, Xu, Ienda and Ahituv 2002) for conflicting estimates of employment effects on later
life labor market outcomes.
Data appendix
Data sources and variable definitions
The primary Census regression results are estimated from pooled 5 percent microdata samples
for 1980, 1990, and 2000, as provided by IPUMS (Ruggles 2004). Estimates in Tables 1.9A and
1.9B that use indicators for whether individuals live in the center city of an MSA include the
1 percent 1990 sample (rather than 5 percent) because center city status is not reported in the
5 percent sample for 1990. Immigrants are defined as individuals who were born abroad and
are either non-citizens or naturalized citizens. The adult sample is comprised of individuals
21-64. Low skill immigrant shares refer to the immigrant share of the 21-64 population without
a college degree. Hourly wages in the Census are defined as annual wage income divided by the
product of usual weekly hours worked and usual weeks worked in a year. Individuals are coded
as having worked in the previous year if they report positive weeks worked in the previous year.
Individuals are reported as having worked in the previous week if their reported employment
status at the time of the Census is "at work" or "has job, not working." School enrollment
is determined from individuals' responses to a Census question which asks whether they were
enrolled in school at any time over the last two months.
Annual wage income is top coded at $999,999. No values are top coded for teens. I multiply
adult top coded values by 1.5. Given the imprecision of wage imputation, there are a number of
implausible wage values for teens in particular, which arise mainly from individuals who report
high annual wage incomes with few weeks or hours worked. It seems likely that these responses
are significant mismeasurements of actual wages. Similarly, there are some implausibly low
wage estimates due to low reported annual wages but high weeks or usual hours worked. I
correct for this by assigning the 10th percentile of the wage distribution (by decade) to those
youth with wages below the value, and I assign the 90th percentile to youth with wages above
that amount. This seems less of a concern for adults, but given the likelihood that the wage
imputation procedure results in some implausible values, I assign the 5th wage percentile to
adults with wages less than that value, and the 95th percentile to adults with wages greater than
that value. Wage regression results are largely robust to these corrections, but the correction
helps summary statistics for the Census sample correspond more closely to those from the CPS.
I use immigrant shares calculated in the Census as the primary regressor of interest in
regressions on CPS data. Since CPS samples are much smaller in size, I pool 1979-1981,
1989-1991, 1999-2001, and 2004-05 for the CPS regression used for the counterfactual summer
employment rate estimation in section 1.5. Immigrant shares calculated from the Census are
assigned to the appropriate range of years.
Table 1.1 - Low-skilled immigrant shares in select MSAs
1980 1990 2000
(1) (2) (3)
A. High Immigration MSAs
Miami, FL 0.448 0.608 0.692
El Paso, TX 0.339 0.430 0.492
Los Angeles, CA 0.306 0.539 0.632
Jersey City, NJ 0.279 0.391 0.514
New York City, NY 0.255 0.374 0.512
Ventura-Oxnard-Simi Valley, CA 0.193 0.320 0.443
San Francisco, CA 0.189 0.473 0.584
Honolulu, HI 0.184 0.244 0.305
Bergen-Passaic, NJ 0.177 0.250 0.395
San Jose, CA 0.176 0.360 0.534
B. Low Immigration MSAs
Mobile, AL 0.014 0.015 0.027
Indianapolis, IN 0.013 0.016 0.046
Memphis, TN 0.012 0.014 0.052
York, PA 0.012 0.021 0.034
Greensboro, NC 0.011 0.015 0.103
Louisville, KY 0.011 0.011 0.034
Nashville, TN 0.011 0.018 0.076
Chattanooga, TN 0.009 0.011 0.030
Birmingham, AL 0.009 0.010 0.032
Knoxville, TN 0.007 0.008 0.017
Notes: Calculations are estimates of the immigrant share of the adult
population that has no more than a high school degree (i.e. no college
experience). High and low immigration MSAs are those with the 10
highest and lowest low-skilled immigrant shares in 1980.
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Table 1.3 - OLS estimates of immigration effects on native outcomes
Employed Employed Annual
last week last year hours
(1) (2) (3)
A. Natives age 16 and 17
Immig. share of low- -0.458 -0.524 -329.2
skilled pop. (0.036) (0.064) (43.8)
N 526,151 526,151 526,151
Mean (1980) 0.320 0.469 228.7
Mean (2000) 0.309 0.437 199.6
Mean (All years) 0.317 0.466 217.7
B. Natives age 21-64 without a high school degree
Immig. share of low- -0.142 -0.102 -139.1
skilled pop. (0.044) (0.031) (74.8)
N 1,263,407 1,263,407 1,263,407
Mean (1980) 0.561 0.639 1109.1
Mean (2000) 0.498 0.612 1062.3
Mean (All years) 0.536 0.626 1078.9
Notes: Estimates are coefficients on the immigrant share of the adult
population with no more than a high school degree. Standard errors
clustered at the MSA level are reported in parentheses. All
regressions include MSA and year fixed effects and the following
individual-level controls: age, age squared, race dummies, and a
dummy indicating whether the respondent is male. Regressions are
weighted by the reported Census person weight. All regressions use
pooled Census data from 1980, 1990, and 2000.
Table 1.4 - Instrumental variable components and first stage results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
A. Dependent Variable: Low skill immigrant stocks
Predicted low skill immigrant stocks 0.386 0.652 0.248 0.395 0.330 0.351 0.455
(0.030) (0.260) (0.063) (0.025) (0.028) (0.029) (0.016)
N 300 200 200 300 300 234 300
B. Dependent Variable: Low skill native stocks
Predicted low skill native stocks 1.278 1.497 0.749 1.312 1.202 1.323 1.278
(0.055) (0.163) (0.265) (0.056) (0.057) (0.055) (0.055)
N 300 200 200 300 300 234 300
C. Dependent Variable: Low skill immigrant shares
Predicted low skill immigrant shares 0.811 1.174 0.442 0.760 0.539 0.818 0.824
(0.067) (0.134) (0.123) (0.117) (0.079) (0.083) (0.076)
N 300 200 200 300 300 234 300
1980- 1980- 1990- 1980- 1980- 1980- 1980-
2000 1990 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000
Census region/year fixed effects X
MSA-level controls X
Excluding California, New York, Texas X
Excluding own-state inflows (see text) X
Notes: All regressions include MSA and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the MSA level are reported
in parentheses. Regressions are weighted by the number of individuals age 18-64 with reported education no
greater than a high school degree. MSA-level controls in column 5 include the average age of the native
population, and the share of the native population that is: black, male, high school dropouts, and college graduates.
Table 1.5 - 2SLS estimates of immigration effects on native outcomes
Employed Employed Annual
last week last year hours
(1) (2) (3)
A. Natives age 16 and 17
Immig. share of low- -0.482 -0.553 -287.8
skilled pop. (0.054) (0.096) (55.6)
N 526,151 526,151 526,151
Mean (1980) 0.320 0.469 228.7
Mean (2000) 0.309 0.437 199.6
Mean (All years) 0.317 0.466 217.7
B. Natives age 21-64 without a high school degree
Immig. share of low- -0.157 -0.124 -248.9
skilled pop. (0.061) (0.048) (98.7)
N 1,263,407 1,263,407 1,263,407
Mean (1980) 0.561 0.639 1109.1
Mean (2000) 0.498 0.612 1062.3
Mean (All years) 0.536 0.626 1078.9
Notes: Estimates are coefficients on the immigrant share of the adult
population with no more than a high school degree. Standard errors
clustered at the MSA level are reported in parentheses. All
regressions include MSA and year fixed effects and the following
individual-level controls: age, age squared, race dummies, and a
dummy indicating whether the respondent is male. Regressions are
weighted by the reported Census person weight. All regressions use
pooled Census data from 1980, 1990, and 2000.
Table 1.6 - Robustness of the effect of immigration on teen employment, 1980-2005 (2SLS)
Dependent variable: employed last year
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Robustness to immigrant concentration variable
Immig. share of low-
skilled pop.
Immig. share of high-
skilled pop.
Log number of low-
skilled immigrants
-0.524 -0.553
(0.064) (0.096)
526,151 526,151
-0.594
(0.128)
0.172
(0.298)
-0.978
(0.199)
0.915
(0.521)
526,151 526,151
-0.058 -0.156
(0.011) (0.037)
526,151 526,151
B. Robustness to sample selection
Immig. share of low-
skilled pop.
-0.432 -0.853
(0.108) (0.335)
-0.428 -0.359
(0.101) (0.108)
-0.584 -0.625
(0.073) (0.115)
318,413 318,413 348,848 348,848 361,416 361,416
Excluding 1980
Excluding 2000
No CA., TX., NY MSAs
C. Robustness to controls
Immig. share of low-
skilled pop.
N
Census region/year fixed
effects
Including 2005 (ACS)
-0.472 -0.505
(0.079) (0.158)
-0.544 -0.573
(0.060) (0.105)
-0.223 -0.377
(0.105) (0.239)
526,151 526,151 565,884 565,884 565,884 565,884
MSA specific time trends X
Notes: Estimates are coefficients on the immigrant share of the adult population with no more than a high
school degree. Standard errors clustered at the MSA level are reported in parentheses. All regressions
include MSA and year fixed effects and the following individual-level controls: age, age squared, race
dummies, and a dummy indicating whether the respondent is male. Columns 5 and 6 of Panel A also
control for the log of the number of low-skilled natives. Regressions are weighted by the reported Census
person weight. All regressions use pooled Census data from 1980, 1990, and 2000. Estimates in columns
3-6 of Panel C include 2005 ACS data.
Table 1.7 - Differential impact of immigration on occupation-level employment by
communication skills required in the occupation (2SLS)
Dependent variable: log number of employed natives in occupation o
Native teens Low-skilled native
adults
(1) (2)
Low-skilled immig. sharect -0.853 -2.421
(0.210) (0.683)
(Low-skilled immig. share),, x (job's percentile in 0.953 1.840
distribution of communication skills) o (0.157) (0.261)
Average communication percentile of job (all years) 0.346 0.542
N 98,700 98,700
Notes: Estimates are coefficients from occupation-MSA-year level 2SLS regressions of the log
number of teens or native adults employed in occupation o on low skill immigrant shares, and
immigrant shares interacted with communication percentile. The number of employed
individuals in a cell is set equal to 1 if there are no observations for the particular occupation-
year-city. Standard errors clustered at the MSA level are reported in parenthesis. See text for
description of communication percentile. Communication percentile is measured from 0 to 1.
Table 1.8 - Estimated wage impact of immigration and implied employment participation elasticities
Dependent variable: log hourly wage
Natives age 16 and 17 Natives age 21-64 without a high
school degree
OLS IV Selection- OLS IV Selection-
corrected corrected
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Immig. share of low-skilled pop. -0.127 -0.143 -0.366 0.144 -0.062 -0.112
(0.052) (0.086) (0.087) (0.166)
N=238,063 N=722,357
Implied weekly employment 12.0 10.6 4.2 - 4.7 2.6
participation elasticity
Implied annual employment 9.5 8.4 3.3 - 3.2 1.8
participation elasticity
Notes: Estimates in columns 1, 2, 4, and 5 are coefficients on the immigrant share of the adult population with
no more than a high school degree. Selection-corrected wage estimates in columns 3 and 6 are calculated as
described in the text. Standard errors clustered at the MSA level are reported in parentheses. All regressions
include MSA and year fixed effects, the log of the maximum of the state and federal minimum wage, city-level
controls (the average age of the native population, and the share of the native population that is: black, male,
high school dropouts, and college graduates) and individual-level controls (age, age squared, race dummies,
and a dummy indicating whether the respondent is male). Regressions are weighted by the reported Census
person weight. All regressions use pooled Census data from 1980, 1990, and 2000.
Table 1.9A: 2SLS estimates of immigration effects for subsamples of the youth population
Dependent variable: Dependent variable:
Employed last week In school
Males Females Males Females
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Comparison of immigration effects for black youth and all other youth
Low-skilled immigrant share (black youth)
Low-skilled immigrant share (other youth)
N
-0.404
(0.077)
-0.567
(0.050)
209,485
-0.447
(0.069)
-0.638
(0.059)
205,454
0.028
(0.024)
0.043
(0.021)
209,485
0.049
(0.022)
0.045
(0.019)
205,454
Mean, all years [immigration impact relative to mean]
Black youth
All other youth
0.175 [-.231] 0.182 [-.245] 0.910 [.003] 0.912 [.005]
0.347 [-.164] 0.352 [-.181] 0.925 [.005] 0.921 [.005]
B. Comparison of immigration effects for youth from poorer families and all other youth
Low-skilled immigrant share (youth from -0.415 -0.487 0.135
poorer families) (0.046) (0.063) (0.021)
Low-skilled immigrant share (other youth) -0.536 -0.594 0.035
(0.046) (0.055) (0.017)
N 198.893 191.033 198.893
Mean, all years [immigration impact relative to mean]
Youth from poorer families
All other youth
0.216 [-.192]
0.346 [-.155]
0.230 [-.212] 0.871 [.015] 0.886 [.015]
0.353 [-.168] 0.947 [.004] 0.954 [.004]
C. Comparison of immigration effects for urban youth and all other youth
Low-skilled immigrant share (urban youth)
Low-skilled immigrant share (other youth)
N
-0.496
(0.059)
-0.531
(0.084)
167,422
-0.518
(0.064)
-0.579
(0.086)
163,918
0.072
(0.022)
0.041
(0.026)
167,422
Mean, all years [immigration impact relative to mean]
Urban youth
All other youth
0.236 [-.211] 0.240 [-.216] 0.896 [.008] 0.892 [.012]
0.346 [-.154] 0.353 [-.164] 0.936 [.004] 0.933 [.003]
Notes: Estimates are coefficients on the immigrant share of the low-skilled adult population interacted with
dummies for various subgroups of youth. Standard errors clustered at the MSA level are reported in parentheses.
The mean of the dependent variable is reported for various subgroups, and the impact of a 10 percentage point
increase in the low-skilled immigrant share relative to this mean is reported in brackets. All regressions include
MSA and year fixed effects and the following individual-level controls: age, age squared, race dummies, and a
dummy indicating whether the respondent is male. Regressions are weighted by the reported Census person
weight. All regressions use pooled Census data from 1980, 1990, and 2000. Panel B only includes individuals
with at least one matched parent in the Census. Panel C uses the 1990 one percent sample in place of the five
percent sample (see data appendix for details).
0.135
(0.019)
0.041
(0.016)
191,033
0.105
(0.025)
0.026
(0.018)
163,918
Table 1.9B: 2SLS estimates of immigration effects for subsamples of the youth population (cont.)
Dependent variable: Dependent variable:
Employed last week In school
Males Females Males Females
(1) (2) (3) (4)
D. Comparison of immigration effects for urban youth and all other youth,
conditional on being black
Low-skilled immigrant share (urban youth) -0.386 -0.475 -0.013 0.031
(0.088) (0.087) (0.060) (0.034)
Low-skilled immigrant share (other youth) -0.326 -0.391 -0.019 0.031
(0.085) (0.107) (0.062) (0.040)
N 30,006 30,848 30,006 30,848
Mean, all years [immigration impact relative to mean]
Urban youth 0.152 [-.253] 0.160 [-.296] 0.902 [-.001] 0.900 [.003]
All other youth 0.195 [-.168] 0.214 [-.182] 0.932 [-.002] 0.932 [.003]
E. Comparison of immigration effects for black youth and all other youth,
conditional on living in the center city of an MSA
Low-skilled immigrant share (black youth) -0.161 -0.293 -0.010 0.017
(0.145) (0.179) (0.045) (0.042)
Low-skilled immigrant share (other youth) -0.387 -0.503 0.097 0.088
(0.107) (0.145) (0.049) (0.030)
N 53,719 54,026 53,719 54,026
Mean, all years [immigration impact relative to mean]
Black youth 0.152 [-.106] 0.160 [-.182] 0.902 [-.001] 0.900 [.002]
All other youth 0.288 [-.135] 0.293 [-.172] 0.892 [.011] 0.887 [.010]
Notes: Estimates are coefficients on the immigrant share of the low-skilled adult population interacted with
dummies for various subgroups of youth. Standard errors clustered at the MSA level are reported in parentheses.
The mean of the dependent variable is reported for various subgroups, and the impact of a 10 percentage point
increase in the low-skilled immigrant share relative to this mean is reported in brackets. All regressions include
MSA and year fixed effects and the following individual-level controls: age, age squared, race dummies, and a
dummy indicating whether the respondent is male. Regressions are weighted by the reported Census person
weight. All regressions use pooled Census data from 1980, 1990, and 2000. Panels D and E use the 1990 one
percent sample in place of the five percent sample (see data appendix for details).
Table 1.A 1 - Means of teen labor market outcomes, Census
Hourly wage Employed Employed Fraction In school
last year last week weeks
worked
1980 2000 1980 2000 1980 2000 1980 2000 1980 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
A. All teens
8.61 7.74 0.47 0.44 0.31 0.31 0.20 0.20 0.89 0.94
B. Gender (natives)
Males 8.78 7.81 0.51 0.45 0.33 0.31 0.23 0.20 0.89 0.94
Females 8.38 7.59 0.43 0.45 0.29 0.33 0.18 0.20 0.89 0.95
C. Race (natives)
Black 8.96 7.60 0.27 0.31 0.15 0.20 0.09 0.12 0.89 0.94
Non-black 8.58 7.75 0.50 0.46 0.34 0.33 0.22 0.21 0.89 0.94
D. Parental education (natives)
At least one parent does 8.57 7.57 0.39 0.34 0.26 0.25 0.16 0.15 0.86 0.90
not have a HS degree
At least one parent has a 8.63 7.73 0.52 0.47 0.35 0.33 0.23 0.21 0.95 0.97
HS degree
E. Family income (natives)
Family is below the 25 th 8.39 7.41 0.36 0.34 0.23 0.24 0.14 0.14 0.84 0.92
percentile of the income
distribution
Family is above the 2 5th  8.67 7.78 0.50 0.48 0.34 0.34 0.22 0.21 0.94 0.97
percentile of the income
distribution
Notes: Hourly wages are calculated only over those who report positive wages. All other variables are
calculated over the entire given subpopulation. Estimates are averages weighted by Census person weights.
Wages are reported in 2006 dollars. See data appendix for a description of how hourly wages are calculated.
Figure 1.1: Trends in annual employment/population rates by age
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Figure 1.2: Trends in teen summer and school-year employment/population rates
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Figure 1.3: Trends in immigrant shares, by age and education groups
1980 1990 2000 2005
I - No college, 18-40
0 No college, 41-64
-U-- At least some college, 18-40
- At least some college, 41-64
Note: 1970-2000 estimates are from Census microdata. 2005 estimate is from ACS microdata. Estimates are for all non-natives.
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Figure 1.4A: Relationship between changes in MSA teen employment rate and low-skill
immigrant shares, 1980-2000
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Change in MSA low-skill immigrant share, 1980 to 2000
Immigrant shares are calculated over the population without college experience. Regression line is weighted by the size
of the 16-17 year old MSA population in 2000.
Figure 1.4B: Relationship between changes in MSA adult dropout
skill immigrant shares, 1980-2000
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Figure 1.5A: Coefficient on immigrant share (IV estimates), by age
Dependent variable: employed in the last week
16 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 64
Age
Sample limited to those without a high school degree, both sexes
Figure 1.5B: Coefficient on age-specific immigrant share (IV estimates), by age
Dependent variable: employed in the last week
Age
Sample limited to those without a high school degree, both sexes
Figure 1.6: Immigration effects on youth wages in a labor market with a binding minimum wage
Lmin L*
Note: In this model, immigration reduces demand for teen labor from D to D'. Teen wages fall
from w* to wmin, and the number of employed teens falls from L* to Lmin.

Chapter 2
Minimal Impact: The Minimum
Wage's Role in the Evolution of U.S.
Wage Inequality over Three Decades
(with David Autor and Alan
Manning)
2.1 Introduction
While economists have vigorously debated the effect of the minimum wage on employment
levels for at least six decades (cf. Stigler, 1946), its contribution to the evolution of earnings
inequality-that is, the shape of the earnings distribution-was largely overlooked prior to
the seminal 1996 contribution of DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (DFL hereafter). Using ker-
nel density techniques, DFL produced overwhelming visual evidence that the minimum wage
substantially 'held up' the lower tail of the US earnings distribution in 1979, yielding a pro-
nounced spike in hourly earnings at the nominal minimum value, particularly for females. By
1988, however, this spike had virtually disappeared. Simultaneously, the inequality of hourly
earnings increased markedly in both the upper and lower halves of the wage distribution. Most
relevant to this paper, the female 10/50 ('lower tail') log hourly earnings ratio expanded by 23
log points (two thirds) between 1979 and 1988, while male and pooled-gender 10/50 ratios grew
by 5.7 and 10.5 log points in the same interval (Table 2.1). To assess the causes of this rise,
DFL constructed counterfactual wage distributions that potentially account for the impact of
changing worker characteristics, labor demand, union penetration, and minimum wages on the
shape of the wage distribution. Comparing counterfactual with observed wage densities, DFL
conclude that the erosion of the federal minimum wage-which declined in real terms by 30
log points between 1979 and 1988-was the predominant cause of rising lower tail inequality
between 1979 and 1988, explaining two-thirds of the growth of the 10/50 for both males and
females. 1
Though striking, a well-understood limitation of the DFL findings is that the counterfactual
wage distributions derive exclusively from reweighting of observed wage densities rather than
controlled comparisons. As such, the DFL exercise is closer in spirit to simulation than inference.
Cognizant of this limitation, DFL highlight in their conclusion that the expansion of lower tail
inequality during 1979 to 1988 was noticeably more pronounced in 'low-wage' than 'high-wage
states,' consistent with the hypothesis that the falling federal minimum caused a differential
increase in lower tail equality in states where the minimum wage was initially more binding.
Building on this observation, Lee (1999) exploits cross-state variation in the gap between state
median wages and the applicable federal or state minimum wage (the 'effective minimum')
to estimate what the share of the observed rise wage inequality during 1979 through 1991
was due to the falling minimum rather than changes in underlying ('latent') wage inequality.
Amplifying the conclusions of DFL, Lee estimates that more than the entire rise of lower tail
earnings inequality between 1979 and 1989 was due to the falling federal minimum wage; had the
minimum been constant throughout this period, observed wage inequality would have fallen.2
These influential findings present a number of puzzles. First, the rise in lower tail inequal-
ity during the 1980s was accompanied by an equally pronounced increase in dispersion in the
upper-half (90/50) of the distribution (Figure 2.1b), an area where the minimum is unlikely
'DFL attribute 62 percent of the growth of the female 10/50 and 65 percent of the growth of the male 10/50
to the declining value of the minimum wage (Table III).
2Using cross-region rather than cross-state variation in the 'bindingness' of minimum wages, Teulings (2000
and 2003) reaches similar conclusions. See also Mishel, Bernstein and Allegretto (2006, chapter 3)(Mishel,
Bernstein and Allegretto 2006) for an assessment of the minimum wage's effect on wage inequality.
to be relevant. Though the contemporaneous rises in upper and lower tail inequality need not
have identical causes, it would be surprising if they had no causes in common. Second, at no
time between 1979 and 2007 were more than eight percent of male hours paid at or below the
federal (or applicable state) minimum wage (Table 2.1). If the falling minimum wage explains
the bulk of the rise in male wage inequality, this implies extremely large spillovers from the
minimum wage to non-covered workers. Finally, the Lee analysis uncovers, and scrupulously
reports, a number of puzzling results that cast some doubt on the validity of the exercise.3
Most surprisingly, the main estimates imply that the declining federal minimum wage substan-
tially reduced the growth of upper-tail inequality in both the male and pooled-gender wage
distributions during 1979 to 1991, a finding that appears implausible on a priori grounds.4
Spurred by these puzzles, we offer a fresh analysis of the impact of state and federal minimum
wages on the shape of the US earnings distribution. Our work benefits from substantially longer
state-level wage panels than were available to earlier studies, and from a proliferation of state
minimum wage laws enacted after 2000 that generate usable state variation in wage floors.5
Our statistical approach follows closely the model of Lee and Teulings; we obtain identification
by using cross-state and over-time variation in the 'bindingness' of federal and applicable state
minimum wages. The main advance of our approach is in estimation. Because the impact
of the minimum wage will in part depend upon where in the wage distribution the statutory
minimum falls, it is necessary to scale the statutory minimum by some measure of expected
'bindingness.' Lee (1999) proposes a natural scaling: the gap between the log state minimum
and log state median wage, which Lee labels the 'effective minimum.' This approach introduces
a potential confound, however, which is that the median wage appears on both sides of the
estimating equation (in the effective minimum wage and in the 10/50 earnings ratio, and other
inequality metrics). This is problematic inasmuch as sampling variation in the median wage
measure may generate simultaneity bias in OLS models that leads to inflated estimates of the
effect of the minimum on state wage distributions.6 Cognizant of the possibility of simultaneity
SThese results are presented with admirable candor, and discussed in detail, by the author.
4See Lee (1999) Table II. The large, positive and highly significant coefficients in this table imply that a 1 log
point in the effective minimum wage (defined as the difference between the log state minimum wage and the log
state median wage), reduces male and pooled-gender 90/50 log wage inequality by 0.16 to 0.44 log points.
5As of 2007, 30 states had established state minimum wages that exceeded the federal level (Table 2.1).
6This problem is exacerbated when state fixed effects are included as more of the remaining variation in the
bias, Lee takes a number of steps to minimize its impact. These steps do not appear to fully
resolve the problem, as we show below.
In this paper, we apply the canonical (Durbin, 1954) technique to purge simultaneity bias
induced by errors-in-variables: we instrument the error-ridden effective minimum wage variable
with a variable that does not contain correlated measurement error, the statutory minimum
wage. This instrumental variable approach, first used by Card, Katz and Krueger (1993) in
their reanalysis of the employment effects of minimum wage laws, fixes simultaneity bias so long
as the statutory minimum is exogenous. 7 For purposes of comparison to these 2SLS estimates,
we also replicate Lee's (1999) OLS models and extend them to 2007.
Our main results are as follows. In partial confirmation of prior work, we find that the
minimum wage significantly affects the shape of the US wage distribution during the 1980s,
particularly for females. However, simultaneity bias causes OLS estimates to substantially
overestimate the contribution of the minimum wage to inequality. This problem is most severe
for the male and pooled-gender wage distributions, but is also pronounced for the female distri-
bution.8 During the period of 1979 through 1988, when the erosion of the minimum wage was
most rapid, OLS models appear to overstate the contribution of the minimum wage to rising
inequality by 450 percent for males, 240 percent for both sexes combined, and 160 percent
for females. After accounting for the decompressing effect of the falling minimum wage, OLS
estimates suggest that latent wage inequality decreased during 1979 to 1988. By contrast, 2SLS
models indicate that the minimum wage explains at most one-third of the substantial increase
in inequality during this period. Graphical comparisons of OLS and 2SLS estimates reinforce
the conclusion that OLS estimates are unlikely to be reliable.
To benchmark the generality of these findings, we calculate the contribution of the minimum
wage to inequality during two subsequent periods of minimum wage erosion, 1991 to 1996 and
1998 to 2006. In these two time intervals, the employment-weighted average of state minimum
wages fell by 12.7 log points and 10.1 log points, respectively. 2SLS estimates indicate that the
effective minimum wage is the result of sampling variation.
7If it is not exogenous, the OLS approach is also invalid. We provide some evidence of the validity of this
assumption by documenting that essentially all changes in wage structure accompanying changes in the minimum
occur within one calendar quarter of the law change, and not in the surrounding quarters before or thereafter.
SThe problem is likely more severe for the male and the pooled distributions because the minimum wage is
largely non-binding in these samples, so identification of OLS models is primarily driven by simultaneity bias
rather than statutory variation in the minimum wage.
falling minimum contributed negligibly (no more than 2 log points) to male and pooled-gender
wage inequality during both periods. 2SLS estimate for females are only are only slightly larger.
By contrast, OLS models suggest that the declining minimum masked substantial compressions
of (latent) female and pooled-gender inequality in both periods-a result that likely derives
from simultaneity bias.
The modest effects of the minimum on inequality that we identify may arise through two
channels: a direct (mechanical) impact whereby wages below the minimum are increased 9; and
an indirect (spillover) effect whereby earnings above the minimum are also pushed upward
(due perhaps to incentive or equity considerations). While our 2SLS models capture the net of
these two effects, it is also of interest to analyze their separate contributions since any usable
forecast of the effect of the minimum on wage inequality must account for spillovers (if present).
Identifying these spillovers requires an empirical model of the full latent distribution of wages
(or at least its lower tail), purged of both direct and indirect minimum wage effects. We
model each states' latent wage distribution as log-normal. We estimate the parameters of these
distributions using wage observations from higher percentiles of the distribution, where the
minimum wage is unlikely to be relevant. We calculate the mechanical impact of the minimum
wage by truncating the lower tail of the (estimated) latent distribution, and we infer spillovers
by comparing the 'mechanical' distribution with the observed distribution.
Though the minimum wage had only a modest effect on inequality over 1979 to 2007,
spillovers were a significant component of this impact. At its highest level (in 1979), the mini-
mum wage mechanically raised percentiles in the female distribution by 4 log points on average,
and spillovers raised percentiles by an additional 2 log points on average. Both the direct and
spillover effects were considerably smaller for males and for the pooled distribution. As the real
minimum eroded between 1979 and 2007, both direct effects and spillovers fell by more than
half. Notably, spillovers appear to account for a somewhat larger share--approximately half-
of the minimum wage's (modest) impact in 1997 than in 1979, when the spillover contribution
was one-third of the total effect.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 describes the data and presents
9We assume no disemployment effects at the modest minimum wage levels mandated in the US, an assumption
that is supported by a large recent literature.
simple, reduced-form estimates of the relationship between the statutory minimum wage and
inequality throughout the distribution. Section 2.3 presents more fully parameterized models
that, like Lee (1999), explicitly account for the bite of the minimum wage in estimating its
effect on the wage distribution. This section compares parameterized OLS and 2SLS models,
and documents the pitfalls that arise in the OLS estimation. Section 2.4 summarizes two sets
of counterfactual exercises. The first exercises, following Lee, uses point estimates from the
main regression models to calculate counterfactual changes in wage inequality holding the real
minimum wage constant. The second analysis uses parametric estimates of the latent wage
distribution to provide a full accounting of mechanical and spillover effects. The final section
concludes.
2.2 Change in the federal minimum wage and variation in state
minimum wages
The Federal minimum wage remained constant in nominal terms over the nine-year period
between 1981 and 1990. Similarly, the Federal minimum wage remained at $5.15 between
September 1997 and July 2007, and by July 2007, the real value of the Federal minimum was
lower than it had been at any point in the past fifty years (Figure 2.1). The difference between
the two periods is that by the late 1980s, only 15 states minimum wages exceeded the federal
minimum wage; by 2007, 30 state minimum wages did. As a result, the average real value of
the minimum wage applicable to workers in 2007 was not much lower than it was in 1997, and
was significantly higher than if states had not enacted their own minimum wages. Appendix
Table 2.1 illustrates the extent of state minimum wage variation between 1979 and 2007.
We use these differences in minimum wages across states and over time as one source of
variation for identifying the impact of the minimum wage on the wage distribution. As an
additional form of variation, we use the notion that the wage distribution of lower wage states
should be more affected for a given value of the real minimum wage. Table 2.1 provides examples
of this. For each year, there is significant variation in the percentile of the state wage distribution
where the state or federal minimum wage "binds." For instance, in 1979 the minimum wage
was equal to the 6th percentile of the female wage distribution in Alaska, Connecticut, and
Washington, equal to the 30th percentile in Mississippi, and the median percentile at which it
bound, across all states, was around the 13th percentile. In 1979, this variation in the "bite"
or "bindingness" of the minimum wage is due mainly to cross-state differences in wage levels,
since only Alaska had a state minimum wage that exceeded the federal minimum. In later
years-particularly 2000 and after-this variation is also due to differences in the value of state
minimum wages.
2.2.1 Sample and variable construction
Our analysis uses the percentiles of states' annual wage distributions as the primary outcomes
of interest. We form these by pooling all individual responses from the Current Population
Survey Merged Outgoing Rotation Group (CPS MORG) for each year. An individual's wage
is taken to be his reported hourly wage, if the individual reports being paid by the hour,
and is otherwise calculated as weekly earnings divided by weekly hours worked. We limit the
sample to individuals age 18 through 64, and we multiply top-coded values by 1.5. We make
no adjustment for individuals with particularly low wages (i.e. sub-minimum wages). We then
take these individual wage data and calculate all percentiles of the male, female, and pooled
state wage distributions for 1979-2007, weighting individual observations by their CPS sampling
weight multiplied by their weekly hours worked.
Our primary analysis is at the state-year level. However, minimum wages often change
during the middle of a year. We resolve this by assigning the value of the minimum wage that
was in effect the longest throughout the calendar year to the state-year observation. For those
states and years in which a different minimum wage was in effect for six months in the year,
the maximum of the two is used. Alternatively, we have tried assigning the maximum of the
minimum wage within a year as the applicable minimum wage, and this leaves our conclusions
unchanged.
2.2.2 Initial evidence on the impact of the minimum wage on the wage dis-
tribution: Reduced form estimates
We begin by describing the empirical relationship between median-scaled percentiles of the
male, female, and pooled wage distributions and functions of the real value of the minimum
wage. In particular, we estimate the following first-differenced equation:
[wst(p) - wst(.5)] - [wst-l(p) - wft-1(.5)} = at + f(w') - f(w _ 1) + est (2.1)
where wst(p) is the log wage at the pth percentile in state s at time t and wl1 is the log of
the applicable nominal minimum wage (i.e. the maximum of the federal and state minimum
wages). We take f(w') to be:
f(w') = f1wM + o2 (w)2  (2.2)
St rp s t - rp(Wst
For now, we view this specification as a way to succinctly demonstrate the relationship
between states' minimum wages and all percentiles of states' wage distributions. This is not
our primary specification since the minimum wage is not properly scaled; in order to make
predictions about the effects of changes in the minimum wage, f(wm) must scale the minimum
by some measure of its bindingness in the wage distribution (i.e. by the wage level of the state).
This is the approach we use in the following section, and it leads us to an instrumental variables
estimation strategy for which equation 1 is the reduced form. We allow a quadratic term in the
log of the minimum wage so as to allow the effect of the minimum wage to vary based on its
level.
We estimate equation 1 over the 1st through 99th percentiles of the male, female, and pooled
state wage distributions using annual data from 1979 to 2007. We include all 50 states, and
weight our regressions by the sum of individuals' sample weights multiplied by hours worked
per week. When reporting regression estimates, we exclude the lowest 5 percentiles since these
often represent wages significantly below the minimum wage, and it seems likely that these are
highly misreported. We exclude the upper 5 percentiles since the level at which wages are top-
coded changes over our sample period. Figures 2.2a and 2.2b display estimates of the marginal
effect of the log minimum wage when evaluated at its weighted average across states and years.
Table 2.2 displays estimates of •p and 02 , as well as the marginal effects of the log minimum
wage, for various percentiles.
For the female wage distribution, there is a positive and statistically significant association
between the median-scaled value of log wage percentiles and the log of the minimum wage
through at least the 15th percentile. This is well beyond where the minimum wage tends to be
binding; referring back to table 1, the median percentile at which the minimum was binding
in 1979 was around the 13th percentile, and in 2007 it was the 4th percentile. A 10 log point
increase in the minimum wage is associated with a 3 log point reduction in log(p5)-log(p50),
and a 1 point reduction in log(pl0)-log(p50). For males, a statistically significant relationship
appears to exist only up to the 10th percentile, and the magnitude of this association at lower
percentiles is significantly less than for females, although the magnitude of the association is
positive (though statistically insignificant) throughout the distribution. For both males and
females, the relationship between upper tail percentiles and the minimum wage is statistically
indistinguishable from zero.
Appendix Figures 2.1a and 2.1b provide estimates of equation (2.1), estimated at the quar-
terly level rather than the annual level, additionally including one lead and lag of the minimum
wage and its square. The figures plot the marginal effects for the lead, lag, and contempora-
neous change in the minimum, evaluated at the average of the log minimum wage across all
states and years. Circles indicate where the marginal effects are statistically significant at the
5 percent level.
For the female wage distribution, there is a strong and significant relationship between
increases in lower tail percentiles and changes in the minimum wage in the quarter that the leg-
islated minimum changes. There is some evidence of a continued relationship between increases
in lower tail percentiles and changes in the minimum wage in the previous quarter, suggesting
that wage distribution adjustment may take at least one quarter. Estimates for the male wage
distribution are less precise, and suggest, if anything, that changes in lower tail percentiles are
negatively associated with changes in the minimum wage in the previous quarter. However,
for both the male and female wage distribution there is no evidence of an association between
changes in lower tail percentiles and changes in the minimum wage that occur in the subsequent
quarter. This suggests against the possibility of anticipation effects or that the observed rela-
tionship in Figures 2.2a and 2.2b is because changes in the legislated value of state minimum
wage occur in states that were already experiencing lower tail contraction prior to the minimum
wage change. We consider this evidence in support of using legislated changes in the minimum
wage as an instrument for changes in the "effective minimum," which we discuss in further
detail in the subsequent section.
These results constitute our initial evidence that there appears to be a strong and positive
relationship between changes in the value of the minimum wage and changes in lower percentiles
of the wage distribution, that this relationship is stronger for the female wage distribution, and
that there is little association between changes in the minimum wage and changes in upper
tail percentiles. These estimates provide meaningful correlations of the relationship between
changes in wage percentiles and changes in the minimum wage, but do not provide parameter
estimates that can be used to predict how state wage distributions' would respond to changes
in the minimum wage. The next section considers an alternative specification that can be used
to do so by specifying and estimating a model that scales the minimum wage by a measure of
the state's wage level.
2.3 Parametric estimation
The previous section has shown that there seems to be an impact of the minimum wage on the
wage distribution beyond the point at which the minimum wage binds. That raises the possi-
bility that the contribution of the minimum wage to the evolution of wage inequality is larger
than one might have expected given the fraction of workers paid the minimum wage. How-
ever, the reduced form specifications we have estimated so far are not well-suited to evaluating
this claim because of problems with the assumptions about the way in which the minimum
wage affects the wage distribution. To see this, consider (2.1). In this specification the impact
of a change in the minimum wage on the wage distribution depends only on the level of the
real minimum wage--it does not depend on any other feature of the wage distribution. That
is implausible--it is intuitively appealing that the impact should depend on the level of the
minimum wage relative to the general level of wages. Although these reduced form estimates
will have some internal validity-they can be interpreted loosely as average effects within our
sample-we are hesitant to claim any external validity as would be required to answer questions
like 'what would have been the evolution of wage inequality if minimum wages had not changed
relative to average earnings?'
This problem was recognized by Lee (1999) who used the log of the minimum relative to
the median as his measure of the 'bite' of the minimum wage. We will also use this measure
and refer to it as the effective minimum. 10
Use of the effective minimum can be justified in the following way, which fleshes out the
arguments used by Lee (1999). Denote by w*t(p) the log wage in state s at time t for percentile
p in the absence of the minimum wage-call this the latent wage distribution. With a minimum
wage, denoted in log form by w', the actual log wage at percentile p, which we will denote by
wst(p) will deviate from the latent distribution for at least some percentiles. If, for example,
the minimum wage had no effect on employment rates, and no spill-overs then we would have
the relationship:
wst(p) = max[w*t(p), w'] (2.3)
However, if there are spill-overs or some employment effects then the minimum wage will
have an effect on percentiles above where it binds (see Lee, 1999, for more discussion of these
arguments, or Teulings, 2000, for an explicit supply and demand model with this feature). So,
let us generalize (2.3) to the form:
Wst(P) = 4w;t (p), w't] (2.4)
What are plausible restrictions on the function 0[.,.]? We would expect it to be increasing
in both its arguments and also that it satisfies a homogeneity property-that if the latent
percentile and the minimum wages both rise in the same proportion, the actual percentile also
rises in that proportion. As the model is expressed in logs this restriction can be written as:
¢[wt(p) + a, w' + a] = a + ¢[w* (p), wn] (2.5)
Now set a = -w* t and applying (2.5) to (2.4) we have that:
wst(P) = wst(p) + [0, wq - w*t(p) ] = wst(p) + ((w"s' - Ws*t(p)) (2.6)
i.e. that the deviation of the actual percentile from the latent percentile depends on the
10The OECD also use the minimum relative to the median as their measure of the bite of the minimum wage.
gap between the minimum and the latent percentile. What are the plausible restrictions on the
function 0(.)? We would expect it to be positive everywhere (otherwise the minimum wage
would reduce wages at some percentiles) and to have a positive first derivative. In addition,
if the minimum wage is very low (or non-existent) we would expect the actual percentile to
be very close to the latent percentile so that we have (-oo) = 0. On the other hand, if
the minimum wage gets very high we would expect the actual percentile to be very close to
the minimum wage so that we have limx-,o O(x) = x. Graphically, we might expect that
the relationship between deviations of the actual from the latent percentile and the difference
between the minimum wage and the latent percentile looks something like that presented in
Figure 2.3.
This discussion should make it clear that non-linearity is likely to be an important feature of
(2.6) so that some thought needs to be given to the functional form of the estimating equation.
In what follows, our main specification uses a quadratic approximation (as does Lee, 1999), and
we approximate (2.6) by:
wst(p) = Wst(p) + Co + Q1(w't -wD(P)) + 2 (S - t(p))2  (2.7)
However, it should be noted that a quadratic cannot have a shape similar to that drawn
above over the whole of its range so that we have to exercise caution in estimating minimum
wage effects outside the observed sample. In particular, this specification cannot really be used
for an assessment of what the distribution of wages would be like if there was no minimum
wage.
To make (2.7) into an estimable equation wage we need to put some additional structure
on the form taken by the latent wage distribution. We follow Lee (1999) in assuming that the
latent wage distribution can be summarized by 2 parameters - the median and the variance so
that we can write:
w*t(P) = -- st + astF-'(p) (2.8)
Where we have the normalization F- 1(0.5) = 0 so that Mit is the median log wage in state
s at time t. Plugging (2.8) into (2.7) and collecting terms we have that:
wst(p) - pst = ao + ost(1 - a 1)F-1(p) + a 2[stF-1 (P)]2 + (2.9)
[al - 2a2  tF(p)](w - Ist) + a2(Ws - s)2
The first two terms are related to the overall evolution of wage inequality and last two
terms to the effect of the effective minimum. Note that the coefficients in (2.9) will vary with
the percentile, not just because p appears in the linear term of the effective minimum but also
because, as pointed out by White (1980), the coefficients a will vary with the data. Intuitively
we would expect that a rise in latent wage inequality leads to a larger impact on lower percentiles
for a given effective minimum.
For (2.9) to be estimable one also needs models for the median and variance. There are
a number of options here and we start our discussion with the choices made by Lee. Lee
replaces Ist by the observed median, at by a set of time dummies and assumes that any cross-
state variation in latent wage inequality is uncorrelated with the median and can therefore be
subsumed into the error without causing bias in the estimated impact of the minimum wage.
Hence, the Lee equation can be written as:
wst(p) - wt (0.5) = at + 31 (w's - wat (0.5)) + 022(ws - wt (0.5)) 2  (2.10)
In the first three columns of Table 2.3 we present estimates of 01 and 22 from equation
(10) for our sample period 1979-2007 for selected percentiles, as well as marginal effects when
estimated at the weighted average of the effective minimum over all states and years in our
sample. If we look at the lower percentiles, we find, as Lee did, large significant effects of the
minimum wage reaching the 30th percentile for men and the 40th percentile for women. However,
there are good reasons to be skeptical of these estimates as one also finds large significant effects
for men at the top of the distribution. This is even more apparent when one plots the estimated
marginal effects of the minimum wage (evaluated at is weighted average across states for the
period 1979-2007), as in figures 2.4a, 2.5a, and 2.6a. The implausibility of the male estimates
is especially clear.
One possible form of misspecification is that the identifying assumption that state latent
wage inequality is uncorrelated with the median is false. Indeed if we regress the log(60)-log(40)
on the median (which should be uncorrelated if the density function is symmetric around the
median) and time dummies (to capture the controls put in equation (2.8)), the log median
has a t-statistic of 17 for females, 2.5 for men and 15 for the combined sample. This suggests
that those states with high median wages have high levels of latent wage inequality. Since
this seemingly indicates permanent differences in latent wage inequality across states, then one
might think of including state fixed effects in (2.10)-Lee also reports this type of specification
(Tables II and III), and we have replicated these results as well (unreported). However, this
makes the implausibility problem even worse-the estimated impacts of the minimum wage at
the top of the distribution are now large and positive for all sets of estimates.
The explanation for this problem is almost certainly a point made by Lee (1999)-the
presence of the median in both the dependent and independent variables in (2.10) induces an
artificial positive correlation caused by sampling variation. This gets worse when state fixed
effects are included as more of the remaining variation is the result of sampling variation.
Lee (1999) is aware of this problem and his preferred solution is to use two different measures
of central tendency in the dependent and independent variables. In the dependent variable he
continues to use the median but he uses the trimmed mean on the right-hand side (i.e. the mean
after excluding the bottom and top 30 percentiles). Although this does reduce the correlation,
it does not eliminate it. In fact, one can show that if the latent log wage distribution is normal,
the correlation between the trimmed mean and the median will be about 0.93-i.e. not one,
but very high (see the derivation in the Appendix). So, this method does not really solve the
problem.
Here, we use another method to estimate an equation like (2.10). Instead of estimating
by OLS we instrument the effective minimum terms. As instruments we use the minimum
wage and its square and the minimum wage interacted with a measure of the average wage
in the state. This latter instrument is to give us instruments which differ in their ability to
discriminate between the linear and quadratic terms. For the linear and quadratic terms in the
effective minimum, the first-stage is simply the reduced forms discussed previously. We also
estimate the model in first-differenced form-this will eliminate any permanent differences in
wage inequality across states. 11
The last three columns of Table 2.3 report the results from this specification. There are a
number of points to note. First, the estimates are more plausible than the OLS estimates. The
estimated impact on the top percentiles is never significantly different from zero while those
for the lowest percentile are. But the estimated impacts of the minimum wage at the lower
percentiles are all much lower than those estimated in the OLS specifications. Nonetheless
they are significantly different from zero and do reach further up the wage distribution than
the direct effects, suggesting there are spillovers. In addition both the linear and quadratic
terms are generally positive supporting the convexity of the relationship argued for above.
However, there is considerable collinearity between the linear and quadratic terms which makes
the standard errors of the individual coefficients often appear very large.
Figures 2.4b, 2.5b, and 2.6b plot the estimated marginal effect for each percentile when the
log of the effective minimum is evaluated at its sample mean. For men the estimated effect
seem to be positive up to the 1 5th percentile (though is only significantly different from zero up
to the 8 th).12 For women there are significant effects up to the 17 th but a positive effect would
seem to remain almost up to the median. For males and females together the effects seem to
reach to the 1 5 th percentile. 13
2.4 Benchmarking the effect of the minimum wage on the shape
of the wage distribution
Our analysis confirms a significant impact of the minimum wage on wage inequality. To develop
a precise sense of the size of this contribution, we conduct two sets of analyses. The first,
following Lee (1999), uses point estimates from the main models to estimate the changes in wage
inequality that would counterfactually have occurred had the minimum wage held constant at
11We do not report OLS specifications in first-differenced form. Unsurprisingly, this magnifies the problems
caused by sampling variation so that the estimates obtained in this way are implausible.
12 Because we would expect the impact of the minimum wage to go to zero as we move up the percentiles, there
will inevitably be some percentiles with effects that are positive but insignificantly different from zero. So it is
not appropriate simply to argue that the minimum wage only effects percentiles where it has a significant effect.
13As a robustness check we also estimated models with a cubic in the effective minimum and found similar
results. We do not present these results here, but report the robustness of our results to the choice of a quadratic
versus cubic specification in our analysis of counterfactual wage distributions in Section 2.4.
a given real level. This analysis provides an estimate of the net contribution of the minimum
to wage inequality. It does not distinguish between mechanical and spillover effects, however.
The second analysis decomposes these two effects through a more ambitious modeling exercise.
2.4.1 Counterfactual wage inequality estimates with the real minimum held
constant
A straightforward approach to gauging the contribution of the minimum wage to inequality
trends is to use the earlier regression estimates to calculate counterfactual wage distributions,
holding the effective minimum wage constant. Following Lee (1999), we calculate for each
observation in the dataset its rank in its respective state wage distribution. We then adjust
each wage by the quantity:
Aw = P /3 (ms,o - mis,rl) + 7 2 (2,ro - 2,71) (2.11)
where iis,,,l is the observed end-of period effective minimum in state s in some year 71, ms,ro
is the corresponding beginning-of-period effective minimum in TO0, and 1, /I2 are point estimates
from the OLS and 2SLS estimates in Table 2.3. We pool these adjusted wage observations to
form a counterfactual national wage distribution, and we compare changes in inequality in the
simulated distribution to those in the observed distribution. 14 One feature of this simulation
procedure bears note: it does not permit estimation the full 'latent' distribution of wages-i.e.,
in the absence of any minimum wage--since the effective minimum wage measure, equal to the
logarithm of the minimum minus the logarithm of the median, is undefined at a minimum wage
of zero. This simulation tool is therefore appropriate for estimating the impact of the minimum
wage over ranges observed in the data. We address this infirmity in the subsequent sub-section.
Panel A of Table 2.4 shows that the female 10/50 log wage ratio increased by 23.2 log points
between 1979 and 1988. Applying the OLS point estimates from Table 2.3, we calculate that
the 10/50 would counterfactually have risen by only 2.1 log points over this period had the 1988
effective minimum been in places in 1979. Thus, consistent with Lee (1999), OLS estimates
14Also distinct from Lee, we use states' observed median wages when calculating in rather than the national
median deflated by the price index. This choice has no substantive effect on the results, but appears most
consistent with the identifying assumptions.
imply that the minimum wage can account for the bulk (21.1 of 23.2 log points) of the observed
expansion of lower tail female wage inequality in this period. 15 The next two rows of the table
present analogous counterfactuals using the 2SLS in lieu of OLS point estimates. Here we find
that the falling minimum wage explains no more than 8 of 23 log points of the expansion of
the female lower tail, and this result is similar across quadratic and cubic specifications. When
these calculations are repeated for the male and pooled-gender wage distributions (panels B
and C), the contrast between OLS and 2SLS estimates is even shaper. OLS models imply that
the falling minimum explains more than all of the 5.7 and 10.5 log point expansions of the male
and pooled-gender distributions between 1979 and 1988. 2SLS estimates instead suggest that
the minimum explains no more than one-third of the total expansion of the 10/50 of either
distribution in either period.
How robust are these findings across time periods and specifications? In panels B and C
of Table 2.4, we calculate identical regression-based counterfactuals for two subsequent time
periods during which the real minimum dropped rapidly: 1991 to 1996, when it fell by 12.7
log points, and 1998 to 2006, when it fell by 10.1 log points. 16 While expansion of lower
tail inequality was much smaller during these intervals, the pattern of counterfactuals is quite
similar. OLS estimates imply in nearly all cases that, were the effective minimum held at its end
of period level throughout, inequality would either decreased or remained stable during these
time intervals. 17 2SLS estimates instead suggest that the falling minimum had at best a modest
effect on inequality. Similar to our findings for 1979 to 1988, we estimate that the minimum
accounts for one-third to one half of the rise in female lower tail inequality, and one-fifth to
one-third of the rise in male and pooled-gender inequality. The discrepancy between OLS and
2SLS results is therefore not specific to the extensively studied 1979 through 1988 interval.
The above simulations are calculated by applying point estimates from models fit to the full
15Lee (Table IV) estimates that the female 10/50 rose by 18.6 log points between 1979 and 1989, and that the
falling minimum accounts for all but 4.5 log points of this increase. We focus on the interval of 1979 to 1988
rather than 1979 to 1989 because wage lower tail wage inequality for males had already begun to reverse course
by 1989. If we instead focus on 1979 to 1989, our results are substantively identical.
16 Since state and federal minimum wages begin to diverge meaningfully after 1997, we report the hours-weighted
average of minimum wages faced by US workers. We study the period to 2006 because the state minimums make
a large jump in 2007, reversing the drop that informs the counterfactual.
17 An exception is male inequality during 1991 to 1996, where the OLS model implies that the minimum had
no effect.
1979 through 2007 sample to specific sub-periods of the data. Since our primary inference con-
cerns sub-periods in which the minimum wage was declining most rapidly, a second robustness
test is to compare models fit using only data from the years of interest for each counterfactual
calculation. A complementary approach is to fit models using only out of sample years for each
counterfactual, applying the point estimates to the years of interest.
Appendix Table 2.2 summarizes results of these alternative approaches. Comparison of
columns (1) through (3) with columns (4) through (6) of the table shows that counterfactuals
based on only in-sample estimates for the years of interest (1979 to 1988, 1991 to 1996, or
1998 to 2006) are closely comparable to those based on full-sample estimation. This pattern
suggests that point estimates obtained from sub-intervals of the data are reasonably comparable
to those obtained from the full sample. Columns (6) through (9) present calculations in which
we use out-of-sample data to form point estimates, and these are used to form counterfactuals
for in-sample years. These results again prove comparable to the primary estimates, with the
exception of 1991 to 1996, in which results are a bit less stable than other time periods. In
net, these simple, regression-based simulation results suggest a consistent, modest effect of the
declining minimum wage on the evolution of lower tail wage inequality. The minimum accounts
for about one-third of the rise in female inequality, and a smaller share for males and for the
pooled distribution.
2.4.2 Decomposing the direct and spillover effects of the minimum wage
One intriguing implication of the results so far is that the minimum wage must have spillovers.
To see this, note that that even at its most binding, the minimum wage was never above the 12th
percentile of the male wage distribution in any state, and was always below the 10th percentile
after 1981 (Table 2.1). Yet, the main estimates imply that the minimum wage compressed the
male 10/50 ratio modestly, even in the late 1990s. Thus, the minimum must have had spillovers
onto higher percentiles. A natural question then arises as to the relative size of the direct and
spillover effects on the wage distribution. To infer these effects requires an estimate of the latent
wage distribution in all parts of the distribution, even those percentiles that are always below
where the minimum binds. It also requires extrapolation of the effect of the minimum wage on
the earnings distribution to the case where the minimum wage did not bind. Inferring these
effects requires more structure, and thus more stringent assumptions, than we have previously
imposed. There is some unavoidable extrapolation in this exercise, although we will attempt
to verify that the assumptions are not violated in the regions of the data that we observe.
To model the effect of the minimum on the actual distribution we need to use a functional
form that has the shape shown in Figure 2.3. We follow Lee (1999) in using the following
version of (2.6):
wst(p) = wt(p) + w - wt(p) (2.12)P1 
-e- t[W  
- sW *
(P) ]
where p > 0 is a parameter that measures the size of the spill-over effect. If p = 0 the model
of (2.12) reduces to one where those with w*(p) < wm have their wage raised to the minimum
but there are no spillovers. Higher values of p imply higher spillovers. With this functional
form, the spillover effects are largest for those just affected by the minimum wage (i.e. those
for whom w*(p) = w m ) and, for these workers, the increase in log wages is equal to p.
To estimate the model, we also need some assumption about the latent log wage distribution.
We assume this is normal-i.e., we use the model of (2.8) with F having the standard normal
form. We use a two-step estimation procedure-first we estimate the latent wage distribution
using parts of the wage distribution where we think the minimum has no effect, and we use
between the 40th and 60th percentiles for this purpose. We model both jit and ast of (2.8)
as additive year and state dummies, that is, we allow both mean and variance to vary across
state and time . With these estimates we can then estimate the latent wage distribution for
all percentiles. So in other words, we are assuming that the wage distribution is relatively
unaffected by the minimum wage between the 40th and 60th percentiles, and using information
on this part of the distribution to infer the shape of the entire latent wage distribution for each
state in each year.
To give some idea of the adequacy of the assumption that the latent wage distribution can
be well-approximated by the normal, Figure 2.10 plots the average deviation (across states
and years) between the actual observed percentile and the estimated latent distribution for
percentiles from the 3rd to the 60th. This is done separately for women, men and the pooled
distribution. For all three samples this deviation is very close to zero for all percentiles between
the 40th and 60th percentiles--this indicates that the normal distribution is a good approxi-
mation for the sample on which the data is estimated (the average deviation must be zero but
it could be correlated with the percentile). For the lower percentiles the average deviation is
positive, exactly what one would expect if the minimum wage has an impact. For men, the
deviation is zero down to about the 20th percentile indicating that normality is a good approx-
imation out of sample. For the women and pooled samples, it is harder to see the validity of
the out-of-sample approximation because there seems to be some effect of the minimum wage
close to the 4 0 th percentile.
Now consider the relationship between the actual minus the latent and the log minimum
minus the latent as implied by the assumptions behind (2.6). This is plotted for the 3 samples
in Figure 2.11. Because of the large number of observations this Figure plots the average value
of the actual minus the latent for 1 log point bins of the estimated log minimum minus the
latent. In all samples one can see the general shape of the relationship between the deviation
between the actual and latent and the minimum and latent that is predicted by theory and
drawn previously in Figure 2.3. The functional form given in (2.12) has the appropriate shape.
Using our estimated values of latent percentiles in the lower tail of state-year wage distrib-
utions, we estimate the model of (2.6) for our three samples using non-linear least squares for
a sample including all percentiles at or above the minimum and up to the 30th percentile. The
estimated values of are 0.094 for females, 0.097 for males and 0.117 for the combined sample.
The estimate of 0.094 for women can be interpreted to mean that those workers with a latent
wage equal to their minimum have their pay raised by 9.4%, an estimate that is not enormous
but is not small either. The parameter estimates for men and women are similar suggesting
that the larger effect of the minimum wage on the female wage distribution is simply a product
of the fact that the male wages are generally higher than female wages..
As an indication that the functional form assumed is a good one, we also plot on Figure 2.11
above the predicted values from the non-linear equation. One can see that the fit is extremely
good with the exception of some of the lowest percentiles.
Our estimates of the non-linear model give us the total effect of the minimum wage on each
percentile. We can then break this total effect up into a direct and a spillover effect of the
minimum wage. The direct effect of the minimum wage can be computed as:
max[w' - w' , 0]
The spillover effect is the difference between the total effect and this direct effect.
To give some idea of the magnitudes of the direct and spillover effects we compute the effect
on average log wages by averaging the direct and spillover effects across all percentiles. These
estimates are reported for each sample and year in Figure 2.12.
There are several points to note. First, the direct effect is generally larger than the spillover
effect though they are very similar for men. Secondly, both effects are larger for women than
men, as one would expect. Thirdly, there is time variation-both direct and spillover effects
were much larger for women in 1979 than they are now. In 1979 the total effect of the minimum
wage on average log wages for women is estimated to be about 6% (though heavily concentrated
in the lower percentiles)-by 2007 it is more like 3% .
2.5 Conclusion
This paper has provided an updated assessment of the impact of the minimum wage on the wage
distribution by using a longer panel (incorporating many additional years of data and including
significantly more variation in state minimum wages) and an instrumental variables specification
that purges estimates of simultaneity bias stemming from errors in variables. We estimate that
up to 35% of growth in lower tail inequality in the female wage distribution between 1979 and
1988-a period of significant expansion in lower tail inequality, as measured by the differential
between the log of the 50 th and 10 th percentiles-is attributable to the decline in the real value
of the minimum wage, while up to 25% of the growth in male lower tail inequality over this
period could be attributed to the minimum wage. These estimates imply that the minimum
wage made a smaller contribution to growth in lower tail inequality than OLS models suggest.
Similar calculations suggest that the minimum wage contributed roughly the same amount to
growing lower tail inequality between 1991-1996 and 1998-2006, two other periods during which
the real value of the minimum wage was also falling.
Nonetheless, we estimate minimum wage effects that extend further up the wage distribution
than would be predicted if the minimum wage had a purely mechanical effect on wages (i.e.
(2.13)
raising the wage of all who earned below it). We estimate the shape of the latent distribution
with a simple structural estimation technique (by assuming log normality and estimating the
mean and variance of the state-year wage distribution using 40th to 60th wage percentiles), and
use this to separately infer the direct impact and spillover effects from changes in the minimum
wage. While the contribution of direct and spillover effects vary across percentiles, on average,
spillovers amount to one-third to one-half of the aggregate impact of the minimum wage on the
lower tail of the wage distribution, on average.
This analysis suggests that there was significant expansion in latent lower tail inequality over
the 1980s, mirroring the expansion of inequality in the upper tail: while the minimum wage was
certainly a contributing factor to widening lower tail inequality-particularly for females-it was
not the only one. Our ongoing analysis seeks to confirm our findings by applying instrumental
variable quantile regression techniques to the estimation of minimum wage effects on the wage
distribution.
2.6 Appendix: The Correlation between the Trimmed Mean
and the Median.
Here, we derive the correlation coefficient between the median and a trimmed mean under the
assumption that log wages are normally distributed and that we are drawing samples of size N
from an underlying identical population. As in the main text, denote by w(p) the log wage at
percentile p.
A standard result (not dependent on a normality assumption) is that the covariance between
wages at two percentiles is given by:
cov [w(p), (p2) 1 -P 2) P1  P2 (2.14)Nf[w(pi)] f[w(p 2)'
where f[.] is the density function. If pl = p2, this gives the variance of the wage at a
particular percentile so that the variance of the median can be written as:
1
var[w(0.5)] = 4Nf[w(.5) (2.15)4Nf [w(0.5)]2
The trimmed mean between the 3 0th and 7 0 th percentiles can be written as:
1 .0.7I = I w(p)dp (2.16)
0.4 0.3
So that the covariance between the median and the trimmed mean can be written as:
cov [ t , w (0.5)] = cov[w(p), w (0.5)]dp (2.17)0.4 0.3
The variance of the trimmed mean can be written as:
var(,=) = cov[w(p), w(p')]dpdp' (2.18)
0.42 0.3 0.3
The formulae in (2.15), (2.17) and (2.18) can be used to compute the correlation coefficient
between the median and trimmed mean. Note that this correlation does not depend on the
sample size N. If the distribution is normal with mean [p and variance U2 then the formula for
the covariance in (2.14) can be written as:
2ira2 P1(1 - p2)
COv[W(pl), w(p 2)] c 2 [P (1 -  22 ,) P1<P2 (2.19)
where 4-l(p) is the inverse of the standard normal cumulative density function. The vari-
ance for the median is given by:
var[w(O.5)] =2 (2.20)
2N
Note that the correlation coefficient will not depend on either p or u.
Table 2.1 - Summary Statistics for Bindingness of State and Federal Minimum Wages
Female Male
# states Min. Med. Max. Share of Avg. Min. Med. Max. Share of Avg.
w/higher binding binding binding hours at log(50)- binding binding binding hours at log(50)-
min. pctile pctile pctile or below log(10) pctile pctile pctile or below log(10)
min. min.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
12.5
13.0
13.0
10.5
10.0
9.0
8.0
7.0
5.0
4.0
4.0
6.0
7.0
6.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
5.0
4.5
4.0
4.0
4.0
4.0
4.0
3.5
4.0
0.206
0.186
0.186
0.148
0.136
0.124
0.111
0.100
0.087
0.080
0.071
0.083
0.097
0.093
0.082
0.079
0.069
0.070
0.093
0.085
0.073
0.062
0.055
0.056
0.051
0.049
0.052
0.053
0.068
0.382
0.427
0.400
0.496
0.538
0.539
0.580
0.611
0.624
0.614
0.629
0.633
0.616
0.604
0.588
0.588
0.602
0.645
0.635
0.561
0.577
0.595
0.603
0.577
0.580
0.619
0.628
0.644
0.624
4.0
5.5
6.0
4.0
4.0
4.0
3.0
3.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
3.0
0.076
0.072
0.077
0.069
0.066
0.056
0.051
0.046
0.041
0.039
0.037
0.043
0.052
0.053
0.047
0.043
0.037
0.041
0.056
0.051
0.042
0.036
0.034
0.036
0.033
0.032
0.032
0.033
0.040
0.677
0.696
0.693
0.712
0.754
0.763
0.757
0.758
0.799
0.734
0.693
0.742
0.788
0.744
0.722
0.726
0.722
0.693
0.722
0.693
0.673
0.693
0.689
0.693
0.675
0.676
0.693
0.723
0.693
Notes: Column 1 displays the number of states with a minimum that exceeds the federal minimum.
Columns (2) and (7) display estimates of the smallest percentile (across states) at which the minimum
wage binds. Columns (3) and (8), and (4) and (9) display estimates of the median and largest percentile
at which the minimum wage binds across states, respectively. For some states in some years, multiple
percentiles in the wage distribution were equal to the value of the minimum wage. For these state/years,
the minimum wage is recorded as binding at the highest of these percentiles. Columns (5) and (10)
display the share of hours worked for wages at or below the minimum wage. Columns (6) and (11)
display the national value of the log(p50)-log(pl 0) for the male and female wage distributions.
Table 2.1 (cont.) - Summary Statistics for Bindingness of State and
Federal Minimum Wages
Males and Females pooled
# states Min. Med. Max. Share of Avg.
w/higher binding binding binding hours at or log(50)-
min. pctile pctile pctile below min. log(10)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
7.0
8.5
9.0
7.0
7.0
6.0
5.0
5.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
5.0
5.0
4.0
4.0
4.0
3.0
3.0
4.0
4.0
3.5
4.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
0.126
0.118
0.121
0.102
0.095
0.084
0.076
0.069
0.060
0.057
0.051
0.060
0.072
0.070
0.062
0.059
0.051
0.054
0.072
0.066
0.056
0.047
0.043
0.045
0.041
0.039
0.041
0.041
0.052
0.592
0.601
0.609
0.639
0.659
0.680
0.696
0.708
0.710
0.697
0.689
0.679
0.676
0.678
0.689
0.687
0.687
0.683
0.659
0.652
0.650
0.655
0.648
0.656
0.662
0.669
0.664
0.670
0.677
Notes: Column 1 displays the number of states with a minimum that
exceeds the federal minimum. Column (2) displays estimates of the
smallest percentile (across states) at which the minimum wage binds.
Columns (3) and (4) displays estimates of the median and largest
percentile at which the minimum wage binds across states,
respectively. For some states in some years, multiple percentiles in the
wage distribution were equal to the value of the minimum wage. For
these state/years, the minimum wage is recorded as binding at the
highest of these percentiles. Column (5) displays the share of hours
worked for wages at or below the minimum wage. Column (6) displays
the weighted average log(p50)-log(pl0) across states.
Table 2.2: Reduced form estimates of the relationship between changes in log(p)-log(p50) and
changes in log(min) and its square
Females Males Male and female pooled wage
distribution
P MW MW2  Marginal MW MW2  Marginal MW MW2  Marginal
Effect Effect Effect
5 1.075 -0.257 0.313 0.344 -0.065 0.154 0.664 -0.162 0.188(0.409) (0.128) (0.040) (0.197) (0.061) (0.039) (0.196) (0.064) (0.041)
10 0.438 -0.110 0.111 0.641 -0.189 0.085 0.550 -0.140 0.136
(0.348) (0.114) (0.029) (0.194) (0.060) (0.029) (0.166) (0.056) (0.030)
15 0.822 -0.223 0.160 0.406 -0.128 0.031 -0.221 0.061 -0.041
(0.168) (0.053) (0.026) (0.217) (0.064) (0.036) (0.208) (0.065) (0.027)
20 0.264 -0.075 0.042 0.456 -0.131 0.072 0.756 -0.224 0.096
(0.231) (0.073) (0.025) (0.246) (0.077) (0.034) (0.150) (0.051) (0.020)
25 0.285 -0.080 0.048 0.103 -0.030 0.014 0.092 -0.024 0.021
(0.179) (0.056) (0.024) (0.148) (0.048) (0.021) (0.122) (0.040) (0.019)
30 0.171 -0.052 0.018 0.624 -0.189 0.068 0.078 -0.031 -0.014
(0.153) (0.047) (0.027) (0.214) (0.065) (0.035) (0.130) (0.043) (0.018)
35 0.330 -0.107 0.012 0.290 -0.084 0.043 0.293 -0.091 0.025
(0.083) (0.026) (0.019) (0.153) (0.048) (0.022) (0.179) (0.055) (0.027)
40 0.291 -0.086 0.036 0.304 -0.089 0.042 0.252 -0.088 -0.008
(0.145) (0.045) (0.019) (0.088) (0.027) (0.014) (0.212) (0.067) (0.024)
45 0.093 -0.028 0.010 -0.095 0.031 -0.003 0.039 -0.012 0.004
(0.110) (0.033) (0.017) (0.119) (0.036) (0.020) (0.105) (0.034) (0.012)
75 0.047 -0.019 -0.009 0.079 -0.014 0.037 0.018 -0.001 0.017
(0.221) (0.069) (0.032) (0.156) (0.051) (0.020) (0.148) (0.048) (0.019)
90 -0.023 0.018 0.029 0.179 -0.042 0.056 -0.243 0.073 -0.028
(0.222) (0.072) (0.024) (0.163) (0.051) (0.030) (0.128) (0.042) (0.024)
Notes: N=1400. Estimates are the coefficients from regressions of changes in log(p)-log(p50) on
changes in log(min) and its square. MW is the coefficient on changes in log(min. wage), and MW2 is
the coefficient on changes in its square. Marginal effect is the marginal effect of changes in log(min.
wage), evaluated at the hours-weighted average of log(min. wage) across states and years. Standard
errors clustered at the state level are in parenthesis. Regressions are weighted by the sum of
individuals' reported weekly hours worked multiplied by CPS sampling weights.
Table 2.3: Relationship between log(p)-log(p50) and log(min. wage)-log(p50), for
select percentiles. 1979-2007.
OLS quadratic 2SLS quadratic
P MW-P50 (MW-P50) 2 Marg. Effect MW-P50 (MW-P50) 2 Marg. Effect
A. Females
5 0.647
(0.136)
10 1.368
(0.156)
15 0.991
(0.167)
20 0.666
(0.139)
30 0.333
(0.108)
40 0.159
(0.052)
75 -0.046
(0.082)
90 0.153
(0.157)
5 1.786
(0.310)
10 1.058
(0.366)
15 0.751
(0.333)
20 0.542
(0.350)
30 0.335
(0.253)
40 0.114
(0.143)
75 0.615
(0.221)
90 0.808
(0.329)
0.056
(0.095)
0.651
(0.110)
0.475
(0.116)
0.311
(0.102)
0.152
(0.079)
0.073
(0.038)
-0.007
(0.057)
0.107
(0.112)
0.670
(0.172)
0.391
(0.202)
0.275
(0.181)
0.200
(0.188)
0.145
(0.134)
0.049
(0.076)
0.248
(0.118)
0.333
(0.180)
0.567
(0.031)
0.432
(0.027)
0.308
(0.025)
0.220
(0.026)
0.114
(0.017)
0.054
(0.010)
-0.036
(0.022)
-0.001
(0.037)
B. Males
0.470
(0.043)
0.290
(0.047)
0.210
(0.043)
0.148
(0.037)
0.050
(0.022)
0.018
(0.013)
0.128
(0.036)
0.154
(0.064)
Notes: N=1450 for the OLS quadratic estimates. N=1400 for the 2SLS quadratic
estimates. OLS quadratic are estimates of coefficients from regressions of log(p)-
log(p50) on log(min)-log(p50), its square, and year fixed effects. 2SLS quadratic are
estimates of coefficients from regressions of changes in log(p)-log(p50) on changes
in log(min. wage)-log(p50) and its square, and year fixed effects. MW-P50 is the
coefficient on log(min)-log(p50), and (MW-P50)2 is the coefficient on its square.
Marginal effect is the marginal effect of changes in log(min. wage)-log(p50),
evaluated at the hours-weighted average of log(min. wage)-log(p50) across states
and years. Standard errors clustered at the state level are in parenthesis.
Regressions are weighted by the sum of individuals' reported weekly hours worked
multiplied by CPS sampling weights.
1.907
(1.046)
0.463
(0.779)
1.064
(0.398)
0.582
(0.326)
0.595
(0.232)
0.331
(0.197)
0.236
(0.313)
-0.059
(0.496)
0.580
(0.551)
0.541
(0.516)
-0.070
(0.490)
0.278
(0.255)
0.051
(0.324)
0.193
(0.288)
0.598
(0.379)
0.557
(0.524)
1.029
(0.648)
0.237
(0.494)
0.597
(0.248)
0.346
(0.201)
0.364
(0.145)
0.198
(0.122)
0.154
(0.189)
-0.057
(0.309)
0.216
(0.273)
0.248
(0.246)
-0.029
(0.237)
0.119
(0.117)
0.020
(0.156)
0.086
(0.138)
0.272
(0.181)
0.247
(0.249)
0.428
(0.119)
0.122
(0.076)
0.205
(0.049)
0.085
(0.043)
0.072
(0.034)
0.047
(0.026)
0.015
(0.049)
0.023
(0.057)
0.155
(0.034)
0.055
(0.041)
-0.013
(0.035)
0.044
(0.039)
0.011
(0.040)
0.024
(0.021)
0.064
(0.031)
0.072
(0.043)
Table 2.3 (cont.): Relationship between log(p)-log(p50) and log(min. wage)-log(p50),
for select percentiles. 1979-2007.
OLS quadratic 2SLS quadratic
P MW-P50 (MW-P50) 2 Marg. Effect MW-P50 (MW-P50) 2 Marg. Effect
C. Male and female pooled
5 1.736 0.685 0.552 1.592 0.773 0.257
(0.169) (0.105) (0.027) (0.568) (0.308) (0.057)
10 1.452 0.634 0.357 0.656 0.300 0.138
(0.201) (0.123) (0.033) (0.438) (0.241) (0.043)
15 0.967 0.427 0.228 0.105 0.067 -0.011
(0.212) (0.137) (0.038) (0.397) (0.205) (0.049)
20 0.688 0.291 0.185 0.388 0.192 0.055
(0.166) (0.103) (0.030) (0.333) (0.168) (0.050)
30 0.451 0.206 0.095 0.350 0.199 0.007
(0.112) (0.071) (0.020) (0.209) (0.105) (0.033)
40 0.195 0.090 0.040 0.161 0.104 -0.019
(0.067) (0.043) (0.012) (0.316) (0.166) (0.035)
75 0.183 0.080 0.044 -0.131 -0.078 0.004
(0.160) (0.096) (0.023) (0.272) (0.142) (0.033)
90 0.627 0.326 0.064 0.526 0.282 0.039
(0.242) (0.144) (0.044) (0.373) (0.194) (0.046)
Notes: N=1450 for the OLS quadratic estimates. N=1400 for the 2SLS quadratic
estimates. OLS quadratic are estimates of coefficients from regressions of log(p)-
log(p50) on log(min)-log(p50), its square, and year fixed effects. 2SLS quadratic are
estimates of coefficients from regressions of changes in log(p)-log(p50) on changes
in log(min. wage)-log(p50) and its square, and year fixed effects. MW-P50 is the
coefficient on log(min)-log(p50), and (MW-P50) 2 is the coefficient on its square.
Marginal effect is the marginal effect of changes in log(min. wage)-log(p50),
evaluated at the hours-weighted average of log(min. wage)-log(p50) across states
and years. Standard errors clustered at the state level are in parenthesis.
Regressions are weighted by the sum of individuals' reported weekly hours worked
multiplied by CPS sampling weights.
Table 2.4: Actual and counterfactual changes in log(p50)-log(pl0) between 1979 and 1988, 1991 and 1996, and 1998 and 2006,
after adjusting the effective minimum wage in the earlier year to equal the effective minimum in the later year
1979 to 1988 1991 to 1996 1998 to 2006
Model 1979 Change Change in 1991 Change Change in 1998 Change Change in
50/10 Due to 50/10 Due to 50/10 Due to
Min. Wage Min. Wage Min. Wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
A. Females
Actual 0.382 0.232 - 0.616 0.029 - 0.561 0.084
OLS quad. 0.593 0.021 0.211 0.669 -0.024 0.053 0.626 0.019 0.065
2SLS quad. 0.463 0.151 0.081 0.634 0.011 0.018 0.584 0.060 0.024
2SLS cubic 0.455 0.159 0.073 0.631 0.015 0.014 0.581 0.063 0.021
B. Males
Actual 0.677 0.057 - 0.788 -0.095 - 0.693 0.030 -
OLS quad. 0.752 -0.018 0.075 0.789 -0.096 0.000 0.742 -0.019 0.049
2SLS quad. 0.691 0.043 0.014 0.776 -0.083 -0.013 0.705 0.018 0.012
2SLS cubic 0.678 0.056 0.001 0.769 -0.076 -0.020 0.704 0.019 0.011
C. Male and female pooled
Actual 0.606 0.105 - 0.691 -0.016 - 0.674 -0.025 -
OLS quad. 0.726 -0.015 0.120 0.741 -0.066 0.050 0.721 -0.072 0.048
2SLS quad. 0.641 0.069 0.035 0.702 -0.028 0.011 0.691 -0.042 0.018
2SLS cubic 0.634 0.077 0.028 0.702 -0.027 0.011 0.690 -0.041 0.016
Note: Columns (1), (4), and (7) are the actual and counterfactual values of the log(p50)-log(pl0) in 1979, 1991, and 1998. Columns
(2), (5), and (7) are the changes in the actual and counterfactual log(p50)-log(pl0) between 1979 and 1988, 1991 and 1996, and
1998-2006. Columns (3), (6), and (9) are the actual change in the log(p50)-log(pl0) - the counterfactual change. Counterfactual
wage distributions are wage distributions adjusted by the effective minimum wage in the later year of the period, and represent the
50/10 had the effective minimum wage of the earlier year actually been equal to the lower effective minimum wage of the later
year. OLS quadratic are counterfactuals formed by adjusting the 1979 and 2007 wage distributions by coefficients from an OLS
regression of log(p)-log(p50) on log(min)-log(p50), its square, and year fixed effects. 2SLS quadratic are counterfactuals formed by
using coefficients from a 2SLS regression of yearly changes in log(p)-log(p50) on changes in log(min)-log(p50) and its square, and
year fixed effects. 2SLS cubic are counterfactuals from a similar regression that includes the difference in the cube of log(min)-log(r
Appendix Table 2.1 - Variation in State Minimum Wages
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Federal min. wage 2.90 3.10
Alabama
Alaska 3.40 3.60
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
3.35 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.80 4.25 4.25 4.25
3.85 3.85 3.85 3.85 3.85 3.85 3.85 3.85 3.85 4.30 4.75 4.75 4.75
4.25 4.25 4.25
3.75 4.25 4.25 4.27 4.27 4.27
3.85 3.85 3.85 4.75 5.25
3.85 4.65 4.65
3.45 3.55 3.65 3.65 3.75 3.85
3.65 3.65 3.75 3.75
3.55 3.85 3.95
3.45 3.55 3.65
5.05 5.05
4.25 4.75 4.75 4.75
3.55 3.65 4.00 4.25 4.25 4.45 4.45 4.45
3.45 3.55 3.65 3.75 3.85
3.85 3.85
3.65
Note: Table indicates years in which each state had a state minimum wage that exceeded the federal minimum wage for at
least 6 months of the year.
Appendix Table 2.1 -Variation in State Minimum Wages, cont.
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Federal min. wage
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
4.25 4.25 4.25 4.75 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15
4.75 4.75 4.75 5.25 5.65 5.65 5.65 5.65 5.65 7.15 7.15
5.00 5.75 5.75 5.75 6.25 6.75 6.75 6.75
4.27 4.27 4.27
4.65
4.77 5.18 5.65 6.15 6.40 6.70 6.90 7.10
5.65 5.65 6.15 6.15 6.15 6.15
5.15 5.15 5.15
7.15 7.15 7.15
6.75
6.25
6.75 6.75 7.50
7.10
6.15
6.85
7.40 7.65
6.15 6.65
6.15 6.40 6.67
5.25 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.75 6.25 6.25 6.25 6.75 7.25
5.50 6.50 6.50 6.50
4.65 4.65 4.65 6.20
5.75 6.25 6.25 6.35 6.50 6.75
6.15 6.15
4.75 5.25 5.25 5.25 6.00 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 7.50
7.15
6.15 6.15
5.05 5.05 5.05 5.05
6.50
6.15
6.33
6.15 7.15
4.75 4.75 4.75 5.50 6.00 6.50 6.50 6.50 6.50 6.90 7.05
4.45 4.45 4.45 5.15 5.65 5.65 6.15 6.15 6.15 6.75
4.50 4.75 5.00 5.25 5.25 5.75 6.25 6.25 6.25 6.75
4.90 4.90 4.90 4.90 5.70 6.50 6.72 6.90 7.01 7.16
6.00 6.75 7.15
6.15
6.85
7.25 7.50 7.80
7.15
6.75 7.10 7.40
7.00 7.25 7.53
7.35 7.63 7.93
5.85 6.55
5.70 6.50 6.50
Note: Table indicates years in which each state had a state minimum wage that exceeded the federal minimum wage for at
least 6 months of the year.
Appendix Table 2: Actual and counterfactual changes in the log(50)-log(10), using coefficient estimates from the 1979-2007
period, within-sample regression coefficients, and out-of-sample regression coefficients
Actual log(50)- Counterfactual: coefficients Counterfactual: coefficients Counterfactual: coefficients
log(10) from 1979-2007 estimation from "in-sample" estimation from "out-of-sample"
Log(50)- Change, Log(50)- Change, Change Log(50)- Change, Change Log(50)- Change, Change
log(10), log(50)- log(10), log(50)- due to log(10), log(50)- due to log(10), log(50)- due to
base year log(10) base year log(10) min. base year log(10) min. base year log(10) min.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
A. 1979 adjusted by 1988 effective minimum wage.
Base year: 1979. Change: 1979 to 1988.
Females 0.382 0.232 0.463 0.151 0.081 0.469 0.146 0.086 0.463 0.152 0.080
Males 0.677 0.057 0.691 0.043 0.014 0.697 0.037 0.020 0.681 0.053 0.004
Pooled 0.606 0.105 0.641 0.069 0.035 0.605 0.106 -0.001 0.642 0.069 0.036
B. 1991 adjusted by 1996 effective minimum wage.
Base year: 1991. Change: 1991 to 1996.
Females 0.616 0.029 0.634 0.011 0.018 0.633 0.012 0.017 0.758 -0.113 0.141
Males 0.788 -0.095 0.776 -0.083 -0.013 0.751 -0.058 -0.037 0.780 -0.087 -0.009
Pooled 0.691 -0.016 0.702 -0.028 0.011 0.704 -0.029 0.013 0.750 -0.076 0.059
C. 1998 adjusted by 2006 effective minimum wage.
Base year: 1998. Change: 1998 to 2006.
Females 0.561 0.084 0.584 0.060 0.024 0.570 0.075 0.009 0.593 0.051 0.033
Males 0.693 0.030 0.705 0.018 0.012 0.700 0.023 0.007 0.708 0.015 0.015
Pooled 0.674 -0.025 0.691 -0.042 0.018 0.681 -0.033 0.008 0.695 -0.046 0.021
Note: The table presents actual and counterfactual estimates of log(50)-log(10), and changes in log(50)-log(10) between 1979
and 1988 (panel A), 1991 and 1996 (panel B), and 1998 to 2006 (panel C). Columns 3-5 present counterfactual estimates that
use coefficients from regressions including all sample years (1979-2007). Columns 6-8 present counterfactual estimates that
use coefficients from regressions that only include the years for which the change is computed in the panel, i.e. "in sample"
counterfactuals for panel A are constructed using regression coefficients from regressions that use data from 1979-1988.
Columns 9-11 present counterfactual estimates that use coefficients from regressions that only include "out-of-sample" years.
For panel A, this is 1989-2006. For panel B, this is 1979-1988 and 1998-2006. For panel C, this is 1979-1996. Columns 5, 8,
and 11 present the change in log(50)-log(10) attributable to changes in the minimum, i.e. (2)-(4), (2)-(7), and (2)-(10).
Figure 2.1a: Trends in state and federal minimum wages, and log(p10)-log(p50)
1974-2007
1974 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
S Real value of average state/federal mins ................. Real value of fed. min.
O log(p10)-log(p50), female .- log(pl0)-log(p50), male
Note: Annual data on state and federal minimum wages and log percentiles. Minimum wages are in 2007 dollars.
Figure 2.1b: Trends in state and federal minimum wages, and log(p90)-log(p50)
1974-2007
N°° , /
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
S Real value of average state/federal mins ................. Real value of fed. min.
O log(p90)-log(p50), female 1- log(p90)-log(p50), male
Note: Annual data on state and federal minimum wages and log percentiles. Minimum wages are in 2007 dollars.
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Figure 2.21: OLS quadratic model of relationship between log(p)-log(p50) and log(min. wage)
Female wage distribution, 1979-2007
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0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Percentile
Estimates are from OLS regressions of changes in log(p)-log(p50) on changes in log(min. wage) and its square,
and year dummy vars. Observations are state-year observations. Dashed lines indicate the 95% confidence interval.
Figure 2.2b: OLS quadratic model of relationship between log(p)-log(p50) and log(min. wage)
Male wage distribution, 1979-2007
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Percentile
Estimates are from OLS regressions of changes in log(p)-laq(p50) on changes in log(min. wage) and its square,
and year dummy vars. Observations are state-year observations. Dashed lines indicate the 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 2.3: The theoretical relationship between deviations in the minimum and latent wage percentile,
and differences between the minimum wage and latent percentile
w(p)-w(p)*
w(p) M-w(p)*
Note: w(p)-w(p)* is the difference between the actual (observed) value of percentile p and the latent
value of percentile p (i.e. its value in the absence of a minimum wage). w(p)m-w(p)* is the difference
between the minimum and the latent value of percentile p.
Figure 2.4a: OLS quadratic model of relationship between log(p)-log(p50) and log(min.)-log(p50)
Female wage distribution, 1979-2007
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Estimates are from OLS regressions of log(p)-log(p50) on log(min. wage)-log(p50), its square,
and year dummy vars. Observations are state-year observations. Dashed lines indicate the 95% confidence interval.
Figure 2.4b: 2SLS quadratic model of relationship between annual changes in log(p)-log(p50)
and annual changes in log(min.)-log(p50). Female wage distribution, 1979-2007
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Percentile
Estimates are from IV regressions of yearly changes in log(p)-log(p50) on changes in log(min. wage)-log(median wage)
and its square, and year fixed effects. Dashed lines indicate the 95% confidence interval. Observations are state-year observations.
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Figure 2.5a: OLS quadratic model of relationship between log(p)-log(p50) and log(min.)-log(p50)
Male wage distribution, 1979-2007
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Estimates are from OLS regressions of log(p)-log(p50) on log(min. wage)-log(p50), its square,
and year dummy vars. Observations are state-year observations. Dashed lines indicate the 95% confidence interval.
Figure 2.5b: 2SLS quadratic model of relationship between annual changes in log(p)-log(p50)
and annual changes in log(min.)-log(p50). Male wage distribution, 1979-2007
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Estimates are from IV regressions of yearly changes in log(p)-log(p50) on changes in log(min. wage)-log(median wage)
and its square, and year fixed effects. Dashed lines indicate the 95% confidence interval. Observations are state-year observations.
-rr , I
" - - .
Figure 2.6a: OLS quadratic model of relationship between log(p)-log(p50) and log(min.)-log(p50)
Male and female pooled wage distribution, 1979-2007
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Estimates are from OLS regressions of log(p)-log(p50) on log(min. wage)-log(p50), its square,
and year dummy vars. Observations are state-year observations. Dashed lines indicate the 95% confidence interval.
Figure 2.5b: 2SLS quadratic model of relationship between annual changes in log(p)-log(p50)
and annual changes in log(min.)-log(p50). Male and female pooled distribution, 1979-2007
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Estimates are from IV regressions of yearly changes in log(p)-log(p50) on changes in log(min. wage)-log(median wage)
and its square, and year fixed effects. Dashed lines indicate the 95% confidence interval. Observations are state-year observations.
Figure 2.7: Actual and counterfactual change in log(p)-log(p50)
A. Female wage distribution, 1979 to 1988
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Percentile
--- Actual change
S- Counterfactual change, OLS quad.
--- Counterfactual change, 2SLS quad.
B. Female wage distribution, 1979 to 2007
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Percentile
- - Actual change
-- Counterfactual change, OLS quad.
I - Counterfactual change, 2SLS quad.
Note: Plots represent the actual and counterfactual changes in the 5th through 95th percentiles of the male wage
distribution. Counterfactual changes are calculated by adjusting the 1979 and 2007 wage distributions by states'
effective minimum wage in 1988 and coefficients from OLS regressions of log(p)-log(p50) on log(min)-log(p50) and its
square, and from 2SLS regressions of the annual change in log(p)-log(p50) on changes in log(min)-log(p50) and its
square.
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Figure 2.8: Actual and counterfactual change in log(p)-log(p50)
A. Male wage distribution, 1979 to 1988
1 '' '' '' ' '''' 1 - 1 1.''.'' ''1'' ' .'''' .''' ..I ... I .... I ... ' I ' rrr I , , I .... I ' I ... I .. I0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Percentile
S-- Actual change
Counterfactual change, OLS quad.
&-- I Counterfactual change, 2SLS quad.
B. Male wage distribution, 1979 to 2007
' ... . oI 20I 2I 3I I" 4 5 .65 7 0I · o 8 I •5 ' "o I I " 1 I. . I . . .. 1I ' " " ' I . . . .. I ..... ;0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Percentile
Actual change
Counterfactual change, OLS quad.
Counterfactual change, 2SLS quad.
Note: Plots represent the actual and counterfactual changes in the 5th through 95th percentiles of the male wage
distribution. Counterfactual changes are calculated by adjusting the 1979 and 2007 wage distributions by states'
effective minimum wage in 1988 and coefficients from OLS regressions of log(p)-log(p50) on log(min)-log(p50) and its
square, and from 2SLS regressions of the annual change in log(p)-log(p50) on changes in log(min)-log(p50) and its
square.
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Figure 2.9: Actual and counterfactual change in log(p)-log(p50)
A. Female and male pooled wage distribution, 1979 to 1988
I0'' ' . . . . . . ..' '11'I' ' ' 0'5 ' " . . . . I ''' ' . '3'3''''5'4I1....... ..  '5 1 ' I  '' . I. ''1' I ''.. .  I 1'''' ' .. ..I ' ' I0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Percentile
Actual change
Counterfactual change, OLS quad.
A-- Counterfactual change, 2SLS quad.
B. Female and male pooled wage distribution, 1979 to 2007
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- CActual change
- Counterfactual change, OLS quad.
-- - Counterfactual change, 2SLS quad.
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Figure 2.11 - Empirical relationship between average deviations in actual percentile and estimated latent percentile and the difference between
the log of the minimum wage and the actual percentile
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Figure 2.12 - Estimates of the direct and spillover effects of the minimum wage, averaged over lower percentiles
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Appendix Figure 2.1: OLS quadratic model of relationship bw. log(p)-log(p50)
and log(min. wage), and one lead/lag.
A. Female wage distribution, 1979-2007
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Estimates are from OLS regressions of changes in log(p)-log(50) on changes in log(min. wage) and its square,
one lead and lag, and year dummy vars. Obs. are state-year observations. Circle indicates sig. at the 5% level.
B. Male wage distribution, 1979-2007
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one lead and lag, and year dummy vars. Obs. are state-year observations. Circle indicates sig. at the 5% level.
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Chapter 3
Implications of Adult Labor Market
Polarization for Youth Employment
Opportunities
3.1 Introduction
One of the most striking recent trends in U.S. labor force participation has been the continued
decline in the employment rate of younger individuals (16-21), particularly of high school aged
students younger than 18. Between 1999 and 2007, for instance, the July employment rate
of 16 and 17 year olds fell from 46 percent to 32 percent, though youth employment rates
relative to adult employment rates actually began falling by the mid-1990s (Figure 3.1). This
represents a significant decline in the amount of early work experience-and hence, human
capital-accumulated while in high school. Even though the majority of jobs worked by high
school students are in the retail and food service sector, early work experience may nonetheless
provide labor market returns later in life through early exposure to the culture and norms of
the workplace, and the early development of a strong work ethic'.
'There is some academic evidence on the impact of working while young, though what exists is often contra-
dictory. For example, see (Tyler 2003) and (DeSimone 2006) for estimates of employment effects on grades and
test scores; see (Ruhm 1997) and (Hotz et al. 2002) for conflicting estimates of employment effects on later life
labor market outcomes.
The welfare implications of lower teen employment rates depend partially on why teens are
not working. A shift in youth labor supply-due, for instance, to educational decisions unrelated
to conditions in the youth labor market-has significantly different welfare implications, and
suggests a different policy response, than if changes in youth employment are due mainly to a
reduction in the demand for youth labor: the decline in early-life work experience might not
be as worrisome if youth are replacing the human capital lost from less work experience with
more formal types of academic human capital. This would be the case if youth are voluntarily
choosing to devote more time to education in order to graduate high school or participate
in resume enhancing activities to appear more attractive to colleges2 . One commonly cited
piece of supporting evidence is that the summer school enrollment rate, as measured by the
percentage of youth who report in the CPS being enrolled in July, has steadily increased since
the mid-1990s. This suggests that there has been some substitution from work to schooling,
though there is little evidence at the present that explains exactly what additional academic
activities youth are pursuing.
A reduction in youth labor supply is unlikely to be the entire explanation: changes in the
low-skilled labor market over the past two decades have plausibly reduced the demand for youth
labor as well. For instance, (Smith 2008a) provides evidence that increases in low-skilled im-
migration have affected youth employment to a much greater extent than have affected adult
employment, and argues that up to 30% of the recent decline in youth employment may be
attributable to growth in low-skilled immigration. (Neumark and Wascher 2007) provides evi-
dence that states with more generous EITC supplements have greater labor force participation
rates for the eligible adult population and have lower teen employment rates.
Recent research on the "polarization" of the adult native labor market raises the possibility
that labor market competition between lower-skilled native adults and native teenagers has
also increased over the 1990s and 2000s. A series of recent papers have documented that the
labor market of many industrialized countries has exhibited polarization ((Autor, Katz and
Kearney 2006a) and (2008), for the United States; (Goos and Manning 2007), for the U.K.;
(Spitz-Oener 2006), for Germany), which is defined as a decrease in the share of the work
2 For expressions of this view in media reports, see Sudeep Reddy, "Teen Behavior Offers Clue To Why Jobless
Rate Stays Low Despite Slowing Growth", The Wall Street Journal, June 18, 2007, and Barbara Hagenbaugh,
"Most Teenagers Forgo Summer Jobs," USA Today, July 9, 2007.
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force employed in occupations traditionally in the middle of the wage or skill distribution,
and an increase in the share employed in higher and lower paying jobs. Autor, Katz and
Kearney (2006a) and (2008) provide evidence that polarization in the U.S. may be due to
increased use of computers in production, which reduces demand for jobs that specialize in
routine tasks (i.e. manufacturing blue-collar jobs, generally in the middle of the occupational
wage distribution), increases demand for jobs that specialize in abstract or cognitive tasks (i.e.
managerial or professional jobs), and has little direct effect on demand for jobs which specialize
in manual tasks3. Given the documented decrease in the share of native adults in middle-wage
occupations throughout the 1990s and 2000s, and corresponding increase in the share employed
in lower-wage or lower-skill occupations-occupations in which the vast majority of teens are
employed-polarization in the adult native labor market may have placed additional pressure
on the youth labor market as well. In this way, technological change may have reduced demand
for more routine-task intensive occupations, increasing the supply of adult low-skilled labor to
jobs that were traditionally common among youth.
The purpose of this paper is to document the strong relationship between the polarization
of the adult labor market (as measured by the change in the share of adults in lower-paying
occupations) and declines in youth employment, and by doing so, demonstrate that increased
labor market competition from native adults is an additional and important factor in explaining
recent developments in youth employment. I show that there is a strong and robust relationship
between the extent of polarization in the adult labor market by state or commuting zone-as
measured by the share of working adults employed in traditionally low-paying occupations--
and declines in teen employment rates, teen wages, and adult wages. There is a much more
modest relationship between polarization and declines in low-skilled native adult employment.
The combination of these facts suggests that youth employment is strongly affected by polar-
ization in the adult labor market, and that youth labor supply is highly elastic relative to adult
labor supply (as has been suggested by (Smith 2008a) in the context of immigration induced
reductions in youth employment). One contribution of this paper, therefore, is to provide ev-
idence of an additional explanation for declining youth employment and for variation in teen
3 The general equilibrium effects of polarization may increase demand for service jobs, however-see (Autor
and Dorn 2007) and (Mazzolari and Ragusa 2007).
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employment across areas. A second contribution of this research is to extend the literature on
the labor market impact of polarization, which has so far focused mainly on describing and
explaining the phenomenon of polarization rather than exploring the effects of polarization on
groups of workers who have traditionally been employed in lower wage occupations.
Section 3.2 of this paper documents the types of jobs that teens, low-skilled prime age na-
tive adults, and other categories of workers tend to be employed in, and demonstrates how
this has changed over the past two and a half decades. Section 3.3 provides empirical descrip-
tive evidence of the robust relationship between increases in polarization and decreases in youth
employment across states and commuting zones, without consideration for why geographic vari-
ation in polarization exists. Section 3.4 interprets these empirical findings through the lens of
a model of local labor markets in which the introduction of computers reduces the demand for
routine labor, thus increasing the supply of labor devoted to manual tasks, and reducing the
wages and employment of teens. Section 3.5 documents that, consistent with this model, areas
that utilized a greater share of the workforce in routine tasks-or were more manufacturing
intensive in 1980-experienced greater amounts of polarization, and saw greater decreases in
youth employment over the subsequent two and a half decades. Section 3.6 concludes by dis-
cussing the extent to which polarization can explain cross-state variation in youth employment
and decreases in youth employment since the 1990s.
3.2 Changes in the Occupational Distribution of Teens and
Adults, 1980-2005
3.2.1 Polarization of the U.S. Labor Market
Figure 3.2, similar to Figure 3 from (Autor, Katz and Kearney 2006b), provides striking visual
evidence of polarization. The figure uses Census and ACS data to plot the smoothed relationship
between changes in the share of the adult population employed in an occupation between 1980
and 1990, 1990 and 2000, and 2000 and 2005, and the occupation's percentile in the wage
distribution of all occupations in 19804. Between 1980 and 1990, there was relative growth in the
4See the data appendix for details on the construction of the data samples used here, as well as for a description
of how I construct measures of polarization.
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share of the population employed in traditionally higher-wage occupations. The occupational
distribution "polarized" during the 1990s, as the share of adults employed in middle-wage
declined and the share employed in either tail increased, and the share employed in the lower
tail continued to increased between 2000 and 2005 as well. For the remainder of this paper, I
will use the term polarization to describe the growth of employment in lower-paying occupations
when ranked by median occupation wage in 1980. The growth of employment in the lower tail
is generally viewed as due in part to a technology-driven reduction in demand for occupations
in the middle of the occupational distribution, which displaces some workers into lower-paying
jobs5 .
Although overall changes in the occupational distribution are indicative of polarization, the
actual magnitude of employment changes is modest. For instance, as described in Table 3.1,
the share of all adults employed in occupations in the bottom quartile of the 1990 occupational
wage distribution increased by slightly over 1 percent between 1990 and 2005. Within education
groups, the share of employed adults in lower paying occupations increased somewhat more
dramatically (there was a three percentage point increase in the share of adults with some
college education, for instance); the overall share of all adults in low paying occupations has
increased by a much smaller amount because the share of all adults with some college education
has increased substantially over the period.
These aggregate trends mask significant variation in polarization across geographic areas,
however, and I will use this geographic variation to identify the relationship between polarization
and youth employment. For instance, across all commuting zones in 2005, the share of all native
employed adults in the lower quantile of the occupational wage distribution ranged from .25 to
.39, and between 1990 and 2005, the change in this share ranged from a decline of .11 to growth
of .075.
5 (Autor and Dorn 2007) provide evidence that increasing employment and wages in low-paying service jobs
is associated with indicators of polarization. Hence, part of the increase in lower-tail employment may be driven
by increasing demand for services due to rising real wages. I document, however, that average wages for all
lower-paying occupations (not limited to service jobs) fall in areas where employment growth in lower-paying
occupations is greater, suggesting that employment growth in lower-paying occupations is not entirely a response
to growth in labor demand for such occupations.
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3.2.2 The Occupational Distribution of Teens and Adults
The vast majority of employed teens work in traditionally lower-paying occupations. This can
be seen in Figure 3.3A and 3.3B, which plot the cumulative density function of employment in
occupations ranked by the occupation's median wage in 1980. About 75 percent of employed
teens work in occupations that are in the bottom quartile of the occupational distribution, in
both 1980 and 2005. There is no evidence from Census data to support the common perception
that teens today are more likely to be employed in well-paying internships rather than retail
or food-service jobs-less than ten percent of employed teens work in occupations that are in
the upper half of the occupational distribution, and there does not appear to be movement into
these occupations over the 25 year period. In fact, the percent of employed teens in the bottom
quarter of the occupational distribution increased by 15 percentage points over 15 years, and
the fraction of teens working as cashiers or in food service-the two most common categories of
employment-increased from about 40 to 42 percent. Given that around three-quarters of all
employed youth work in occupations in the bottom quarter of the distribution, an increase in the
supply of adults to lower-paying occupations may be expected to have negative consequences
on youth employment, provided that this increase in adult labor supply is not in response to,
or accompanied by, a significant increase in labor demand for these jobs.
3.2.3 Trends in Teen Employment and Differences by Demographic Charac-
teristics
Over the last 15 years, teen employment rates peaked around 1998, began falling prior to
the 2001 recession, continued falling throughout and after the recession, and reached their
lowest recorded level in 2007 (Figure 3.1). However, relative to adult employment rates, youth
employment began actually falling in the mid-1990s. During the tight labor market of the late
1990s, for instance, employment rates for all categories of native workers (by age, sex, and
race) increased-with an exception of teens. Hence, the dramatic shift in teen employment
really began in the late 1990s, when trends in teen employment separated from trends in adult
employment.
There are surprisingly few differences in the occupational distribution of youth across groups
defined by race, gender, or parental background. Figures 3.4A, 3.4B, and 3.4C illustrate the first
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of these facts: the occupational distribution of teens as divided by race or family education are
extremely similar, though male teens tend to work in traditionally higher-paying occupations
than do females. Again, the idea that more priveledged youth concentrate in better paying jobs
appears to be a mispercention-the majority of all youth, regardless of demographic character-
istics, work in the lower-paying retail or food service sectors. This would seem to suggest that
adult labor market polarization may affect all groups of youth by an equal amount, assuming
similar labor supply elasticities across groups. Consistent with this, trends in employment rates
are also quite similar across groups, though the overall level of the employment rate varies. Fig-
ures 3.5A, 3.5B, and 3.5C demonstrate that employment rates for all groups were mostly stable
from the mid-to-late 1990s, after which they fell throughout the remainder of the decade (al-
though the absolute level of employment tends to be higher for white teens and teens from more
educated families). Given the similarity of employment trends and occupational distributions
across these groups of teens, it is somewhat surprising that I find that the relationship between
the polarization of an area and declining teen employment is greater in magnitude for minority
teens and teens from poorer families (Section 3.3.3).
There is significant geographic variation in youth employment levels, though employment
trends tend to be similar (Figure 3.5D displays employment trends by Census region). Employ-
ment rates for youth in the south initially exceed those for youth from other regions, though by
the early 1990s employment rates for youth in the northeast are highest. Youth employment
rates in the south are always lower than for other regions, though the magnitude of the decline
in youth employment over the 2000s is not as severe as in other regions. Teens tend to work in
the same sorts of occupations, regardless of geographic location (Figure 3.4D), though youth
from western states appear to be more likely to work in higher paying occupations. Since the
teen occupational distribution is similar across areas, yet there is significant variation in polar-
ization across areas, regional variation in polarizaton may also provide a potential explanation
for regional variation in youth employment rates.
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3.3 The Relationship Between Polarization of the Adult Labor
Market and Youth Labor Market Outcomes
3.3.1 Baseline estimates
In this section, I provide initial empirical support for the hypothesis that some of the decline
in youth labor force participation is due to crowd-out from adults by demonstrating that there
is a robust, negative relationship between the share of adults in lower-paying occupations and
teen employment. In the subsequent sections, I argue that an increasing share of adults in
lower-paying occupations can be understood as coming from a reduction in labor demand for
occupations that are traditionally in the middle of the wage distribution. Given this, the
empirical relationships described in this section can be understood as the result of a technology-
driven reduction in labor demand for middle-paying occupations, which increases the supply of
labor to lower-paying occupations, and crowds out youth employment.
Figures 3.6A-3.6D illustrate the relationship between changes in state employment rates
and log wages for native teens and native less-educated adults (without a high school degree),
and polarization-as measured by growth in the share of all employed adults in jobs from the
bottom quartile of the 1980 occupational wage distribution. The plots demonstate the primary
empirical finding of this section: there is a striking, negative relationship between changes in
teen employment rates and changes in the number of adults employed in traditionally lower-
paying jobs, but there is little relationship between changes in adult employment rates and
changes in polarization. There appears to be a stronger relationship between this measure of
polarization and adult wages than teen wages. Of course, part of the relationship for adults is
mechanical, since an increase in the share of adults in lower-paying occupations would reduce
average wages through compositional effects even in the absence of a direct effect on wages.
Hence, in the more rigorous empirical results that follow, I demonstrate that the wages of
adults employed in lower-quartile occupations fall as the share employed in these occupations
increases.
To examine the extent of this relationship more thoroughly, I estimate the following equation
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separately for teens and adults:
Ygt = at + 09 + /SHAREgt + y7Xt + Egt (3.1)
where g is the geographic level of analysis (either state or commuting zone), t is year, ygt is
a labor market outcome, such as average log wages or the fraction employed in the last week,
Xgt are area-level, time-varying controls such as area-level time trends or other demographic
controls, which I include in some specifications. SHARE is the share of all employed adults (18-
64) who report working in jobs from the bottom quartile of the occupational wage distribution
in 1980. There is no inherent reason why the share in the bottom quartile should be used as
the regressor of interest, instead of the bottom decile or bottom multiple deciles, though the
relationship between y and SHARE is robust to how I define lower-tail polarization (Section
3.3.2).
I view this equation as a description of the equilibrium relationship between youth and
adult labor market outcomes, and employment shifts into the lower tail of the occupational
distribution. This regression does not have a causal interpretation, and as such does not recover
any fundamental parameter of labor supply or labor demand. Although I view an increase
in SHARE as primarily a labor demand driven phenomenon (reduced demand for routine-
intensive/manufacturing, middle-paying occupations that drives some adults into lower-paying
occupations), 3 will be determined by a combination of labor demand parameters (elasticity of
substitution between teens and adults) and labor supply parameters (elasticity of employment
participation for teens and adults). Since I do not have a plausibly excludable instrument for
labor demand or labor supply, I cannot separately identify these parameters.
An increase in SHARE can be interpreted as coming from two labor-demand side explana-
tions: either an increase in labor demand for lower-paying occupations, or a decrease in demand
for middle-paying occupations, pushing some adults into lower-paying occupations. Given that
I document a decrease in wages associated with higher values of SHARE, and that changes in
SHARE are positively associated with the amount of computer-substitutable labor used in an
area in 1980 (see section 5), increasing values of SHARE are most consistent with a reduction
in labor demand for middle-paying occupations.
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Another concern with the interpretation of equation 3.1 is that a larger share of adults work
in lower-paying occupations in some areas because local teen employment rates are lower in
these areas-that is, causality may run in the opposite direction. I view this as unlikely, because
although most employed teens work in lower-paying occupations, teens actually occupy only a
small fraction of these jobs: in the 2000 Census, only 7% of all bottom-quartile occupations are
held by teens.
Table 3.3 displays estimates of equation 3.1. Panel A estimates the relationship between
employment growth at the bottom of the occupational wage distribution and the fraction of
individuals who report being employed in the previous week. Panel B reports the same re-
lationship, using average log wages as the dependent variable. The baseline specification is
reported in columns 1 and 2. In this specification, equation 3.1 is estimated at the state-year
level using Census and ACS data from 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2005, and includes state and year
fixed effects, but no additional controls. The coefficients from this baseline specification imply
that a 1 percentage-point increase in the share of adults employed in the bottom quartile of
the occupational distribution is associated with a 1.2 percentage point lower teenage employ-
ment rate, has no association with adult employment rates, would is associated with 1 percent
lower teen wages and 3 percent lower adult wages6. Teen and adult estimates are statistically
different from each other. To put these magnitudes in perspective, referring back to table 1,
the fraction of native adults employed in the bottom quartile increased by around 1 percentage
point nationally (and on average, across states), between 1990 and 2005.
One concern is that within-state changes in the polarization measure may be correlated
with other time-varying state characteristics. A potential solution is to include state-specific
time effects (columns 3 and 4). The estimated relationship between SHARE and teen and
adult labor market outcomes is now larger in magnitude, and the coefficient on SHARE in
employment regressions for adults and teens are no longer statistically different from each other.
However, inference is limited by standard errors that are much larger than before: adding state-
specific time trends reduces the remaining variation in the employment share measure by almost
6As discussed above, the negative association between low-skilled adult wages and SHARE is partly mechan-
ical, since an increase in SHARE implies that a larger share of adults are employed in traditionally lower-paying
occupations. However, the relationship between SHARE and low-skilled adult wages only for those in bottom-
quartile occupations is similar in magnitude to that for the entire sample of low-skilled adults.
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60%. To exploit additional geographic variation, I estimate equation 3.1 at the commuting zone
level. Commuting zones (CZs) are a geographical distinction most recently used by (Autor and
Dorn 2007), and divide the entire country into 741 groups based on commuting patterns7 .
Hence, CZs provide significantly more identifying variation than when estimating at the state
level, and unlike MSAs, CZs are defined for the entire countrys.
Columns 5 and 6 display estimates of equation 3.1 when estimated at the CZ level rather
than the state level. The coefficients are estimated more precisely than when estimated at the
state level. Again, employment effects for teens are larger than for adults, and wage effects
for adults exceed those for teens. Point estimates are uniformly smaller in magnitude than
when estimated at the state level. One possible explanation for this is that using finer levels
of geography increases measurement error in the estimates of employment shares, attenuating
coefficient estimates towards zero9. I attempt to correct for this by randomly splitting the
Census sample into two groups, calculating the CZ-year level employment share measure for
each group, and using one estimate to instrument for the other. These estimates are presented
in columns 7 and 8, and the magnitude of the point estimates are larger than in OLS estimation
(the exception is employment effects for high school dropout adults).
Regression results reported in columns 9 and 10 add CZ-specific time trends, and columns
11 and 12 additionally include a host of CZ-level demographic variables1 o. The inclusion of
CZ-specific time trends implies much larger employment effects than before: a one percentage
point increase in the polarization rate is associated with a 2.3 percentage point reduction in teen
employment rates, and a 1 percentage point reduction in adult rates. Teen employment effects
are still significantly different from adult effects, although now there is no statistical difference
between wage effects. An F-test for the joint significance of the CZ-specific time trends (not
reported) rejects the hypothesis that they are all equal to zero, and so they are included for
7Commuting zones were first defined by (Tolbert and Killian 1987) and updated by (Tolbert and Sizer 1996).
SThere are some complications when estimating at the commuting zone level using Census data, as some
PUMAs cross commuting zones. Details of how I deal with this and related issues are provided in the data
appendix.
SFor instance, (Aydemir and Borjas 2005) argue that sample size issues are one explanation for why estimates
of the labor market effects of immigration may be smaller when estimated at smaller units of geography.
1'The included variables are the share of the adult population that is: without a high school degree, with some
college, male, white, black, hispanic, immigrant, immigrant (conditional on being without a high school degree),
and the log of the number of people in the CZ.
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the remainder of the analysis. Including additional demographic variables as controls makes
little difference above the inclusion of time-trends, and regardless, some of the controls may
themselves be endogenously affected by polarization (for instance, the educational distribution
or the immigrant share of the population).
These regressions demonstrate a strong and negative relationship between SHARE and
teen employment rates and wages. However, it is also useful to understand the amount by
which teens are displaced due to polarization-that is, for every 100 additional adults observed
employed in lower-paying occupations, how many fewer teens are employed? To answer, this,
I estimate an analog to equation 3.1, using the log of the number of employed teens as the
dependent variable, and the log of the number of adults employed in lower-quantile occupations
as the regressor of interest (controlling for the log of the number of teens and adults in the CZ
and including CZ and year dummies, and CZ-specific time trends as additional controls). A one
percent increase in the number of adults in lower-paying occupations is estimated to reduce the
number of employed teens by 1.25%, and the estimate is highly significant. On average (across
CZs and years), 50,800 adults and 2,900 teens are employed in a CZ at the time of the Census.
Hence, for every 100 additional adults in lower-paying occupations, 7 fewer teens are observed
to be employed: polarization displaces teens, but displacement is far from one-to-one11 . This
displacement estimate is in fact quite similar to that estimated in (Smith 2008a) in the context
of immigration, which found that 4 fewer teens are employed for every 100 additional low-skilled
immigrants who live in a city.
3.3.2 Robustness of findings
Table 3.4 explores the robustness of these findings to the definition of lower paying occupations
and the time periods used in the analysis. Columns 1 and 2 repeat the CZ-level estimates from
the previous table, including CZ-level covariates and CZ-specific time trends. In columns 3
and 4, I report estimates of equation 3.1 where the share of adults employed in lower-paying
occupations is defined as the share in occupations in the lower decile of the distribution rather
than the lower quantile. The relationship between the share of adults employed in the lower
11A one percent increase in the number of adults in lower-paying occupations is, on average, an increase of 508
adults. A 1.25% decrease in the number of employed teens is, on average, 36, so every 100 additional adults is
associated with about 7 fewer employed teens.
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decline of occupations and employment rates is larger in magnitude than the estimates from
columns 1 and 2, though the estimates are statistically indistinguishable.
The relationship between adult employment polarization and employment rates is stronger
in the 1990-2005 period (columns 7 and 8) than in the 1980-2000 period (columns 5 and 6).
Since the hollowing out of the middle of the occupational distribution did not strongly develop
until the 1990-2000 period, estimates from this later period may be more accurate for predicting
the impact of continuing polarization on youth employment.
3.3.3 Effects by race, gender, and family background
Table 3.5 presents estimates of equation 3.1, estimated separately by gender, race, and fam-
ily income (whether the teen's family is in the upper or lower quartile of the family income
distribution). I consider three labor market outcomes: employment rates, the log of the em-
ployment rate, and the log of average wages. I include the log of the employment rate as an
additional outcome of interest, since (given differences in overall employment rates) an equiv-
alent percentage-point effect represents a larger percentage effect for blacks or hispanics than
whites, for females than males, and for lower-income families than higher-income families.
The association between SHARE and employment rates is somewhat larger in magnitude-
both in percentage point, and percentage, terms-for females than for males. This is consistent
across races, although standard errors are to large to statistically distinguish the estimates from
each other. This is consistent with the observation from Figure 3.4c that females tend to work
in lower-paying occupations than males do.
The magnitude of the relationship between SHARE and employment rates is similar across
races and teens from higher and lower income families. However, since employment rates tend
to be lower for minority youth and youth from lower-income families, this represents a larger
percentage impact for these groups; for instance, a one percentage point increase in SHARE is
associated with a reduction in black male employment rates by 2.4 percentage points and white
employment rates by 2.15 percentage points, but a 15 percent reduction in black employment
rates versus a 6.6 percent reduction in white male employment rates. These differences are
somewhat surprising, given the similarity in occupational distributions across races and family
background (Figures 4a and 4b), and present an interesting question for future research.
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3.3.4 Interpretation of findings
So far, this analysis has focused on documenting the relationship between employment growth
in lower-paying occupations and labor market outcomes. Since I estimate both negative wage
and employment effects, it seems plausible that growth in lower tail employment is driven by
an increase in labor supply to these jobs, rather than an increase in labor demand for these
sorts of occupations. The next section formalizes this hypothesis within a model of local labor
markets and considers the impact of a particular form of skill-biased technical change, which
reduces demand for routine tasks while leaving demand for manual tasks relatively unchanged.
Section 3.5 then tests implications of the model by exploring correlates of the employment
share in lower-paying occupations and other CZ-level demographic and industrial structure
characteristics.
3.4 Interpretation of Results Within a Theoretical Framework
A stronger theoretical framework is necessary for interpreting the previous findings. A natural
baseline is starting from a model of local labor markets similar to that used in (Autor and
Dorn 2007). In their model, local economies produce two outputs, goods and services. Services
are produced using a single labor input-manual labor-and goods are produced with computer
capital, labor used in routine tasks, and labor used in abstract tasks. They assume that
computer capital and routine labor are perfectly substitutable, and both are complementary in
production with abstract labor. Less-educated individuals can supply labor to either routine
or manual tasks, while more educated individuals supply labor to abstract tasks. The authors
demonstrate that within this framework, a reduction in computing costs reduces demand for
routine labor and increases demand for abstract labor due to the nature of complementarity
and substitutability between these types of labor and computer capital. Demand for manual
labor actually increases (as does the real wage for manual labor), as some of the extra income
accruing to suppliers of abstract labor is spent on services.
I closely follow the basic framework of their model, but modify it in a few key ways to pro-
vide a tractable framework for understanding the relationship between changes in employment
and wages for teens and adults and changes in the share of adults employed in lower wage
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occupations: I include teens in the production of services, I assume that production of services
exhibits diminishing marginal returns in labor, and I allow the labor supply of low-skilled adults
and teens to be elastically supplied. Further, I consider how the wages of all low-skilled adults
(rather than just the wages of those who specialize in manual or routine labor) will respond to
a change in the price of computing.
To begin, I assume that services in a local labor market are produced with teen labor (T)
and adult manual labor (LM). Teen and adult manual are perfectly substitutable, and there
are decreasing marginal returns to labor within service production:
Ys = as(astT + asmLm)± (3.2)
Goods are produced with computer capital (K), routine labor (LR), and abstract labor
(LA). I assume that computer capital and routine labor are perfectly substitutable, and assume
that the production of goods is Cobb-Douglas, using the routine labor/capital aggregate and
abstract labor as inputs:
Y, = ag(arLr + K)/3 LA-a (3.3)
For simplicity, I drop the efficiency parameters ag, as, though I retain ast and asm to
indicate the potential for differential wages between teens and adults who supply manual labor.
I retain a, because (assuming it varies across states or CZs) it provides a production-driven
explanation for geographic variation in the share of labor in routine tasks. The Cobb-Douglas
parameter 3, and 6, may range from 0 to 1.
All skilled adults (defined as those with some college education) provide abstract labor
inelastically. Each low-skilled adult i is endowed with one unit of manual labor and 7i units of
routine labor, which, if supplied, they supply to either manual or routine tasks. Individual i*,
for whom Wm = 77!wr, will be indifferent between providing labor to either routine or manual
tasks. All other low-skilled individuals will specialize by providing labor to one task or the
other: low-skilled individual i, if choosing to work, will exclusively provide labor to manual
tasks as long as wm > U7iwr, and will otherwise provide labor to routine tasks.
Low-skilled individual i supplies labor provided that the wage he receives exceeds his reser-
vation wage Ri. I assume that Ri has a continuous distribution, and may or may not be
correlated with an individual's efficiency at routine tasks qi. For the simple points I am trying
to demonstrate with this model, I do not make any further distributional assumptions about
Ri or about the joint distribution of Ri and ri. The nature of the distribution of Ri will define
the employment participation elasticity of labor supply for low-skilled individuals CL = log L
where L = 1 (wi > Ri), wi = max(l7iwr, win) and WL is the average wage paid to low-skilled
labor (i.e. the labor-weighted average of wages to manual and routine labor). Youth labor
supply decisions are made in a similar manner, though they supply labor only to services:
ET = ng where LT = 1 (WT > Ri).
Labor is paid its marginal product:
WT = psastS(astT + OsmLm) - 1  (3.4)
Wm = Pscsmi(astT + asmLm) - 1
p _ pg3(arLr + K)-'L1A
ar Or
WA = pg(1- )(Lr +K)LA
where p is the exogenously determined cost of capital, and p, and pg are the endogenously
determined prices for services and goods 12
The average wage paid to low-skilled labor is:
IWL = ¢flWr + (1 - ¢)Wm (3.5)
where 
€ is the fraction of employed low-skilled individuals supplying labor to routine tasks,
1 - 4 is the fraction supplying labor to manual tasks, and ? is the average 7 for individuals who
supply routine labor.
For interpreting the results from the previous section, it is interesting to consider what
this models suggests as potential causes of increasing low-skilled labor in service occupations,
and the effects of this on the employment and average wages of low-skilled adults and teens.
12Prices for goods and services can be defined in terms of other model parameters and variables by specifying
consumers' utility function. For purposes of this model-demonstrating that the wages of low-skilled individuals
can fall while the share of adults in lower-paying (service) occupations increases-solving for prices in terms of
other model parameters is an unnecessary complication. For an example of how to solve such a mode, see (Autor
and Dorn 2007), which assumes a Cobb-Douglas utility function over goods and services.
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As in (Autor and Dorn 2007), I consider the implications of an exogenous reduction in the
price of computer equipment (capital) p. A reduction in the price of computer capital directly
reduces wages for routine tasks, since labor for routine tasks and computer capital are perfect
substitutes. This reduces the share of low-skilled labor in routine tasks, and increases the
share in manual tasks. At the same time, wages for high-skilled individuals increase due to
complementarities between high-skilled labor and routine task input. The authors demonstrate
that, in their model, real wages for manual task input actually increase due to rising income from
higher-skilled workers, despite the increase in labor supply to service occupations from lower-
skilled workers. The unambiguity of this result depends, however, on modeling the production
of services as a linear function of labor. If the production of service goods has diminishing
marginal productivity in manual labor, the impact of falling computer costs (a reduction in p)
on wages for manual-task input is ambiguous. To see this, note that:
0 log wm logT (3.6)(3.6)8 log p 0 log p
Slog p astT + asmLm 8st log p astT + asmLm 8s log
Autor and Dorn (2007) show that this first term can be negative as rising incomes of high-skilled
individuals pushes up the price of services. The sign of the second term depends on whether
teen wages increase or decrease. This term will be negative if teen wages decrease, since a
decrease in p will then decrease T. The sign of the last term will be positive, provided that
more low-skilled labor switches to manual tasks from routine tasks than exit the labor market.
This last term-an increase in the amount of low-skilled labor provided to manual tasks-is
what enables a decline in the wage for teens and manual labor in response to a reduction in
the price of computer equipment. If the magnitude of this term is greater than the sum of the
first two, then teen wages or wages to adults in manual tasks can fall in response to a fall in
computing costs.
In the context of the model presented here, a reduction in the price of computing capital (a
reduction in p):
. reduces the wage for routine tasks, causing some low-skilled labor to shift from routine
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to manual tasks.
* may increase or decrease teen wages, depending on the magnitude of the increase in ser-
vice prices, the extent to which service production exhibits diminishing marginal returns,
parameters at, and ams, and the labor supply elasticity of teen and adult low-skilled
labor. If teen wages fall, then the youth employment rate will also fall.
* may increase or decrease wages for adult manual tasks (for the same reasons as why the
effect on teen wages is ambiguous).
* may increase or decrease average wages (and hence, labor supply participation) for low-
skilled adults. The change in average low-skilled adult wages in response to a change in
p is:
OL = (9 wr - Wm) + + W (1-•) (3.7)Odp Op Op Op
Provided the average wage to routine jobs exceeds that for manual jobs, the first term is
positive, since a reduction in the cost of computing reduces the share of employed low-
skilled individuals supplying labor to routine jobs. The wage paid to routine labor falls,
so the average 7i of remaining individuals who supply labor to routine jobs will be higher
than before-so the second term is ambiguous. The sign of the third term depends on
whether wages to those supplying labor for manual tasks increases or decreases. Hence,
average wages for low-skilled workers may increase or decrease, and aggregate low-skilled
labor supply may then either increase or decrease as well.
This model implies that reductions in the cost of routine-task-replacing capital (such as
computers) reduces labor demand for routine tasks. In response, more low-skilled individuals
supply labor to manual jobs, leading to an increase in the share of adults in lower-paying occu-
pations. This potentially reduces the wages of teens due to decreasing returns in the production
of services, and potentially reduces the wages of low-skilled adults due to the reduction of wages
for both manual and routine tasks. According to this model, an increase in the number of adults
in lower-paying occupations-and an accompanying reduction in teen employment-stems from
a reduction in demand for low-skilled labor in more routine tasks. Again, the fundamental force
behind these changes is a reduction in the cost of computing.
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One testable implication of this model is that the share of adults in lower-paying occupations
is likely to increase more in areas for which a greater share of labor is initially used in routine
tasks. To see this, note first that wages to routine labor for individual i are 7-j, and this is
greater in areas with lower a, (assuming that all other model parameters are uncorrelated with
ar). Provided that service production as a function of low-skilled labor is sufficiently concave
(i.e. 6 is sufficiently large), then areas with lower ar will also have have higher routine wages
relative to manual wages (relative to areas with higher aO). Routine wages will fall more in
these areas as p falls, since =(P/ar)  . Again, provided 6 is sufficiently large, routine
wages relative to manual wages will fall by more in these areas, and the share of the low-
skilled population in manual (service) occupations will also increase by more. The next section
considers this, and explores other factors that may be associated with changes in the share of
adults in lower-paying occupations as well.
3.5 CZ-level Characteristics Associated With Growth in Lower-
paying Employment
The purpose of this section is to gain a better understanding of the driving forces behind in-
creases in the share of adults in lower paying occupations-and in particular, why this varies
across geographic areas. In particular, the goal of this section is to estimate the relationship
between changes in SHARE (and teen employment rates) and area-level variables associated
with having a larger share of the population that is vulnerable to displacement by comput-
ers. Identifying such a relationship will provide suggestive evidence that a technology-driven
reduction in demand for middle-paying occupations has driven adults into lower-paying occu-
pations and increased competitive pressures in the lower-skill labor market (thus reducing teen
employment rates).
The preceeding model and discussion suggests one such variable-a measure of how inten-
sively a local economy uses routine labor relative to manual labor. As described in the previous
section, SHARE may increase more in areas that traditionally used routine labor more heavily.
A related argument, which is somewhat more intuitive, though outside the scope of the model,
is that a greater share of low-skilled labor may shifts to more manual-intensive (lower-paying)
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occupations in areas which more heavily utilized routine labor in the past, since there is more
low-skilled labor in these areas that can potentially be substituted with cheaper capital (and,
the monetary savings are greater for doing so).
I measure a CZ's use of routine task input relative to manual task input (RTI) by using a
measure identical to that proposed and used in (Autor and Dorn 2007), which can be thought of
as a proxy for the aggregate amount of labor supplied to routine tasks relative to that supplied
to manual tasks. The measure is formed by first estimating the "routine-intensiveness" and
"manual-intensiveness" of labor within a CZ. Following (Autor and Dorn 2007) (which forms
estimates of routine and manual intensiveness by following the methodology described in (Autor,
Levy and Murnane 2003)), I estimate the routine-task intensiveness of a given occupation by
averaging the occupation's requirement for routine motor tasks (as defined by requirements for
"finger dexterity") and routine cognitive tasks (as defined by requirements for setting "limits,
tolerances, and standards"). The requirements of each occupation for these and other skills
has been graded on a scale of 0 to 10 by the US Department of Labor and is provided in
their Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT). I take the hours-weighted sum of this variable
as a proxy for the "routine-task intensiveness" of employment in a CZ. To proxy "manual-
task intensiveness," I take the hours-weighted sum of occupations' demand for "eye-hand-foot
coordination" within a CZ. The ratio of this estimated aggregate routine to manual labor input
is a proxy for the aggregate intensity that routine tasks are utilized relative to manual tasks in
any CZ. Hence, a CZ with a higher RTI more intensively uses routine tasks relative to manual
tasks. I normalize this measure to have a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1 in 1980. In a
given year, CZs that more intensively use routine labor have a smaller share of the employed
adult population in lower-paying occupations 3 .
To test the hypothesis that CZs with more routine-intensive employment may have experi-
enced a greater increase in the share of all adults employed in lower-paying occupations (since
a larger share of the workforce could be impacted by labor-replacing computers), column 1 of
Table 3.6 displays estimates from a regression of the change in SHARE between 1980 and 2005
on the CZ-level estimate of RTI in 1980, along with other demographic characteristics in 1980.
'
3 The coefficient on a CZ-year level regression of SHARE on RTI and year and CZ dummy variables is -.019
with a standard error of .001; a one-standard deviation in RTI is associated with a 1.9 percentage point lower
value of SHARE.
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CZs that more intensively utilized routine labor relative to manual labor in 1980 experienced
larger growth in lower-paying occupational employment - a one standard deviation increase in
RTI is associated with a 1.3 percentage point increase in the share of adults employed in lower
paying occupations.
CZs with a larger share of the population employed in manufacturing industries uses routine
labor more intensively (the coefficient on a regression of the share in manufacturing on SHARE,
along with year and CZ dummies, is .041 with a standard error of .002). Hence, it could be
that a secular decline in manufacturing-rather than a reduction in the cost of routine-task
substituting technology-is responsible for the increase in SHARE. Indeed, column 2 shows
that SHARE fell more in CZs for which a larger share of the population was employed in
manufacturing in 1980. However, when the 1980 manufacturing share is entered simultaneously
with RTI, RTI remains significant and its coefficient remains unchanged in magnitude, while the
coefficient on the share in manufacturing falls and is insignificant (column 3). Hence, it appears
that the relative intensity of routine-task input, rather than the importance of manufacturing
in a CZ, is a stronger predictor of future employment growth in lower-paying occupations.
Since a greater share of adults work in lower-paying occupations in areas where routine
tasks were used more intensively or a greater share of the workforce was in manufacturing in
1980, teen employment might also be expected to have fallen by more in these areas. Columns
4-6 display estimates from regressions of changes in teen employment rates between 1980 and
2005 on changes in RTI and the share employed in manufacturing in 1980. A one standard
deviation increase in RTI is associated with a 1.5 percentage point reduction in teen employ-
ment between 1980 and 2005, and when the share in manufacturing and the value of RTI in
1980 are simultaneously entered, the predictive power falls entirely on RTI. However, there is
essentially no relationship between changes in teen real log wages and either RTI or the share in
manufacturing. One explanation is that over this 25 year period, there is a significant amount of
positive self-selection as youth with higher earnings ability are more likely to remain employed,
thus mitigating the observed association between SHARE and teen wages.
3.6 Conclusion
Historically low teen employment rates may be explained by a combination of labor supply
and labor demand factors. Greater returns to high school and college education raise the
opportunity costs to working both during the school year and summer, and may reduce teen
labor supply. Simultaneously, increased availability of substitutable labor (immigrants, EITC
or welfare-eligible natives, and low-skilled native adults) may have reduced demand for youth
labor. Consistent with this possibility, this paper has shown that a portion of the fall in teen
employment may be due to increased labor market competition from native adults. The share
of adults employed in lower-paying occupations increased more-and teen employment rates
fell more-in areas where routine tasks were used more intensively in 1980. This is consistent
with routine-task replacing technology (computers) displacing native adults into lower-paying
service occupations, which exerted pressures in the lower-skill labor market and negatively
affected youth employment and wages.
This paper is therefore one of the first to provide evidence of negative labor market conse-
quences due to employment polarization on workers whose jobs may not be directly replacable
by the technological forces behind overall polarization. Teens tend to work in lower-paying ser-
vice occupations, and the share of adults in lower-paying occupations has increased somewhat
over the past few decades. The actual labor supply reallocation across occupations due to this
polarization has not yet been severe-the share of all employed adults in lower-paying occupa-
tions has only increased by a percentage point or two since 1990. Hence, the direct impact on
youth employment rates is not dramatic. Given the coefficient estimates from Table 3.3, youth
employment rates may have been one to four percentage points higher in 2005 if not for adult
employment polarization since 199014.
Nonetheless, the continued polarization of the adult labor market creates an additional
pressure on the youth labor market, and may be expected to continue doing so. For this
reason, it should be considered along other labor demand-related explanations for continuing
declines in youth employment. The long-term welfare consequences for youth from greater
14A 1% increase in SHARE is associated with between a 1 and 4 percentage point decrease in teen employment
rates, depending on included covariates and included years. Across CZs, SHARE increased by 1 percentage on
average between 1990 and 2005.
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labor market competition in the low-skilled labor market depend on the long-term returns to
employment while young, and on what youth do if they are not employed. Academic evidence
on the first point is mixed, and there is little evidence regarding the second. However, since
this paper demonstrates that increasing polarization in the adult labor market may be expected
to negatively impact teen employment, this-along with Smith (2008)-provides evidence that
greater labor market competition from adults explains at least a portion of the recent decline in
teen employment. A downward shift in labor supply, due to an increased emphasis on schooling,
may be part of the explanation-but it is not the entire one.
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Data Appendix
I use 5% extracts of the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Censuses, and the 2005 American Community
Survey, from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS). Throughout the analysis,
I limit the sample to the native-born, who I define as all citizens who do not report being
born abroad. Adults are defined as those 19-64. Teens are defined as those 16 and 17. I
exclude 18 year olds, as some may be in high school and some may be old enough to have
graduated. I collapse employment and wage statistics to the state or commuting zone level,
weighting individual data by the Census sampling weight. Regressions are all weighted by the
sum of individual sampling weights for the state or commuting zone, for the relevant sample
(i.e. either the sum of sampling weights for all native teens or all native adults). Low-skilled
adults are defined as those without a high school degree.
I divide individuals into commuting zones based on the procedure used in (Autor and
Dorn 2007), and as originally defined in (Tolbert and Killian 1987) and (Tolbert and Sizer 1996).
The smallest consistent geographic unit in the Census is the public use microarea (PUMA), but
PUMAs sometimes cross commuting zones. To deal with this complication (again, following
Autor and Dorn 2007), I reweight individual observations within a PUMA by the fraction of
the population that lives in a particular commuting zone. For instance, if an individual reports
living in a PUMA that crosses two commuting zones, and exactly half of the PUMA population
lives in each commuting zone, then the individual is recorded as living in each commuting zone,
but his weight is multiplied by one-half.
To determine an occupation's place in the 1980 wage distribution-in a manner consistent
with reporting from later Censuses-I use the IPUMS recode of individual occupations' into
a 1990-consistent coding (I further reclassify some occupations that are only observed in one
sample by merging them with related occupations). I then rank occupations by their median
wage in 1980 (where wage is defined as an individual's annual earnings divided by weeks worked
time usual hours worked per week). I then determine each occupation's percentile in the hours-
weighted distribution of all jobs in 1980.
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Table 3.1 - Share of employment in all occupations in the lower quartile of the 1980 occupational wage distribution
Employment share, 1990 Employment share, 2005 Change in employment share,
1990-2005
Nat. CZ CZ CZ Nat. CZ CZ CZ Nat. CZ CZ CZ
mean min. max. mean min. max. mean min. max.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
All adults:
All
All
All
Native adults:
No high school degree
No high school degree
No high school degree
At least some college
At least some college
At least some college
Native teens:
Males and females
Females
Males
Males and females
Females
Males
Males and females
Females
Males
Males and females
Females
Males
Males and females
Females
Males
Note: Estimates represent the share of each group (conditional on being employed in the last week) in an occupation whose median wage is less
than or equal to the 25th percentile in the hours-weighted distribution of occupations' 1990 median wages. 1990 data is from the 1990 IPUMS
Census public use sample, and 2005 data is from the 2005 IPUMS American Community Use survey public use sample. State mean is the
population weighted mean of employment shares or changes in shares across states; state minimum and state maximum are the minimum and
maximum of employment shares or changes in shares across states.
125
0.250
0.337
0.169
0.241
0.329
0.158
0.400
0.610
0.244
0.167
0.217
0.119
0.752
0.757
0.747
0.255
0.345
0.172
0.244
0.333
0.161
0.398
0.601
0.250
0.171
0.221
0.123
0.746
0.754
0.739
0.196
0.257
0.116
0.182
0.233
0.114
0.280
0.460
0.134
0.120
0.147
0.079
0.538
0.555
0.448
0.413
0.554
0.388
0.412
0.554
0.388
0.613
0.792
0.495
0.332
0.383
0.325
0.893
0.963
0.880
0.267
0.350
0.190
0.252
0.332
0.174
0.416
0.648
0.243
0.199
0.246
0.150
0.777
0.855
0.699
0.269
0.354
0.190
0.251
0.331
0.174
0.416
0.639
0.248
0.200
0.246
0.150
0.770
0.849
0.692
0.212
0.279
0.090
0.192
0.231
0.090
0.045
0.000
0.000
0.132
0.147
0.068
0.387
0.339
0.134
0.418
0.516
0.352
0.388
0.496
0.341
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.337
0.439
0.341
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.017
0.013
0.020
0.011
0.003
0.016
0.017
0.038
-0.001
0.032
0.029
0.030
0.025
0.098
-0.048
0.014
0.009
0.017
0.008
-0.001
0.013
0.016
0.038
-0.002
0.029
0.025
0.028
0.025
0.096
-0.047
-0.107
-0.121
-0.134
-0.106
-0.120
-0.145
-0.401
-0.646
-0.451
-0.074
-0.117
-0.117
-0.409
-0.508
-0.713
0.084
0.087
0.125
0.075
0.095
0.118
0.525
0.369
0.696
0.106
0.192
0.139
0.277
0.340
0.362
Table 3.2 - Means and Standard Deviations Across CZs for Select Variables
1980 1990 2000 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Employment to population ratio:
All native adults
Native adults without a HS degree
Native adults with some college
Native teens
Average real log wages:
All native adults
Native adults without a HS degree
Native adults with some college
Native teens
Other CZ-level statistics:
SHARE (P25)
SHARE (P10)
Share of employed adult population
in manuf. industries
Share of employed adult population
RTI
Teen share of population
Teen share of employed population
0.690
(0.045)
0.556
0.055
0.780
0.034
0.314
0.075
2.055
(0.104)
1.914
(0.110)
2.205
(0.096)
1.327
(0.048)
0.261
(0.039)
0.124
(0.039)
0.231
(0.084)
0.121
(0.016)
0.000
(1.000)
0.042
(0.005)
0.020
(0.004)
0.740
(0.046)
0.525
0.063
0.813
0.033
0.322
0.080
2.030
(0.142)
1.761
(0.119)
2.167
(0.135)
1.132
(0.090)
0.244
(0.040)
0.111
(0.033)
0.182
(0.067)
0.125
(0.017)
-0.020
(0.833)
0.030
(0.005)
0.013
(0.003)
0.742
(0.044)
0.508
0.062
0.803
0.033
0.316
0.089
2.093
(0.133)
1.726
(0.080)
2.222
(0.131)
1.220
(0.061)
0.242
(0.034)
0.129
(0.025)
0.152
(0.062)
0.135
(0.020)
-0.400
(0.649)
0.030
(0.005)
0.013
(0.004)
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0.727
(0.039)
0.491
0.070
0.778
0.031
0.260
0.090
2.123
(0.181)
1.705
(0.126)
2.257
(0.179)
1.159
(0.125)
0.251
(0.033)
0.131
(0.022)
0.129
(0.055)
0.147
(0.020)
-0.687
(0.583)
0.031
(0.004)
0.011
(0.004)
Notes: Estimates are means across commuting zones, weighted by the population count for
the commuting zone. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Table 3.3 - Relat. between emp. rates and wages and the share of the adult native population in lower wage occupations, 1980-2005
Teens HSD Teens HSD Teens HSD Teens HSD Teens HSD Teens HSD
Adults Adults Adults Adults Adults Adults
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel A: Dependent Variable - Fraction employed last week
SHARE -1.235 0.031 -1.903 -1.099 -0.790 -0.062 -0.967 -0.043 -1.949 -0.838 -2.345 -0.970
(0.473) (0.268) (0.567) (0.637) (0.170) (0.087) (0.213) (0.101) (0.400) (0.293) (0.438) (0.247)
F-stat 8.17 2.12 16.28 16.50 13.41 10.83
p-value 0.01 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R2 adjusted 0.787 0.842 0.918 0.909 0.727 0.781 0.721 0.781 0.840 0.855 0.841 0.875
N 204 204 204 204 2964 2964 2964 2964 2964 2964 2964 2964
Panel B: Dependent Variable - Average log wage
SHARE -0.988 -2.930 -2.646 -3.114 -0.469 -1.952 -0.469 -2.197 -1.907 -2.080 -1.817 -1.718
(0.522) (0.402) (0.720) (0.513) (0.200) (0.177) (0.264) (0.209) (0.593) (0.416) (0.709) (0.481)
F-stat 8.14 0.57 38.49 34.24 0.10 0.02
p-value 0.01 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.89
R2 adjusted 0.849 0.925 0.911 0.968 0.702 0.868 0.703 0.862 0.752 0.914 0.771 0.926
N 204 204 204 204 2964 2964 2964 2964 2964 2964 2964 2964
Level of observations STATE STATE STATE STATE CZ CZ CZ CZ CZ CZ CZ CZ
Split-sample IV X X X X X X
Area-specific time trends X X X X X X
Area-level controls X X
Note: Estimates are coefficients on the share of adults in occupations from the bottom quartile of the wage distribution of occupations in
1980, from a state-year or commuting zone-year level regression of employment rates or average wages on the share in lower wage
occupations, state and year fixed effects, and additional controls. Regressions use Census data from 1980, 1990, 2000, and ACS data from
2005. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis, and are clustered at the state level. The estimated F-stat and p-value are statistics for
testing the equality of coefficients for teens and adults, and were estimated from pooled regressions including both the teen and adult
sample.
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Table 3.4 - Robustness of results to the definition of the share employed in low wage occupations, 1980-2005
Teens HSD Teens HSD Teens HSD Teens HSD
Adults Adults Adults Adults
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Dependent Variable - Fraction employed last week
SHARE (P25)
SHARE (P10)
F-stat
p-value
R2 adjusted
SHARE (P25)
SHARE (P10)
F-stat
p-value
R2 adjusted
N
-2.345 -0.970
(0.438) (0.247)
10.84
0.00
0.841 0.875
2964 2964
-3.403 -1.378
(0.666) (0.454)
10.41
0.00
0.825 0.868
2964 2964
-1.817 -1.718
(0.709) (0.481)
0.02
0.89
-3.322 -2.256
(1.093) (0.784)
0.87
0.35
0.771 0.926 0.752 0.924
2964 2964 2964 2964
-1.951 -0.794
(0.413) (0.261)
6.27
0.01
0.893 0.921
2223 2223
-2.948 -2.553
(0.703) (0.553)
0.59
0.44
0.845 0.952
2223 2223
-4.007 -1.808
(1.748) (1.258)
2.04
0.15
0.738 0.806
2223 2223
-1.861 -0.973
(2.455) (1.807)
0.09
0.76
0.630 0.830
2223 2223
1980, 1990, 2000, 2005
1980-2000
1990-2005
X X X X
Note: Estimates are coefficients on the share of employed adults in occupations from the bottom quartile of the wage
distribution of occupations in 1980, from a CZ-year level regression of employment rates or average wages on the
share in lower wage occupations, including CZ and year fixed effecs, CZ-specific time effecs, and other CZ-level
controls (see text for full list of controls).
128
Panel B: Dependent Variable - Average log wage
Table 3.5 - Relationship between teen labor market outcomes for various categories of teens and the share of the adult native
population in lower wage occupations, 1980-2005
All teens White teens Black teens Hispanic teens High inc. Low inc.
families families
All Males Females Males Females Males Females Males Females All All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Panel A. Dependent Variable - Fraction employed in the last week
SHARE -2.34 -2.21 -2.47 -2.15 -2.51 -2.43 -3.23 -4.21 -1.89 -2.58 -2.13
(0.44) (0.51) (0.50) (0.54) (0.53) (1.12) (1.35) (1.94) (1.46) (0.69) (0.64)
Mean (1980) 0.31 0.33 0.29 0.36 0.32 0.17 0.14 0.27 0.22 0.37 0.23
Mean (2005) 0.26 0.24 0.28 0.28 0.32 0.13 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.29 0.19
Panel B. Dependent Variable - Log of fraction employed in the last week
SHARE -7.69 -7.34 -8.17 -6.64 -7.03 -15.06 -19.77 -17.44 -8.47 -7.31 -10.15
(1.50) (1.86) (1.71) (1.80) (1.63) (9.94) (9.57) (10.96) (8.33) (2.25) (3.29)
Mean (1980) -1.19 -1.13 -1.27 -1.04 -1.17 -1.86 -2.08 -1.37 -1.60 -1.02 -1.52
Mean (2005) -1.40 -1.48 -1.35 -1.33 -1.21 -2.16 -1.93 -1.91 -1.83 -1.29 -1.81
Panel C. Dependent Variable - Log of average hourly wage
SHARE -1.82 -1.87 -1.71 -2.94 -1.93 -0.68 -2.32 3.22 -1.61 -4.31 -0.89
(0.71) (0.87) (0.94) (1.06) (1.13) (4.64) (4.29) (5.05) (4.51) (1.38) (1.85)
Mean (1980) 1.32 1.35 1.29 1.36 1.29 1.38 1.35 1.38 1.33 1.38 1.28
Mean (2005) 1.16 1.18 1.13 1.18 1.13 1.16 1.06 1.21 1.21 1.23 1.12
Note: Estimates are coefficients on the share of employed adults in occupations from the bottom quartile of the wage distribution of
occupations in 1980, from a CZ-year level regression of the employment rate, the log of the employment rate, or the log of average
wages for the given category of youth on the share in lower wage occupations, including CZ and year fixed effecs, CZ-specific time
effecs, and other CZ-level controls (see text for full list of controls).
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Table 3.6 - Association between the CZ-level share of employed adults in the lower quarter of the occupational distribution and other CZ
characteristics
Dependent Variable: Change in SHARE, 1980-2005 Change in teen employment rate, Change in teen log real wages,
1980-2005 1980-2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
RTI (1980) 0.013 0.013 -0.015 -0.016 -0.001 -0.005(0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008)
Fraction of employed in 0.074 -0.011 -0.096 0.005 0.021 0.051
manuf. occupations (1980) (0.014) (0.017) (0.037) (0.048) (0.057) (0.076)
Fraction male (1980) 0.330 0.122 0.336 -0.932 -0.683 -0.935 0.291 0.338 0.263
(0.095) (0.094) (0.095) (0.263) (0.254) (0.265) (0.416) (0.399) (0.418)
Fraction white (1980) -0.051 -0.049 -0.049 -0.072 -0.074 -0.073 0.001 -0.010 -0.010
(0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.059) (0.061) (0.060) (0.094) (0.095) (0.095)
Fraction black (1980) -0.039 -0.004 -0.039 -0.113 -0.154 -0.113 -0.124 -0.138 -0.125
(0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.111) (0.109) (0.111)
Fraction hispanic (1980) 0.102 0.111 0.098 -0.129 -0.143 -0.127 -0.272 -0.259 -0.255
(0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.045) (0.048) (0.048) (0.072) (0.076) (0.076)
Fraction immigrant (1980) -0.234 -0.116 -0.252 0.730 0.578 0.737 0.044 0.077 0.125
(0.075) (0.081) (0.080) (0.208) (0.218) (0.222) (0.329) (0.342) (0.351)
Fraction of HSD pop. 0.080 0.032 0.091 -0.572 -0.508 -0.577 0.449 0.418 0.398
immigrant (1980) (0.042) (0.046) (0.045) (0.117) (0.125) (0.126) (0.184) (0.196) (0.200)
Fraction HSD (1980) -0.135 -0.180 -0.132 -0.393 -0.338 -0.395 -0.285 -0.281 -0.298
(0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.074) (0.073) (0.075) (0.116) (0.114) (0.118)
Fraction with some college -0.190 -0.092 -0.199 -0.548 -0.670 -0.543 0.060 0.065 0.102
(1980) (0.025) (0.026) (0.029) (0.070) (0.071) (0.081) (0.111) (0.111) (0.127)
Adjusted R2  0.174 0.110 0.173 0.446 0.438 0.445 0.225 0.225 0.225
N 741 741 741 741 741 741 741 741 741
Notes: Regressions are run at the commuting zone level. Standard errors are presented in parenthesis, and are clustered at the
commuting zone level. The dependent variable in regressions for columns (1)-(3) is the change in the share of all employed native adults
employed in the lower quartile of the occupational distribution between 1980 and 2005. The dependent variable in regressions for
columns (4)-(6) is the change in teen employment rates between 1980 and 2005. The dependent variable in regressions for columns (7)-
(9) is the change in teen log real wages between 1980 and 2005. All independent variables are measured in 1980. RTI is relative routine-
task intensity, as defined in the text.
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Figure 3.1: Trends in July Employment-Population Ratio, Adults and Teens
. - ..
1980 1985
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
I
2005
--- Emp. rate, 16-17 - Emp. rate, 18-64
--- - - Ratio of emp. rates
Source: CPS monthly data, NBER extracts.
Figure 3.2 - Changes in Employment Share of an Occupation, by 1980 Wage Levels
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Occupation's Percentile in 1980 Wage Distribution
1980-1990 - 1990-2000
2000-2005
Data source - 1980, 1990, 2000: IPUMS extracts from the U.S. Census.
2005: IPUMS extracts from the American Community Survey.
Figure 3.3a - CDFs of employment share, 1980
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Data source - 1980 IPUMS extracts from the U.S. Census.
Figure 3.3b - CDFs of employment share, 2005
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- - Native teens (16 and 17) ----- Natives without high school degree
All native adults - Natives with at least some college
Data source - 2005 IPUMS extracts from the U.S. Census.
Figure 3.4 - CDF of Teen Employment By Occupation in 2005, Ranked by Percentile in the 1980 Wage Distribution
A. By Race B. By Parental Education
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C. By Gender
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D. By Census Region
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Notes: Graphics are plots of the empirical, non-smoothed CDF of the occupational employment distribution for teens, by race, parental education, gender, and Census
region. Occupations are ranked by their percentile in the hours-weighted adult wage distribution of all occupations in 1980. Data is from the 2005 American Community
Survey.
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Figure 3.5 - Trends in Annual Teen (16-17) Employment-Population Ratio, By Race
A. By Race B. By Parental Education
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Notes: Graphics are plots of the employment-to-population ratio for teens age 16-17, by race, parental education, gender, and Census region. Data is aggregated from
monthly CPS data from the NBER extracts.
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Figure 3.6 - Relationship between change in native teen or adult labor market outcomes and change in
share of employed native adults in lower paying occupations (1980-2005)
A. Teen Employment Rates
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Notes: Low paying occupations are those in the bottom quartile of the hours-weighted wage distribution of occupations in 1980.
1980 data is from the IPUMS public use sample for the 1980 Census.
2005 data Is from the IPUMS public use sample for the American Community Survey.
B. Adult High School Dropout Employment Rates
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Notes: Low paying occupations are those in the bottom quartile of the hours-weighted wage distribution of occupations in 1980.
1980 data is from the IPUMS public use sample for the 1980 Census.
2005 data is from the IPUMS public use sample for the American Community Survey.
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Figure 3.6 - Relationship between change in native teen or adult labor market outcomes and change in
share of employed native adults in lower paying occupations (1980-2005)
C. Teen Average Log Wages
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Change in fraction of adult population employed in lower wage occupations (1980 basis)
Notes: Low paying occupations are those in the bottom quartile of the hours-weighted wage distribution of occupations in 1980.
1980 data is from the IPUMS public use sample for the 1980 Census.
2005 data is from the IPUMS public use sample for the American Community Survey.
D. Adult High School Dropout Log Wages
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